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Abstract  
Taking into account insights into the reality of human decision-making, is an 
important challenge for today’s policymakers. Are there `cheaper´, more efficient 
and possibly as well more effective, non-financial ways of influencing the behaviour 
of private and corporate citizens, nudging them towards socially desired choices, for 
example, in the domain of energy consumption? Can such mechanisms complement 
or substitute for monetary incentives in fostering sustainable decision-making in 
policy relevant areas such as energy consumption? If so, what mechanisms might be 
feasible to implement in actual policymaking? Against this background, the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (Ministerie van Economische Zaken) wants to know 
which “nudges” are the most suitable for application in the field of energy 
conservation. To this end, in this report we 
(1) take stock what is known about the effects of non-monetary incentives in 
general, and legacy reminders in particular, in increasing individuals’ regard for 
collective interests and for intergenerational beneficence, in particular in the domain 
of energy consumption (literature review); 
(2) investigate in a laboratory setting the effects of selected non-monetary 
incentives on a selection of relevant decision tasks (laboratory experiments); and 
(3) apply the insights from the literature review and laboratory experiments to 
specific instruments of policy-making in the Netherlands. 
 
Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Choice Architecture, Nudge, Energy Efficiency 
 
JEL classification: D01, D03, D04 
 
Acknowledgements 
This study is made under the authority of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 2 
 
Inhoud 
 
 
Managementsamenvatting ......................................................................... 4 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................13 
2. Overview of the Current project ........................................................15 
2.1 Contribution of the Current Project.....................................................15 
2.2 Research Approach of the Current Project ..........................................17 
2. 3 Summary of Results of the Current Project ........................................19 
2.3.1 Results from the Literature Review ...............................................19 
2.3.2 Results from the Experimental Studies ..........................................34 
3. Applications to Specific Instruments .................................................41 
3.1 Instruments Targeted at Private Households ...................................41 
3.1.1   Relevant Features of Energy Statements and Smart Meters ......46 
3.1.2   Application of Results from the Literature Study ......................47 
3.1.3   Application of Experimental Results ........................................50 
3.1.4 Example Case Studies: Large-scale Roll-outs of Smart Meters in 
Ireland and Sweden ................................................................................50 
3.2 Instruments Targeted at Firms and Managers .................................53 
3.2.1 Relevant Features of LTAs ..........................................................56 
3.2.2 Applications of Results form the Literature Study .......................57 
3.2.3 Application of Experimental Results ...........................................59 
4. Conclusion .........................................................................................60 
References ..................................................................................................66 
 
 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 3 
Appendix A: Literature Review ..................................................................80 
A.1 Foundations of Human Motivation for Pro-Social Behavior ..............80 
A Psychological Perspective ..................................................................80 
An Economic Perspective ......................................................................84 
A Synthesis of the Psychological and Economic Perspectives ...............85 
A.2 The Role of Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives in Stimulating 
Motivations for Pro-Social Behavior ........................................................86 
The Hidden Costs of Reward .................................................................86 
Internalization ........................................................................................87 
Motivation Crowding Theory.................................................................90 
Preliminary Summary: Effects of Incentives on Motivation ...................90 
Inter-temporale Choice and Time–inconsistent Preferences ...................91 
A.3 The Manager as an Individual who has Decision Making Authority 93 
A.4 From Psychological and Economics Theories to the Practice of Policy-
Making: The Role of Nudges ................................................................. 104 
A.5 Selected nudges in the current project .............................................. 106 
 A.6 Evidence on Effects Sizes of Nudges in Related Areas ................... 117 
 
Appendix B: Detailed Overview of Experimental Studies......................... 119 
B.1: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Legacy Reminders .......... 119 
B.2: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Commitment .................. 128 
B.3: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Norms and Ranking on 
Individual and Managers Pro-Social Behaviour ...................................... 135 
B.4: Experiment Instructions .................................................................. 149 
 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 4 
Managementsamenvatting 
 
Gedragseconomie 
Gedragseconomisch onderzoek stelt de individuele besluitvormer centraal. In aanvulling 
op traditioneel economisch onderzoek wijst de gedragseconomie op de belangrijke rol die 
zowel de motivatie van het individu als de invloed van de omgeving op het individu 
speelt in de besluitvorming. Gedragseconomisch onderzoek wijst uit dat individuen niet 
alleen op financiële prikkels reageren, maar dat hun keuze ook wordt beïnvloed door op 
het eerste oog irrelevante zaken, zoals bijvoorbeeld de volgorde waarin alternatieven 
worden voorgelegd of wanneer dezelfde uitkomst als een winst of verlies wordt 
omschreven. Dit betekent dat de manier waarop beslissingen worden gepresenteerd en 
keuzes worden voorgelegd, de zogenaamde keuzearchitectuur, mede bepalend is voor de 
uitkomst. Afhankelijk van de gekozen keuzearchitectuur zullen bepaalde 
gedragsuitkomsten dus eerder worden geobserveerd dan anderen. Door hier bewust mee 
om te gaan kunnen overheden het gedrag van individuele besluitvormers een zetje 
(nudge) geven in een richting die maatschappelijke wenselijk wordt geacht. In tijden van 
bezuinigingen is het extra belangrijk om te achterhalen of beleidsdoelen ook kunnen 
worden gerealiseerd door middel van deze niet-financiële prikkels. In het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk gebeurt dit al actief. Daar onderzoekt het door David Cameron ingestelde 
Behavioural Insight Team sinds 2010 hoe inzichten van wetenschappelijk onderzoek uit 
de gedragseconomie en de sociale psychologie kunnen worden toegepast op het 
overheidsbeleid en overheidsdiensten.  
 
Onderzoeksvraag en opzet 
De afgelopen tijd zijn er een aantal recente Europese veldstudies geweest op het gebied 
van energiebesparing die suggereren dat er door toepassing van inzichten uit de 
gedragseconomie winst is te behalen in de orde van grootte van 10%. In dit rapport staat 
daarom de vraag centraal welke gedragseconomische inzichten voor de Nederlandse 
overheid een potentieel interessant startpunt kunnen vormen voor het stimuleren van 
duurzame besluitvorming in het algemeen en energiebesparing in het bijzonder. Dit 
onderzoek is inventariserend van karakter. Voor de uiteindelijke toepassing van deze 
inzichten zijn veldexperimenten in de Nederlandse beleidscontext nodig. Voor de 
beantwoording van de onderzoeksvraag is gekozen voor een tweeledige aanpak. 
Enerzijds is een uitgebreid literatuuronderzoek gedaan, waarin theoretisch inzichten en de 
resultaten van relevante experimentele studies en empirische studies op basis van 
velddata zijn verzameld. Anderzijds zijn een aantal laboratoriumexperimenten uitgevoerd 
in aanvulling op de bestaande literatuur. Hierbij is expliciet aandacht besteed aan 
managers (een noviteit in de literatuur), die vanwege hun beslissingsbevoegdheid een 
relatief groot stempel op, bijvoorbeeld, energiegebruik, kunnen drukken.
 
 
 
Resultaten op hoofdlijnen 
Op basis van de literatuur en de resultaten van de experimenten hebben we eerst acht 
gedragseconomische inzichten geïdentificeerd die in de context van duurzame 
besluitvorming/energiebesparing het meest relevant zijn: 
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Inzichten uit de wetenschappelijke literatuur 
Commitment Om duurzaam keuzegedrag in de toekomst vast te leggen, 
werken instrumenten die besluitvormers daartoe vandaag 
committeren. Dergelijke instrumenten zijn vooral effectief 
wanneer er daadwerkelijk (kleine) kosten voor de besluitvormer 
mee verbonden zijn. 
Standaardkeuze
1
 In het ontwerp van een instrument is de uitkomst in geval geen 
besluit wordt genomen van groot belang. Aangezien veel 
besluitvormers niet tot een keuze komen, is de standaardkeuze 
(‘default’) vaak het resultaat. 
Informatie Informatie over duurzaam handelen dient relevant en bondig te 
zijn. 
Feedback Feedback aan de besluitvormer dient tijdig en specifiek te zijn. 
Referentiepunt en 
Sociale normen 
Bij het nemen van een besluit wordt de status quo, eerdere 
keuzes van de besluitvormer en keuzes van een relevante 
referentiegroep meegewogen. Sociale normen zijn een 
potentieel krachtig instrument om duurzaam handelen te 
bewerkstelligen. Daarbij is de keuze van de referentiegroep 
essentieel: besluitvormers worden in sterkere mate beïnvloedt 
door andere die sociaal nabij zijn en tot dezelfde generatie 
behoren. Sociale en/of temporele afstand verkleinen de 
effectiviteit van sociale normen. 
Rangschikking Rangschikking als variatie op sociale normen zijn een 
potentieel krachtig instrument om duurzaam handelen te 
bewerkstelligen. Sociale en/of temporele afstanden verkleinen 
ook de effectiviteit van het maken van een rangorde. Het effect 
van ‘naming and shaming’ lijkt vooral gedreven door de wens 
om de schaamte te vermijden die komt met een lage plek in de 
rangorde. 
Framing Framing is cruciaal: kleine veranderingen in het ontwerp van 
een instrument kunnen een groot effect op de effectiviteit ervan 
uitoefenen. Online informatievoorziening (en feedback) is 
bijvoorbeeld aanzienlijk minder effectief dan offline 
informatieverschaffing. 
Verantwoording Verantwoording lijkt het effect op status en zelfbeeld te 
versterken. Indien verantwoording afgelegd moet worden over 
gemaakte keuzes wordt het effect van sociale normen sterker. 
Dit is vooral relevant voor managers die omwille van hun 
functie verantwoording verschuldigd zijn aan aandeelhouders 
en andere belanghebbenden. 
 
                                               
1  Standaardkeuzes zijn relevant voor duurzame besluitvorming in het algemeen, bijvoorbeeld voor 
instellingen van technische apparatuur, maar niet voor de beleidsinstrumenten die in dit rapport besproken 
worden. 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 6 
In het onderzoek is voor twee beleidsinstrumenten bekeken welke van deze 
gedragseconomische inzichten gegeven de opzet van het instrument het meest interessant 
zijn: 1. de slimme meter en 2. meerjarenafspraken met het bedrijfsleven over energie-
efficiency. 
 
De slimme meter 
Het eerste beleidsinstrument betreft de slimme meter in combinatie met 
tweemaandelijkse overzichten van verbruik en indicatieve kosten of directe feedback via 
een applicatie en/of een beeldscherm met precieze en tijdige informatie over het 
energieverbruik van de huishouding. In abstracto kunnen de tweemaandelijkse 
overzichten en directe feedback via een applicatie/beeldscherm gezien worden als 
informatie-/feedback-, communicatie- en zelfmonitoringinstrument.  
 
Internationaal empirisch onderzoek geeft aan dat van slimme meters met een direct of 
indirect feedback mechanisme een energiebesparing te verwachten valt, waarbij de 
gevonden mate van extra besparing varieert tussen 4% en 12%. Wanneer consumenten 
energiebesparende maatregelen willen treffen is het belangrijk dat aan de slimme meter 
een feedback mechanisme wordt gekoppeld wat duidelijk maakt hoe deze maatregelen 
zich in besparingen vertalen. De frequentie, vorm en waarde van de geboden informatie is 
daarbij een voorname factor die het effect bepaalt. Zo toont onderzoek aan dat online 
verbruiksinformatie, die de verbruiker in staat stelt een vergelijking met een 
referentiegroep te maken, een zwakker effect heeft dan offline informatie. Online 
informatie bereikt bovendien slechts die consumenten die uit zichzelf al meer hechten aan 
duurzaam handelen. Hiernaast toont de literatuur aan dat directe feedback via 
bijvoorbeeld een applicatie/beeldscherm tot hoger energiebesparing leidt dan indirecte 
feedback via bijvoorbeeld schriftelijke tweemaandelijkse overzichten. Zo heeft KEMA 
voor Nederland geraamd dat slimme meters in combinatie met twee maandelijkse 
overzichten (indirecte feedback) of displays (directe feedback) een gemiddelde besparing 
van respectievelijk 3,2% en 6,4% opleveren voor elektriciteit en respectievelijk 3,7% en 
5,1% voor gas.  
 
De empirische bevindingen van het onderzoek bevestigen eerder werk goeddeels. 
Instrumenten die commitment bevorderen zijn volgens internationaal empirische 
onderzoek vooral effectief wanneer het instrument de consument vraagt doelstellingen 
voor energiebesparing te expliciteren waarna vervolgens in de energierekening verwezen 
wordt. Gegeven de situatie in Nederland zou het vermelden van doelstellingen op de 
energierekening of bij de tweemaandelijkse overzichten een mogelijke optie kunnen zijn 
die het onderzoeken waard is. Ook toont het onderzoek aan dat deze instrumenten 
effectiever zijn als het commitment zichtbaar is en als het gerelateerd is aan 
onmiddellijke voordelen voor de besluitvormer, in de vorm van een lagere 
energierekening. Ten aanzien van het communiceren van sociale normen (bijvoorbeeld 
het gemiddelde energieverbruik van de buurt of wijk) blijkt uit dit onderzoek dat het van 
belang is dat de consument zelf geen grote invloed op de norm heeft. Voor maximale 
effectiviteit moet de referentiegroep dus niet te klein zijn en tegelijkertijd psychologisch 
relevant voor de consument. In veldonderzoek werd een energiebesparingspotentieel door 
het communiceren van sociale normen van 2%-6% aangetoond. Het publiceren van een 
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rangorde van (groepen) huishoudens, bijvoorbeeld op wijkniveau, die de relatieve positie/ 
prestatie weergeeft zou aanvullende energiebesparing kunnen opleveren. 
 
Meerjarenafspraken met het bedrijfsleven over energie-efficiency 
Het tweede beleidsinstrument zijn de meerjarenafspraken op industrieniveau (MJA3-
convenant en MEE-convenant). In abstracto kunnen deze afspraken gezien worden als 
een instrument dat het expliciteren van doelstellingen en zelfmonitoring beoogt. 
 
Eerder onderzoek toont aan dat de effectiviteit van het stellen van doelen afhangt van de 
mate waarin deze (publiek) bekend zijn. Ook is eerder aangetoond dat besluitvormers 
meer gecommitteerd worden door stapsgewijs naar grotere duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen 
te bewegen. Incrementele kleinere stappen hebben een grotere kans van slagen dan een 
grote stap ineens. De literatuur op het terrein van niet-financiële prikkels die 
energiebesparing door managers proberen te bewerkstelligen, zoals het effect van 
rangschikking en normen, is beperkt in omvang, zeker in vergelijking met de literatuur 
die zich op het keuzegedrag van huishoudens richt. De empirische bevindingen 
suggereren dat het opstellen van langetermijnakkoorden op zichzelf al een effect kan 
hebben op het stellen van doelen en verkrijgen van commitment. Uit eerdere literatuur 
blijkt bovendien dat indien te behalen voordelen in termen van netto contante waarde 
worden gepresenteerd, het te verwachten psychologische effect op het keuzegedrag van 
managers vermoedelijk het grootst is. Ons onderzoek suggereert dat het afleggen van 
verantwoording over het gesloten akkoord naar relevante belanghebbenden een 
aanvullend positief effect kan hebben. Ons onderzoek suggereert bovendien dat 
anticipatie van de rankschikking een belangrijke rol speelt. Een positief effect valt al te 
verwachten van het opstellen van (beperkte) ranglijsten van ondernemingen binnen 
relevante vergelijkingsgroepen op willekeurige momenten.  
 
De tabellen aan het eind van deze samenvatting geven per beleidsinstrument aan welke 
effecten in de literatuur en onze eigen laboratoriumexperimenten zijn gevonden, wat de 
openstaande vragen zijn en welk vervolgonderzoek gewenst is. De resultaten van het 
literatuuronderzoek zijn bevindingen uit eerdere laboratoriumonderzoek evenals 
veldstudies en veldexperimenten. Aangezien de resultaten van de verschillende studies 
niet kunnen worden gewogen vanwege verschillen in de opzet is er voor gekozen de 
maximaal gevonden gemiddelde effecten te rapporteren. De variantie van de 
gerapporteerde effecten komt deels door het verschil van laboratorium en veldonderzoek, 
en deels door de combinatie van direct of indirect feedback met een nudge. In het 
laboratorium worden doorgaans grotere effecten gevonden dan in veldonderzoek. Indien 
feedback over het feitelijke energiegebruik wordt gecombineerd met een nudge kan dit de 
effectiviteit van de feedback mogelijk verhogen en derhalve tot hogere 
besparingspercentages leiden. 
 
Conclusies en aanbevelingen 
Nudges hebben de potentie om consumenten en bedrijven aan te zetten tot duurzame 
keuzes en hiermee energie-efficiëntie te bevorderen. Hoewel onze onderzoeksresultaten 
verkennend zijn wijzen ze op een aantal potentieel krachtig instrumenten: door de 
beslissers in huishoudens, bedrijven en organisaties te confronteren met sociale normen 
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en rangschikking is het mogelijk hun (bewuste en onbewuste) zelfbeeld actief aan te 
spreken om duurzamere besluitvorming te stimuleren.  
 
Het onderzoek geeft aanleiding tot het doen van een aantal aanbevelingen voor beleid: 
- De bevindingen suggereren dat duurzaam gedrag bevorderd kan worden door 
ranglijsten van (groepen) consumenten op te stellen, door managers aan te geven 
hoe zij ten opzichte van een relevante sociale referentiegroep presteren en door 
managers te vragen duurzaamheidsbeslissingen expliciet te verantwoorden.  
- Bij al deze aanbevelingen is het van belang dat het onderliggende probleem 
gecommuniceerd wordt in een context die nauw aansluit op de belevingswereld 
van de besluitvormer; zowel in de geografische, temporele als sociale dimensie. 
Dit suggereert bijvoorbeeld dat nadruk op betere lokale luchtkwaliteit of grotere 
energievoorzieningzekerheid een groter effect zou hebben dan nadruk op de 
gevolgen van mondiale klimaatverandering. 
- In de onderzochte beleidsinstrumenten slimme meters en meerjarenafspraken kan 
bewust gebruik worden gemaakt van nudges die meer duurzame keuzes uitlokken. 
Ons onderzoek heeft bij beide instrumenten verschillende aangrijpingspunten 
voor aanpassingen geïdentificeerd: 
o Bij de slimme meter in combinatie met tweemaandelijkse overzichten zijn 
toepassing van commitment, sociale normen en framing kansrijk voor het 
vergroten van de gerealiseerde energiebesparing. Wij adviseren deze 
aangrijpingspunten te toetsen met veldexperimenten. 
o Bij de slimme meter zijn pilots uitgevoerd met directe feedback. Bij de 
verdere uitrol adviseren wij ook te toetsen op de effecten van sociale 
normen en framing als deze via een in-home display gecommuniceerd 
worden.  
o Bij de meerjarenafspraken biedt de toepassing van sociale normen en 
rangschikking mogelijkheden om de effectiviteit te vergroten. Wij 
adviseren om veldexperimenten op deze aangrijpingspunten uit te voeren. 
De gegevens uit verslagen van ondernemers op basis van bestaande 
meerjarenafspraken kunnen worden benut om de effecten van 
commitment in kaart te brengen. 
  
Met veldexperimenten kan nader onderzocht worden op welke wijze het effect van de 
instrumenten kan worden vergroot. Beslissingen aangaande duurzaamheid variëren 
bijvoorbeeld in de mate waarin individuele en collectieve belangen verschillen en ook in 
de mate waarin individuele afwijkingen van het collectieve belang gevolgen hebben. 
Veldexperimenten zijn ook nodig om te toetsen of laboratoriuminzichten zich voordoen 
in de praktijk. Nader onderzoek dient uit te wijzen of de bevindingen die in dit rapport 
gerapporteerd worden, ook toepasbaar zijn op beleidscontexten die duurzaam handelen 
betreffen maar minder naar een publiek goed te abstraheren zijn (de setting van de 
laboratoriumexperimenten). Tevens is het zo dat andere doelgroepen dan die welke in de 
experimenten zijn opgenomen afwijkend kunnen reageren op de onderzochte condities. 
 
Toekomstig onderzoek zou zich moeten richten op de mate waarin de bevindingen in het 
veld gerepliceerd kunnen worden. Alleen gerandomiseerde veldstudies die (1) de invloed 
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op het gedrag over een langere periode volgen en (2) de behandeling nauwgezet 
toesnijden op de daadwerkelijk te ontwikkelen instrumenten, kunnen kwantitatieve en 
causale verbanden blootleggen. Dergelijke studies kunnen uitsluitsel geven over de 
effectiviteit van niet-financiële beleidsinstrumenten in het bevorderen van duurzaam 
keuzegedrag. 
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Tabel 1: Belangrijkste relevante bevindingen t.a.v. Slimme Meters en Tweemaandelijkse Overzichten2 
Relevante 
nudges 
Resultaten uit het literatuuronderzoek, 
laboratoriumexperimenten, en case studies 
Openstaande vragen Implicaties voor verder 
onderzoek 
Informatie 
feedback 
 Feedback over energieverbruik door middel 
van geavanceerde factureringspraktijken 
heeft een positief effect (max. 9% in het 
veld, en max. 20% in het lab). 
 Advies over besparingspotentieel heeft een 
positief effect (max. 5% in het veld). 
 Online informatie heeft geen significant 
effect, in tegenstelling tot offline informatie 
die een significant positief effect heeft. 
 Informatie moet tijdig, bondig, maar goed 
gepresenteerd en makkelijk te absorberen, 
worden verstrekt. 
 Informatie moet besparingen / voordelen in 
het heden benadrukken. 
Het is niet duidelijk hoe de consumenten die het minst 
geïnteresseerd zijn bereikt kunnen worden, omdat informatie 
gemakkelijk kan worden genegeerd. Waarschijnlijk kunnen 
een combinatie van zeer specifieke adviezen en aanverwante 
monetaire gevolgen (potentiële winsten en verliezen van 
veranderingen in gedrag) effectief zijn, bijvoorbeeld als "U 
verliest op dit moment € x per maand door het niet 
consequent uitzetten van uw verlichting." Het doel moet zijn 
om gewoonten te veranderen om duurzame effecten te 
bereiken. 
De analyse van de gegevens van de 
eerste uitrol van slimme meter in 
vergelijking met de controlegroep 
zal inzichten over het effect in 
Nederland geven. Marktonderzoek 
moet uitwijzen hoe informatie kan 
worden verstrekt op een effectieve 
en efficiënte manier, en hoe het 
bewustzijn van energieverbruikers 
het beste kan worden gestimuleerd.. 
 
Commit-
ment en 
het stellen 
van doelen 
 Privaat commitment heeft een positief 
effect  (max. 12% in het lab). 
 Publieke toezegging (bijvoorbeeld  
ondertekende verklaringen) heeft een 
positief effect (max 15% in het veld). 
Vrijwillige doelen voor specifieke besparing kunnen worden 
opgenomen in opvolgende tweemaandelijkse overzichten, 
maar het is niet duidelijk of dit zal leiden tot een blijvend 
effect, dat wil zeggen: verandering van gewoonten. 
Veldstudies in Nederland 
(gerandomiseerde gecontroleerde 
trials) naar het effect van 
commitment en het stellen van 
doelen. 
Sociale 
normen 
 Sociale normen reduceren energieverbruik 
(2% -6% in het veld)  
 Beschrijvende en beoordelende normen 
hebben geen significant effect op 
individuen in strategische situaties (in het 
laboratorium) 
Welke sociale norm wordt opgevat als "relevant" is moeilijk 
te voorspellen. Individuen moeten kunnen identificeren met 
de onmiddellijke buurt of met demografisch soortgelijke 
huishoudens. 
Enquêtes om de relevante normen 
te identificeren. Daarna veldstudies 
in Nederland (gerandomiseerde 
gecontroleerde trials) met de 
vastgestelde normen. 
Rangschik-
king 
 Openbare rankschikkingen verhogen pro-
sociaal gedrag van individuen in 
strategische situaties (max. 15% in het lab). 
Het actief aanspreken van het (bewuste en onbewuste) 
zelfbeeld van individuen (‘naming and shaming') heeft 
potentieel grote en blijvende gevolgen. Het kan effectief zijn 
om kleinere gemeenschappen (bijvoorbeeld buurten, 
postcodegebieden) in plaats van individuele huishoudens te 
Laboratorium onderzoek naar het 
effect van publieke rangschikking 
van groepen versus controlegroepen 
en vergelijking maken met effect 
van rangschikking van individuen 
                                               
2 Schattingen over het effect van de verschillende nudges op energiebesparing lopen sterk uiteen. In de tabel worden gemiddelde effectgroottes gerapporteerd. Hierbij 
zijn twee uitgangspunten gehanteerd: 1) Daar waar studies grote verschillen in effecten laten zien zijn de gerapporteerde waarden gebaseerd op zo representatief 
mogelijk onderzoek. 2) Er is voor gekozen om binnen de groep van representatieve studies geen weging aan te brengen, maar de maximaal gevonden gemiddelde 
effectgroottes te rapporteren. Bevindingen zijn ook van toepassingen voor soortgelijke instrumenten met indirecte feedback. 
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rangschikken en deze rangschikkingen regelmatig in de 
lokale kranten te publiceren.  
binnen groepen. 
Framing  Precieze framing (bijvoorbeeld presentatie) 
van zaken is cruciaal en kan de effectiviteit 
van de nudge maken of breken. 
 Afwijking van de norm presenteren als 
(monetaire) verliezen, zou een positief 
effect kunnen hebben (nog geen bewijs). 
Het effect van feedback informatie is afhankelijk van de 
precieze presentatie. Het niet bereiken van een doel, of het 
consumeren van meer dan de norm zou in termen van 
verliezen kunnen worden meegedeeld, bijv. "U geeft € x per 
maand meer uit dan het gemiddelde huishouden in uw buurt 
". 
Enquêtes om de relevante normen 
te identificeren. Daarna veldstudies 
in Nederland (gerandomiseerde 
gecontroleerde trials) met de 
vastgestelde normen en 
verschillende manier van framing. 
 
 
 
 
Tabel 2: Belangrijkste relevante bevindingen t.a.v. Slimme Meters met Real-Time Display (RTD)3 
Relevante 
nudges 
Resultaten uit het literatuuronderzoek, 
laboratoriumexperiment, en case studies 
Openstaande vragen Implicaties voor verder 
onderzoek 
Informatie 
feedback 
 Installatie van een slimme meter heeft een 
klein, niet-blijvend effect (max. 5%). 
 Feedback over energieverbruik via een 
RTD heeft een positief effect (max. 12%). 
 Installatie van een slimme meter vermindert 
klachten van klanten vanwege verbeterde 
klantenservice. 
Consumenten moeten een effect van hun energiebesparing 
zien op hun energierekening om duurzame effecten te 
bereiken. 
Voor de verdere rol-uit van de 
slimme meter zou het interessant 
zijn om te testen wat het effect van  
een RTD is op energiebesparing. 
Indien technisch mogelijk, zouden 
de gevolgen van de opname van een 
beschrijvende (en bij voorkeur ook 
beoordelende) sociale norm op de 
RTD kunnen worden getoetst aan 
een controlegroep (veldstudie). 
Sociale 
normen 
 Communicatie van beschrijvende en 
beoordelende sociale normen zou een 
positief effect hebben (nog geen bewijs). 
Welke sociale norm wordt opgevat als "relevante" is 
moeilijk te voorspellen (zie hierboven). 
Framing  Presentatie van afwijking van de norm als 
(monetaire of kW) verliezen, zou een 
positief effect kunnen hebben (nog geen 
bewijs). 
Het effect van feedback informatie is afhankelijk van de 
precieze presentatie (zie hierboven). 
 
 
 
                                               
3 Schattingen over het effect van de verschillende nudges op energiebesparing lopen sterk uiteen. In de tabel worden gemiddelde effectgroottes gerapporteerd. Hierbij 
zijn twee uitgangspunten gehanteerd: 1) Daar waar studies grote verschillen in effecten laten zien zijn de gerapporteerde waarden gebaseerd op zo representatief 
mogelijk onderzoek. 2) Er is voor gekozen om binnen de groep van representatieve studies geen weging aan te brengen, maar de maximaal gevonden gemiddelde 
effectgroottes te rapporteren. Bevindingen zijn ook van toepassingen voor soortgelijke instrumenten met directe feedback. 
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Tabel 3: Belangrijkste relevante bevindingen t.a.v. meerjarenafspraken (MJA3-covenant en MEE-convenant) 
Relevante 
duwtjes 
Resultaten uit het literatuuronderzoek, 
laboratorium-experiment, en case studies 
Openstaande vragen Implicaties voor verder 
onderzoek 
Sociale 
normen 
 Beschrijvende en beoordelende sociale 
normen verhogen pro-sociaal gedrag van 
individuen in leidinggevende posities (max 
45% in het lab). 
De resultaten werden verkregen uit het observeren van 
studenten in leidinggevende posities. De representativiteit 
van de bevindingen voor de besluitvorming van managers 
dient te worden bevestigd.  
Welke sociale norm wordt opgevat als "relevant" voor 
managers is moeilijk te voorspellen (dezelfde bedrijfstak, 
vergelijkbaar bedrijfsgrootte, land of regiospecifiek etc.). 
Enquête om de relevante normen 
onder Nederlandse topmanagers te 
identificeren.  
Experiment om effecten van 
beschrijvende en beoordelende 
sociale normen op de beslissing van 
managers in simulaties van real-life 
situaties te testen. 
Rangschik-
king 
 Openbare rangschikkingen verhogen pro-
sociaal gedrag van individuen in 
leidinggevende posities (max 40% in het 
lab). 
De resultaten werden verkregen uit het observeren van 
studenten in leidinggevende posities, de representativiteit 
van de bevindingen voor de besluitvorming van managers te 
maken dient te worden bevestigd.  
Experiment om effecten van de 
openbare rangschikking op de 
beslissing van managers in 
simulaties te testen. 
Verant-
woording 
 Terugkerende (schriftelijke) verantwoording 
van beslissingen met betrekking tot een 
sociale norm kan positieve effecten hebben 
(nog geen duidelijk bewijs). 
De resultaten werden geobserveerd in een situatie waarin 
verantwoording werd gecombineerd met een sociale norm. 
Het is niet duidelijk in hoeverre verantwoording alleen een 
effect heeft. Onder de voorwaarde dat de resultaten ook 
gelden voor de besluitvorming van managers is het 
wenselijk dat Energie-efficiëntie hoog op de agenda van 
bestuurders staat. Waarschijnlijk kan een mondelinge 
verantwoording voor hooggeplaatste beleidsmakers dit 
effect reeds bewerkstelligen. Het is onduidelijk waar in het 
proces van de ondertekening van MJA3-convenant en MEE-
convenant deze interventie zinvol en haalbaar zou zijn. 
Laboratorium onderzoek naar het 
effect van verantwoording door 
managers vs verantwoording door 
individuen. 
Commit-
ment en 
het stellen 
van doelen 
 Het publiek bindende karakter van MJA3- 
en MEE-convenant heeft eerste positieve 
effecten (nog geen systematisch bewijs). 
  De analyse van de gegevens 
verkregen uit verslagen van de 
ondernemingen over de eerste 
MJA's in vergelijking met een 
(eventueel buitenlandse) 
controlegroep zal inzichten geven 
over het besparingspotentieel in 
Nederland. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 1960 the energy consumption per person in the Netherlands has risen from 1.826 
kg of oil equivalent per capita (KG) per year to 5.021 KG in 2010 with a small reduction 
to 4.646 KG a person in 2011 (World Bank, 2013). The overall increase in the use of 
energy can be explained by technological developments, economic growth and cultural 
developments (Gatersleben & Vlek, 1998). Most of the energy in households is used for 
heating the house, warm water and air-conditioning. Since the energy crisis in the early 
1970s and increasing concerns about global warming and resulting environmental, 
economic and social problems, a growing body of research is investigating how to reduce 
energy consumption. 
 
“To combat climate change, many economists and policymakers advocate price-based 
approaches, such as greenhouse gas emissions taxes and emissions trading programs, or 
technology-based approaches, such as R&D subsidies and public-private R&D 
partnerships. In the end, however, both types of approaches rely on consumers and firms 
to make different choices: they will need to change what they do. […] A recently-
growing body of research in psychology and behavioural economics suggests that non-
price interventions can be just as powerful as prices in changing consumer choices. These 
behavioural approaches, which include commitment devices, information provision or 
attentional devices, appeals to social norms, or apparently-small changes to prices, 
default options, or transactions costs, are quite inexpensive and can be extremely 
powerful.” (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010: 1). 
 
Energy efficiency is not only extremely relevant from a policy perspective, but also 
highlights that nudging
4
 people towards (more) socially-desirable Behavior is difficult, 
even in the presence of private incentives: Policymakers have encountered substantial 
difficulties over the past three decades trying to induce people to change energy 
consumption behaviours and adopt new, more energy-efficient technologies, even when 
these behaviours appear to be in the energy consumers’ own financial interests. Actual 
penetration of energy efficient technologies and behaviours have remained strikingly low, 
“a phenomenon that has been alternately dubbed the “Energy Efficiency Gap” and the 
“Energy Paradox” (Jaffe & Stavins 1994). This suggests that prices and technology may 
not be the only barriers to increased energy efficiency” (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010: 
1).  
 
More generally, and beyond the field of energy (efficiency), governments and 
governmental agencies are regularly confronted with the question of how to effectively 
(achieving the desired behaviour) and efficiently (at the lowest feasible cost) influence 
the behaviour of the private and corporate citizens. Situations in which private and 
collective rationality diverge abound: Current taxpayers need to be persuaded to forego 
                                               
4 Nudging refers to subtly pushing individuals to alter their choices and behavior in response to changes in 
factors other than actual (monetary) incentives (e.g., a set of options as the incentives; and they way in 
which they are displayed as the nudge) (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008: 9).  
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current consumption for the sake of future generations. Frequently, more and less 
sustainable technological solutions exist (e.g., more and less efficient consumer 
appliances, building isolation in housing construction, and so on). Consumers frequently 
opt for the cheaper but less sustainable alternative. A standard approach of policymakers 
to encourage consumers to opt for the socially desirable alternative involves monetary 
incentives such as subsidies. However, these instruments are not only costly, prompting 
questions about their efficiency, but—as the “Energy Paradox” illustrates—, even though 
they are costly, they are not always effective either, i.e. often the desired policymaking 
objectives are not (fully) achieved. One presumable core reason lies in the fact that 
individuals decide as “Humans” rather than as “Econs” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008): While 
“Econs” may not be able to make perfect forecasts, they at least make unbiased forecasts, 
that is, their forecasts may be wrong, but not systematically so in any predictable manner. 
And they respond primarily to incentives—their decisions are not affected by seemingly 
“irrelevant” factors such as the display of a set of alternatives, the order in which options 
are offered, and so on. In contrast, “Humans” make systematic and predictable errors—
their forecasts are flawed and biased in systematic ways. For example, people tend to 
suffer from the so-called “status-quo” bias—a strong tendency to stick to the status quo 
and go along with a default option, even if an alternative option exists that would offer 
superior benefits for them (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). In response, a growing body of 
research has been undertaken over the past decades, often in the form of partnerships 
between behavioural scientists and partner organizations, such as, for example, 
governments, NGOs, and private sector businesses. Together, these studies have 
generated important insights into the effects of non-price interventions, and have yielded 
increasingly compelling results, pointing towards both behavioural effectiveness and 
favourable cost efficiency of such non-price interventions (Allcott & Mullainathan, 
2010).  
   
Taking into account these insights into the reality of human decision-making, is an 
important challenge for today’s policymakers. Are there `cheaper´, more efficient and 
possibly as well more effective, non-financial ways of influencing the behaviour of 
private and corporate citizens, nudging them towards socially desired choices, for 
example, in the domain of energy consumption? Can such mechanisms complement or 
substitute for monetary incentives in fostering sustainable decision-making in policy 
relevant areas such as energy consumption? If so, what mechanisms might be feasible to 
implement in actual policymaking? Against this background, the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, henceforth EZ) wants to know 
which “nudges” are the most suitable for application in the field of energy conservation. 
To this end, it is necessary to 
 
(1) take stock what is known about the effects of non-monetary incentives in general, and 
legacy reminders in particular, in increasing individuals’ regard for collective 
interests and for intergenerational beneficence, in particular in the domain of energy 
consumption (literature review); 
(2) investigate in a laboratory setting the effects of selected non-monetary incentives on a 
selection of relevant decision tasks (laboratory experiments). 
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(3) Applying the insights from the literature review and laboratory experiments to 
specific instruments of policy-making in the Netherlands. 
 
 
2. Overview of the Current project 
2.1 Contribution of the Current Project 
 
Against the sketched background, the current project builds on and extends prior research 
in several ways.  
 
First, we improve upon existing studies by taking stock of the current state-of-the-art in 
the field and, on that basis, suggest and test ways in which nudges that have shown or 
argued to be promising can be further improved upon in their effectiveness. In so doing, 
we focus specifically on the energy sector and are able to tailor the experimental design 
specifically to the conditions that prevail in the Dutch energy sector and to the interests of 
EZ.  
 
Second, we incorporate new insights from recent psychological research that have not 
been analysed in this domain. Specifically, we explore the effects of a novel, potentially 
powerful type of nudge that has been shown to influence pro-social behaviour in other 
domains (e.g., charity giving), that is, legacy reminders. Recent research on personality 
and life-span development psychology suggests that it is possible to increase individuals’ 
regard for collective interests and for intergenerational beneficence by reminding them of 
their inherent desire to generate a positive legacy (hence the term “legacy reminders” for 
such nudges; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2012). “Acting on the behalf of future generations can 
paradoxically represent a dramatic form of self-interest—immortality striving,” Wade-
Benzoni et al. explain. “Believing that we have made a difference by leaving a group, an 
organization, a professional field, or the world a better place helps us to gain a sense of 
purpose in our lives and buffer the threat of meaninglessness posed by death.” To date, 
the effects of legacy reminders in the field of energy conservation have not been analysed, 
although forms of legacy reminders have been used (presumably successfully) in 
commercial advertising for years (e.g., watchmaker Patek Phillipe).  
 
Third, we emphasize the behaviour of individuals that are in a “managerial” position. 
While the decisions of individuals in managerial positions are of substantial relevance for 
modern societies and, consequently, policy-making, research into the specific decision-
making of managers and how it is influenced by nudges is severely under-developed, 
compared to the decision-making of individuals in private positions. Specifically, most of 
the extant research in both psychology and (behavioural) economics on how to “nudge” 
individuals into the adoption of pro-social and/or energy efficient behaviour has focused 
on private consumers. Consumers without any doubt constitute a key target group of 
policymakers that aim for energy conservation. Abrahamse et al. (2005), for example, 
report that in the U.S., in 2003, private households were responsible for an estimated 
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1214.8 million metric tons (MMT) of U.S. energy-related CO2-emissions (equivalent to 
21% of the total). They further argue that OECD figures on households’ contributions to 
total energy use generally range between 15% and 20% (Biesiot & Noorman, 1999). At 
the same time, these figures suggest not only that private households are an important 
target group, but also, that organizations, including private firms, are crucially important 
as well, both in their capacities as users of energy (the focus of this study) and as 
producers of energy. Managers, as decision-makers and representatives of these firms, 
therefore, represent an important target group as well—one that, however, has received 
comparatively little research attention. Can the responses of private households to 
behavioural interventions be viewed as similarly representative of the decisions that 
managers might take in response to the same nudges? This is unlikely. What 
distinguishes at the core individuals who take decisions for their private households and 
individuals who decide in their capacity as managers is that the latter persons need to 
justify their decisions. Line managers have to justify their purchasing decision of new 
production equipment vis-à-vis their superiors; top managers and Chief Executive 
Officers (CEO) must justify their decisions vis-à-vis shareholders (for example, to accept 
lower profits due to investments in more environmentally-friendly production 
technologies, or to invest in energy saving measures despite the risk of substantial 
disruptions to the production process).
5
 How does being forced to formally justify their 
decisions change the effectiveness of various nudges? What about the role of publicity, in 
particular in relation to personal reputation and firm reputation? While prior evidence on 
factors that induce firms to increase their investments in Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) suggests that publicity pays a key role, for example, in the form of public rankings 
(“naming and shaming”), the evidence remains patchy (cf. Abrahamse et al., 2005) and 
we lack systematic insights, especially compared to insights gained from prior research 
on private households’ decisions as energy consumers. 
 
Overall, what benefits can supposedly be reaped from governmental intervention in 
private households’ as well as firms’ energy consumption choices? Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the potential for increasing energy efficiency is substantial. For example, 
during the California energy crisis in the 2000s, consumers managed to reduce their 
electricity usage by 13% in response to large price increases (Allcott & Mullainathan, 
2010; Reiss & White 2008), suggesting that, given the “right” incentives, consumers 
might indeed be able to economize substantially on their energy use.
6
  
                                               
5 Recent studies reveal that the more visible actions, the more accountable managers feel for their actions, 
and the more they will try to increase firm value to build a good reputation. This leads to decisions that are 
better aligned with shareholders’ interests. Hence, one way to align the objectives of top managers with 
those of shareholders is to deﬁne their responsibilities in a way that maximizes their visibility. Legitimate 
power determines how much effect a manager can have on firm performance. Powerful managers make 
decisions that have a potentially large impact on firm performance. Individuals with higher power are more 
optimistic in their assessments of risks (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  
6 Generally, behaviors related to energy conservation can be divided into two categories: efficiency and 
curtailment behaviors (Abrahamse et al., 2005: Gardner & Stern, 2002). Efficiency behaviors are one-shot 
behaviors and entail the purchase of energy-efficient appliances, devices, and materials, such as insulation. 
Curtailment behaviors involve repetitive efforts to reduce energy use, such as simple changes in routines 
and habits, or infrequent and low-cost energy stocktaking behaviors (changes in habits and lifestyles i.e., 
replacing incandescent bulbs with CFLs, weather stripping). To date, most studies into household behavior 
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2.2 Research Approach of the Current Project 
 
The current research project adopted a two-fold approach to improving upon existing 
knowledge in the field of nudging individuals towards pro-social behaviour and, in 
particular, towards energy conservation.   
 
First, we took stock of the current state-of-the-art in the field by performing an extensive 
literature review of relevant theoretical literature, related experimental studies, and 
empirical studies using field data, in particular related to pro-social behaviour in the 
energy domain. While a summary of the main findings is presented in the next section, 
the detailed review can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Second, based on this extensive literature review, we developed and tested ways in which 
nudges that have shown (or argued) to be (potentially) promising could be further 
improved upon in their effectiveness (e.g., combination of nudges), the results are 
described in detail in Appendix B. This analysis was based on the development of a novel 
experimental design in which a selection of nudges (partly in combination) was 
administered in a laboratory (lab) setting. Novel aspects of the design were 
 the focus on comparing decisions of individuals in managerial positions with 
those of individuals in private settings, 
 the analysis of newly developed nudges such as positive legacy reminders, and  
 the comparison of these novel features with established findings, giving rise to the 
identification of important future research issues (e.g., investigation of context-
specific effectiveness of nudges for example for strategic vs. non-strategic energy 
conservation settings).  
                                                                                                                                            
in particular have either not distinguished between the two or aimed at both efficiency and/or curtailment 
behaviors. We follow the lead of these researchers and, for this exploratory study, do not explicitly 
distinguish between both types of behavior, among others, because the experimental settings suggested here 
aim at capturing rather fundamental behavioral responses to the analyzed nudges. However, future field 
experiments might want to explicitly account for such subtle distinctions. First, the energy-saving potential 
of efficiency behaviors has been estimated to exceed that of curtailment behaviors (e.g. Gardner & Stern, 
2002). For example, it has been argued that households may save more energy by properly insulating their 
homes than by lowering thermostat settings. On the other hand, prior research also suggests that energy-
efficient appliances do not necessarily result in a reduction of overall energy consumption if people use 
these appliances more often (“rebound effect; e.g., Berkhout, Muskens, & Veldhuijsen, 2000). Second, 
efficiency behaviors require much less behavioral persistence ex post but tend to be associated with much 
greater behavioral inertia ex ante. As such, in the field, differential effectiveness of nudges may emerge for 
both types of behaviors. 
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Experimental economics seeks to control causative factors in order to provide better 
ceteris paribus comparisons between situations. In addition to testing the predictions 
and underlying assumptions of economic theory, experimental economics is also more 
and more used to test-bed institutions and environments implementable as policies. 
The aim is to create a controlled economic environment, and to observe individual 
economic agents together with an institution through which they interact
7
.
 
In doing 
so, experiments can serve as a first step towards evidence-based policymaking. While 
laboratory experiments allow for identifying the direction and relative strength of 
effects of specific nudges, a solid understanding of the size of these effects is only 
possible by conducting adequate field studies. 
 
 
The current study focused on the general context of ‘sustainable decisions’, i.e. individual 
or firm decisions that have an impact on the environment. More specifically, we consider 
energy saving as a consumption decision. The underlying assumption is that this decision 
imposes an externality on society, and that the decision maker needs to be incentivized to 
internalize this externality such that decision making comes closer to the social optimum. 
The main research question of the laboratory study is therefore how and to what extent 
non-monetary incentives can be used to ‘nudge’ decision makers towards the 
internalization of externalities. The results of this laboratory study, therefore, can serve as 
a first step towards building up the necessary foundations for running tailor-made field 
studies, if desired. 
 
Existing research gives no clear indication about the reasons why people do not change 
energy consumption behaviours and adopt new, more energy-efficient technologies, even 
when these behaviours appear to be in the energy consumers’ own financial interests 
(“Energy Paradox”). Obviously, one possible reason is that people misperceive monetary 
and non-monetary costs and benefits. However, prior research suggests that further 
reasons exist and may vary depending on whether the decision setting is a non-strategic 
or a strategic context.  
 
In a non-strategic context, an individual’s decision balances private costs (disutility of 
less energy, monetary expenditure for CO2 certificates, investment costs for installing 
insulation, non-monetary disutility) against private benefits (lower energy expenditures, 
non-monetary utility from positive self-image, ‘warm glow’). The individual’s own 
decision and outcomes from this decision are independent of the decisions of others. 
                                               
7 To guarantee internal validity of the findings, the experimental design has to fulfill the following criteria: 
the environment (preferences, technology, and initial endowments, rewards ), the institution (rules of the 
game, e.g. possible actions, sequence of actions, information conditions, framing (language, story)); and the 
conditions under which evidence is generated (evidence is replicable) need to be controlled. Any  
confounding effects need to be avoided in order to sharpen the effects of focus variables, to minimize 
blurring due to nuisance variables (boredom, experimenter demand effect), and to allow to disentangle the 
effects of different variables. Participants may not be deceived, i.e. there is no deviation from announced 
relations between actions and rewards, and no ‘tricks’. 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 19 
However, the decision still carries a positive externality (social benefits). The socially 
optimal decision considers social benefits, thus would lead to a higher level of energy 
savings. In non-strategic contexts, therefore, factors explaining why energy consumers 
fail to engage sufficiently in energy conservation (even if it would be in their own 
financial interest) include as well inconsistent time preferences. Consequently, in the 
current experiment, we tested in a non-strategic setting two nudges that address 
individuals’ assessment of costs and benefits across time, namely:  
• legacy reminders (both positive and negative), and 
• commitment.8 
  
In a strategic context an individual’s decision balances private costs against private 
benefits and additionally takes the decisions of others strategically into account. The 
decision can be understood as a social dilemma (cooperation problem) in which the 
individual’s endowment can be used for private consumption or for providing the public 
good (positive externality). Hence, an individual’s decision and outcome from this 
decision depends on the decisions of others. The optimal decision can be described as the 
Nash equilibrium. As marginal private benefits are smaller than marginal social benefits, 
in equilibrium there is insufficient provision of the public good. In strategic contexts, 
therefore, reasons for why energy consumers fail to engage sufficiently in energy 
conservation (even if it would be in their own financial interest) include as well their 
neglect of collective interests (free-riding). Consequently, in the current experiment, we 
tested in a strategic setting two nudges that address individuals’ concern for collective 
interests, namely:  
• social norms as reference points, 
• ranking (a kind of refinement of the basic social norm nudge combined with 
public visibility in order to appeal to status and self-image concerns).
9
  
 
The overall set-up of the experiment is described in more detail in Appendix B. 
 
2. 3 Summary of Results of the Current Project 
 
2.3.1 Results from the Literature Review 
In the following, we provide a concise overview of some of the major areas of research in 
the field and the corresponding results. The discussion of more fundamental literature 
relevant to the study is presented in Appendix A. Note that we do not aim to exhaustively 
present a literature review, but rather to convey key insights that are most relevant for the 
current research project, i.e. that concern the domain of energy consumption and 
                                               
8 Both of these types of nudges are administered to participants that act purely on their own behalves in the 
position of individuals. 
9 Both of these types of nudges are administered, first, to participants that act purely on their own behalves 
in the position of individuals; and, second, to participants that act in a managerial position (‘managers’). 
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conservation.
10
 This literature summary is structured by the various “nudges” that are 
suggested in the literature. 
 
Commitment devices 
Research in psychology and economics indicate that humans procrastinate, that is: they 
put off actions today that in the long run they know would be good for them, such as 
exercising, eating healthfully, saving for retirement (for a concise overview, see, 
Appendices A.2, A.4.1, and A.5.1 and e.g., Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010). Since 
“tomorrow” is always a day in the future, procrastination may cause individuals to 
indefinitely delay actions or investments that yesterday they said they wanted to 
undertake today. Therefore, “commitment devices” are interventions that allow 
individuals to “lock” themselves today into the action that they want to take tomorrow. 
According to Abrahamse et al. (2005), a commitment is an oral or written pledge or 
promise to change behaviour (e.g. to conserve energy), which is often linked to a specific 
goal, for instance, to reduce energy use by 5%. This promise can be a pledge to oneself, 
in which case it may activate a personal norm (i.e. a moral obligation) to conserve energy. 
The promise can also be made public, for instance, by means of an announcement in the 
local newspaper or on a website. Then, social norms (i.e. expectations of others) may 
play a role as determinants of conservation behaviour (see also the sub-section below on 
social norms). 
  
Most of the work by economists on commitment devices has focused on individuals’ 
savings decisions and health-related behaviours, but the phenomenon is no less relevant 
in the energy domain. The following situations provide some examples: Can individuals 
be induced to commit to reducing energy consumption or to engage in energy-saving 
investments and then stick to these commitments, for example, stick to a commitment to 
invest in solar panels or insulation of their home within a specific time period; stick to a 
commitment to use less energy by e.g. turning down the heat or shift consumption out of 
peak time, stick to a commitment to buy compensation for CO2 generation when booking 
their next flight? In an early study, Pallak and Cummings (1976) used commitment to 
promote gas and electricity conservation among households. Those who had signed a 
public commitment (i.e. publication in a leaflet) showed a lower rate of increase in both 
gas and electricity consumption than those in either the private commitment or the control 
group. This effect was maintained over a period of 6 months following discontinuation of 
the intervention.  
 
This early study highlights an important element of the effectiveness of goal setting and 
commitment devices (Houde & Todd, 2011): the degree to which the goal-setting or 
commitment is publicly visible (see also below the section on self-image and status). 
Furthermore it should be noted that a commitment may also take the form of “escalating 
commitment”: engaging people (small) step by step into a series of energy-conserving 
behaviours tends to work better then requiring them to make one large “jump”. One of 
                                               
10  Additional evidence that might be relevant for the energy domain comes also from other areas of 
application, and is presented in Appendix A. 
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the reasons for this may be related to habit formation. To the extent that energy efficient 
behaviours can become part of habitual behaviours, they are likely to be more persistent, 
even after the (monetary or non-monetary) incentive has ended (Houde & Todd, 2011).  
 
In a 1982 study of daily/weekly feedback by Winett et al. (1982), 82 Virginia households 
participated in a study of household energy conservation. Participants in the four 
treatment groups were given specific instructions on turning back their thermostat. They 
were also given a 15% reduction goal and asked to sign a form indicating their 
commitment to work toward this goal. Although the study does not explicitly test for the 
effects of goal setting, the approach was successful in generating overall energy savings 
of 17%. 
 
Lockhorst et al. (2011) present the results of a meta-analysis on 19 studies on the effects 
of commitment alone and commitment plus another treatment (e.g., feedback, incentives, 
persuasive messages) on general pro-environmental behaviour of individuals, of 
households, or of employees in firms. The overall pattern of results suggests that during 
the intervention period, both commitment alone and in combination with another 
treatment yield moderate and reliable effects relative to control conditions. With respect 
to the question whether commitment or commitment plus another intervention led to 
long-term behaviour change, relative to control conditions, their results show that both 
commitment only and commitment plus another treatment yielded sustained behaviour 
change.  
 
Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) argue that studies from economics, psychology, and 
other fields have consistently shown that there can be a wide gap between 
implementation intention and action. In experimental settings, it is often relatively easy to 
change people’s attitudes, for example regarding whether they should visit the health 
centre for a check-up, but much more difficult to get them to follow through and actually 
change their behaviour. In the energy domain, consumers are reported consistently to say 
that they are interested in buying energy efficient products and engage in energy-
conscious behaviours. Their actual behaviour, however, sometimes does not reflect their 
stated goals. It is not yet clear, how much of this gap can be addressed by, e.g. programs 
that encourage people to actually map out how they plan to go get that new air 
conditioner. Field studies in domains such as healthcare have, however, shown that 
careful implementation of commitment nudges can address such concerns, at least to 
some extent. For example, linking the formulation of goals and the statement of 
commitments to the incurrence of substantial costs (“stakes”) has been shown to raise the 
likelihood that people will actually follow through with their commitments. Blumenthal-
Barby and Hadley Burroughs (2012), for example, refer in particular to a current trend in 
healthcare, that is, websites (e.g., www.stickk.com) that allow users to commit 
themselves to achieving certain goals (e.g., losing weight). Failure to achieve this goal 
after a pre-specified time period, as assessed by an ex-ante nominated third party, has real 
financial consequences.  
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Default options
11
 
Pichert and Katsikopolous (2008) define a default as “the condition that is imposed when 
an individual fails to make a decision (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) or the option that 
consumers receive if they do not explicitly request something different (Brown & 
Krishna, 2004)” (p. 65). People rarely switch away from the option that requires no action, 
for example, when choosing a retirement savings plan or a retail electricity provider. 
Sticking to the “default option” represents a frequently observed and strong inertia 
behaviour (Thaler and Sunstein (2008)). Underlying possible reasons, which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, are procrastination (people intend to change behaviour 
tomorrow but never do), the “endowment effect” (people come to prefer whatever option 
they currently have), or (switching) costs of changing options (including mental effort), 
or lack of information on the benefits of such a change. Because agents’ inertia keep 
them on the default option, an effort by the “choice architect” to set this default to an 
individual or social optimum instead of some less desirable choice can dramatically 
improve welfare. There appears to be substantial scope for making use of this powerful 
inertia by cleverly designing default options in the energy field as well. In many domains, 
for example, the default option is not the most environmentally-friendly one. Factory 
settings on phones and laptops are typically not the most energy-conserving mode. When 
buying a plane ticket online, a passenger must check an extra box to purchase carbon 
offsets, instead of unchecking a pre-checked box. Similarly, default settings of household 
appliances may be subjected to environmentally-friendly regulation. McCalley (2006), 
for example, estimated that setting the default temperature on washing machines to 
“cold” could save up to 24%  in terms of total amount of energy used (averaged in his 
study over 20 washing trials), compared to regular machine settings, in which 
temperature default settings higher than cold are assigned to each washing program by 
the manufacturer.  
 
In a set of four studies (two natural experiments and two laboratory experiments), Pichert 
and Katsikopoulos (2008) found a strong effect of information presentation format, 
specifically of the default used, on the choice of electricity provider. In one study, 
participants were asked—in a hypothetical scenario— to choose between two electricity 
suppliers: one advertising ‘clean electricity’ generated from environmentally benign 
renewable energy sources, and another offering a more economically priced tariff, but 
providing no information on the origin of the electricity. Three treatment conditions were 
administered: “green”, i.e. the green utility served as the default, and the grey one was the 
competitor; “grey”, i.e., roles were reversed; “neutral”, i.e., neither of the utilities was the 
set as default. In the grey condition, 31 of 75 participants (41%) chose the green (non-
default) supplier; in the green condition, 52 of 77 participants (68%) opted for the green 
(default) supplier. When the two options were presented in a neutral format (no default), 
67% of subjects opted for the green provider. It seems that while the grey condition hurt 
green choices, the green condition did not actually lift it above the neutral benchmark 
level. Finally, Ehrhardt-Martinez, Donnelly, and Laitner (2010) report that household 
participation rates are significantly higher for advanced metering and residential feedback 
programs that are explicitly designed as opt-out programs in which opt-in serves as the 
                                               
11 For more details on the general literature on default options, see Appendix A.6. 
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default, and opt-out requires an active and deliberate choice by the consumer against the 
default. 
 
Information and Feedback 
Behavioural changes are positively associated with the provision of a limited amount of 
relevant and targeted information, and specific and timely feedback. As for the provision 
of information, it is important to note that the information should not only be relevant 
with respect to the behavioural changes in question. It should also, perhaps counter 
intuitively, be limited. An overload (of information and options) has been shown to 
induce people to abstain from acting, rather than lead them to make a change.
12
 As for 
feedback, to have the desired (positive) effect, research has shown that it needs to be 
specific and timely.  
 
The Energy Demand Research Project (EDRP), conducted by AECOM Building 
Engineering and Ofgem (AECOM Building Engineering and Ofgem, June 2011), was a 
major project in U.K. with the aim of testing consumers’ responses to different forms of 
information and feedback about their energy use. For this project, four energy providers 
each conducted trials of the impacts of various interventions (individually or in 
combination) between 2007 and 2010. The interventions used were primarily directed at 
stimulating energy conservation. A minority of the interventions also aimed at shifting 
use from peak to off-peak periods. The project involved in total over 60,000 households, 
including 18,000 households that were equipped with smart meters. Measures were 
generally applied at the household level. One energy provider also tested action at 
community level. The main findings from this report suggest that the effects of energy 
conservation advice (information) as such were observed only in some cases. When they 
were observed, they were associated with reductions in annual energy consumption of up 
to 5%. Information on energy conservation was most effective when provided in simple, 
short statements, and (repeatedly) over a period of time—minimal information provision 
but well-presented and easy to absorb a little each month. Therefore, the authors of the 
report conclude that “advice should be provided but the details of delivery (e.g. clarity, 
quantity of information, timing) and combination with other interventions, are critical” (p. 
167). The same essentially applied to the provision of historic usage feedback. 
 
Most relevant in this context is a study by Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010). Their study 
explicitly focuses on advanced metering initiatives and residential feedback programs and 
constitutes the most comprehensive, closely related analysis of relevant issues in this 
domain.
13
 Specifically, they present a meta-review of 57 primary studies into household 
                                               
12 In a non-energy related context, Iyengar and Lepper (2000), for example, showed that when consumers in 
a grocery store were presented with a limited display of six jams to test and taste, 12% of them actually 
bought a jam afterwards. However, when they were confronted with an extensive array of 24 jams to test, 
only 2% of the customers actually bought one a jam. In both cases, the number of jams that they could 
choose from for making the purchase was the same (24). 
13
 Their meta-review explores the effects of a variety of variables associated with temporal and regional 
context as well as various program design characteristics with the goal of providing preliminary insights as 
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electricity-saving in response to various types of feedback performed over the course of 
the past 36 years in nine countries including the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, and 
European countries.  
 
 
Figure 1: Average household electricity savings by feedback type—Results of a meta-review 
based on 36 studies implemented between 1995-2010 (source: Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010) 
 
Overall, they find that significant savings can be achieved, but also that future research is 
sorely needed. The key message from their meta-analysis is that the type of feedback 
matters crucially. Some forms of feedback appear to be much more effective than others 
in generating more substantial energy savings. In particular, the frequency and richness of 
the feedback seem important: daily/weekly feedback and real-time plus feedback (“plus” 
meaning that additional useful information on energy consumption is provided, rather 
than only total usage figures) tend to generate the highest savings per household. Further, 
they suggest that, indeed, most of the energy savings from feedback programs result from 
changes in behaviours, that is, from stimulating curtailment, rather than from encouraging 
investments in energy efficiency (although people who invest more also tend to save 
more energy).  
 
In a field experiment, involving 1,743 US households, Houde et al. (2013) investigated 
the impact of providing real-time whole-home electricity consumption feedback to 
households. The feedback technology used in their study was a monitoring device that 
recorded electricity consumption, combined with a web application that graphically 
displayed consumption information in near real-time (information was updated every ten 
minutes) as well as other related energy information such as cost and comparative use. 
The specific feedback technology used consisted of a hardware device that allowed the 
                                                                                                                                            
to the ways in which and the degree to which different factors are likely to influence feedback-induced 
energy savings” (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010): iv). 
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display of ten minute interval electricity consumption data. The data were provided to the 
households via a web interface developed by Google, a large California-based IT 
company, and called Google Powermeter. The main feedback feature of the interface was 
a graph that presented the ten minute interval and historical electricity consumption 
data.
14
  
 
The largest reductions in energy consumption were initially observed at all times of the 
day. Later on during the study this pattern shifted and morning and evening intervals 
showed larger reductions. Interestingly, the results appear largely unaffected by 
individual household characteristics such as demographics, housing characteristics and 
psychological variables. This is in line with prior studies that have also found that 
observable variables (e.g., household demographics) tend to poorly predict heterogeneity 
in energy savings from feedback (e.g. Davis 2011). Overall, Houde et al. (2013) conclude 
that on the one hand, households responded significantly to feedback and were able to 
reduce electricity usage, indicating quite some scope for changing habits and behaviour 
(curtailment) and inducing investments in more energy-efficient appliances (efficiency). 
On the other hand, the primary challenge appeared to be to prevent these reductions from 
weakening with time.  
 
Social norms  
Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), suggests that people use a set of standards to 
evaluate reality and to evaluate themselves. First they rely on objective or non-social 
standards. Second, people compare themselves to others, especially when an objective 
standard is not available or is not perceived as relevant. For more details see Appendix 
A.5.2. For a norm to be defined as a social norm, it must be shared by others and 
sustained by their approval (Elster, 1989). Norms are maintained by the unwanted 
emotions (guilt, embarrassment, shame) an individual feels when he/she is not complying 
with them. An individual’s need to belong to a social group and be accepted by it 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995) makes heeding social norms particularly important (Meek et 
al. 2010). Observing what others do can, therefore, strongly affect individuals’ actions by 
influencing what they perceive to constitute appropriate behaviour in a given situation. 
 
Various mechanisms may underlie individuals’ adherence to social norms (Allcott & 
Mullainathan, 2010). They may conform to others’ behaviour because they believe in the 
wisdom of crowds, i.e. that others took an action because they had more or different 
information about its benefits. Or they may perceive that there is some external 
approbation or inner comfort from conformity. In a recent study, Goldstein et al. (2008), 
partnered with a hotel in Phoenix, Arizona, to induce guests to reuse their towels. The 
researchers tried several different messages: “Save the Environment,” “Preserve 
Resources for the Future,” “Partner with the Hotel to Save the Environment,” and “Join 
                                               
14 The interface also had a number of additional features, such as, for example, (1) an annual electricity 
budget tracker, (2) a forecast of the annual electricity bill, (3) a display of total daily kWb, (4) an estimate 
of the base load consumption, (5) a comparison at the day level of current consumption to past 
consumption, (7) a link to a web page with energy conservation tips, and (8) an email reminder. 
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Your Fellow Citizens in Helping to Save the Environment.” The final card which 
included the information that the majority of hotel guests do reuse towels, i.e. that 
conservation was the social norm, yielded a significantly higher towel reuse rate (44.1%) 
than the environmental protection conditions (35.1%). 
 
Studies by Nolan et al. (2008) and Schultz et al. (2007) found that the use of social norms 
resulted in household energy savings of 5.7–10% and that the use of both descriptive and 
injunctive norms was important in shaping household energy behaviours. Descriptive 
norms capture people's perceptions of what is commonly done in a particular situation, 
whereas injunctive norms entail a prescriptive connotation, that is, a perception of what 
behaviour is approved upon by the majority of peers in a particular situation, i.e. how one 
should behave. 
 
Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) analysed the results of two natural field experiments (NFEs) 
in the U.K. In their first study, Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) used daily energy consumption 
from a natural field experiment during 2010-2012, in which 569 households were 
randomized them into three groups: (i) a control group which received a normal, basic 
energy statement; (ii) a treatment 1-group which received additionally information about 
social norms (average consumption of peer group); (iii) a treatment 2-group which 
received additionally information about social norms as well as further information about 
how to save energy.
15
 Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) began their study by reading the energy 
(gas) meters in October 2010. Their consumption data (per day) stretch until March 2012. 
The first intervention took place in December 2010 (high energy season), the second one 
in June 2011 (low energy season), and the third one in January 2012 (high energy season). 
For each intervention time period the treatments were identical and the households 
remained in the same groups for the whole study period. This first study yielded the 
following results: First, both treatment groups reduced their energy consumption, 
compared to the control group. Second, after the first intervention, the effect size of this 
reduction in the treatment 2-group (social norms with information) was twice as large as 
the effect size in the treatment 1-group which received social norm feedback only. 
However, over time, the “social norms-only” group (treatment 1) caught up: Over a 
period of 15 months, both treatments groups had the same lasting effect in terms of 
changing energy behaviour. Interestingly, the social norm treatment had an immediate 
effect on behaviour. The first day that people received the feedback was the day with the 
largest per day behavioural change. This suggests that while social norms might decay 
over time, they require little learning or sinking in—they seem to be an instant ‘attention 
grabber’. Fourth, those who were above the social norm were more likely to change their 
behaviour than those below the social norm. For their second study, Dolan and Metcalfe 
(2013) used monthly energy consumption involving 2,142 private households over a 
four-month period during 2012. These households were energy customers of a firm called 
First Utility in the U.K. that were used to receiving billing information by email. 
                                               
15 The treatment 1-group received the basic energy statement plus a bar graph illustrating their consumption 
in comparison to the average in their neighborhood for their property size (referred to as a ‘descriptive’ 
social norm). The treatment 2-group furthermore received basic information demonstrating how to change 
behavior to increase energy-relevant knowledge on the back of the statement. 
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Households were randomized into one of eight groups: (i) control; (ii) online (i.e. email) 
social norm; (iii) offline (i.e. letter) social norm; (iv) high-user frame (online); (v) high-
user frame with social norm (online); (vi) social norm and $10 incentive for reaching an 
exogenous target (online); (vii) social norm and $100 incentive for reaching an 
exogenous target (online); (viii) $100 incentive for reaching an exogenous target (online). 
Results indicate, first, that offline social norms worked better than online social norms, 
even though customers in this study were used to information being delivered online. 
Second, the employed basic monetary rewards (given online) had a large effect on 
reducing energy consumption both in the two-month treatment period, and the two-month 
post treatment period. Third, the interaction of social norms with basic monetary 
incentives had no effect on energy consumption. This suggests that there may be a 
crowding out effect of placing social norms in the same frame as financial incentives, in 
that they are not complementary and can even backfire. Fourth, providing online 
information stating that consumers were inefficient users of energy had no impact on 
energy behaviour.  
 
Recent psychological research highlights the role that a specific type of social norm 
might play in stimulating pro-social behaviour, that is, legacy concerns. Legacy norms 
and the concerns about them are a form of social norm that extends the group of social 
“peers” to future generations that evaluate an individual (see Appendix A.4.4 for more 
details). Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez & Larrick (2012) conducted two experiments to 
test the relationship between mortality salience, legacy, and pro-social behaviour. In the 
first experiment, they demonstrated that those participants primed with a negative legacy 
reminder (death anxiety) behaved more pro-socially towards future generations than 
those participants in the control condition. Moreover, participants who were primed with 
negative legacy reminders displayed more generosity towards others in the future than 
towards others in the present. In a second experiment, Wade-Benzoni et al. (2012) set up 
a scenario in which participants had to attribute resources to either themselves in the 
present, themselves in the future, another person in the present or another person in the 
future. Again, those participants who were primed with the negative legacy reminder 
were nicer to future others (i.e. they attributed more resources) than to other groups. In 
these experiments, negative legacy reminders (death priming) consistently led to more 
beneficence towards others in the future, implying that indeed death priming activates a 
form of concern for the future (and leave a legacy) and that people therefore spend more 
resources on those in the future than others now. While little is known to date about the 
effects of such legacy concerns on energy use behaviour, successful marketing campaigns 
in the private sector have been making use of this potentially very powerful type of cue 
for quite some time (e.g., luxury watches by Patek Philippe). 
 
Framing  
Whichever nudge is chosen, ample evidence from psychology and behavioural economics 
has shown that framing can play a key role in influencing behaviour.
16
 Framing can make 
the difference between significance and non-significance and, for significant effects, can 
                                               
16 See Appendices A.1 and A.6 for more details. 
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have a great impact on effect size (consider, e.g., the dramatic differences in effect of the 
different messages tried by Goldstein et al. (2008) in their study of hotel guests’ reuse of 
towels). Framing effects derive, for example, from people’ loss aversion, and their use of 
mental accounts (for a detailed overview, see Houde & Todd, 2011). Specifically, loss 
aversion implies that people tend to focus more on losses than on equally large gains 
(“losses loom larger”). Prior studies found, for example, that placing a decision either in a 
positive frame (gain) or in a negative frame (loss) changed decisions by up to 26% (e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Haude & Todd, 2011). The use of mental accounts implies 
that people tend to have a separate budget for various types of goods and services (e.g., 
food, clothing, energy) (Houde & Todd, 2011). In the energy domain, Houde and Todd 
(2011) suggest that people’s use of mental accounts could be used in order to foster 
energy conservation. This could be achieved by framing costs for investing in energy 
conservation measures as included in other, larger costs that people have to incur anyway. 
For example, if a private household already incurs substantial costs for a retrofit (e.g., 
€100,000), suggesting that they add another €100 to the overall bill for (new) compact 
fluorescent lamps (CFLs), has a greater chance of succeeding than suggesting this minor 
investment separately and on its own. Furthermore, the choice of specific reference points 
has been shown to have powerful framing effects (Houde & Todd, 2011): People judge 
the expected outcomes of their actions relative to some reference point. This reference 
point is determined by  
 their own goal setting (e.g., energy use relative to self-set goal of reducing 
consumption by 10%),  
 their own past experiences (e.g., energy use in the focal year relative to energy use 
in the previous year) as well as by  
 information about the outcomes for other people (“peers”) (e.g., energy use in the 
focal year relative to average energy use of peers in the focal year).     
 
Consequently, providing information about relevant peers’ (e.g., neighbours) successful 
energy conservation efforts has been shown to work much more effectively than 
providing rather abstract information about environmental consequences (e.g., Houde & 
Todd, 2011). However, this decision-making relative to some reference point also implies 
that there are particular challenges involved in stimulating people who are exceeding the 
target (e.g., use less energy than the average of relevant peers) to further engage in energy 
conservation. Schultz et al. (2007) found that this is, however, possible: households that 
had already achieved below-average energy consumption could be encouraged to further 
reduce energy use by providing them not only with information on the average use but by 
adding something as trivial as a smiley face symbol next to the comparison. 
 
Status and self-image
17
  
Generally, prior research has shown that individuals have strong preferences for 
occupying a high position in the social ranking among their peers, and this preference is 
likely to be an important motivation of human social and economic behaviour (Barankay, 
2012). For example, rankings and league tables, where people are ranked relative to 
                                               
17 See Appendix A.5.4 for more details. 
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others in terms of a performance measure, are a pervasive feature of life (e.g. employers 
use them to measure employee performance and determine bonuses and promotions) 
(Grote, 2005). Beyond the monetary benefits that may go along with high rankings, it has 
also been argued that people may care about their ranking per se, even when rankings 
have no financial consequences (referred to as “rank incentives”, as they directly affect 
self-image) (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Köszegi, 2006) and convey status (Moldovanu et 
al, 2007, Besley & Ghatak, 2008). A crucial element for the effectiveness of nudges to 
appeal to individual’s status seeking and desire to improve their (self-) image is public 
visibility. Ariely et al. (2009) refer to this as image motivation (or signalling motivation) 
and characterize it (p. 544) as “an individual’s tendency to be motivated partly by others’ 
perceptions. Image motivation therefore captures the rule of opinion in utility, i.e., the 
desire to be liked and respected by others and by one’s self.” Houde and Todd (2011) 
suggest that tools that appeal to image motivation could be to display boards or lists of 
people who have made substantial energy conservation contributions. Interestingly, this 
striving for (self-)image and status works not only at the level of the individual but also at 
the group level (e.g., competitions between neighbourhoods with respect to energy 
reductions, Houde & Todd, 2011).  
 
The desire for social approval is one of the reasons why individuals act more generously 
in public if their generosity is visible to others (Hollander, 1990). Studies by Andreoni 
and Petrie (2004) and Rege and Telle (2004) show that recognizing contributors by 
revealing their identity increases contributions to public goods. Social groups, charity 
organizations and online communities publicize individuals’ contributions for this reason, 
and very few contributions are actually done anonymously. Samak and Sheremeta (2013) 
confirmed in a recent laboratory experiment that contributions to a public good 
significantly increased when contributors were acknowledged (i.e., photos and names of 
all contributors are displayed after the contribution stage) relative to when contributors 
were not acknowledged. When viewing information about contributors was costly, there 
was no significant difference in contributions as compared to the case where all 
contributors are recognized by default, suggesting that just the possibility of being 
recognized is sufficient to drive the increase in contributions. This effect holds even 
though the identities of contributors are viewed less than 10% of the time. They also 
pinpoint which information is most effective at increasing contributions. Recognizing 
only the highest contributors was not significantly different from not recognizing 
contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors was as effective as 
recognizing all contributors. This finding suggests that it is the fear of shame, rather than 
the anticipation of prestige, that drives the identification-related increase in contributions 
in their experiment. 
 
Combined effects 
Generally, prior research suggests that while individual nudges in isolation may have 
significant, substantial, and lasting effects on individuals’ (pro-social) behaviour, 
combining several complementary nudges in a suitable manner greatly enhances their 
behavioural effectiveness—often at only a small additional cost. For example, studies on 
goal setting (Becker, 1978; McCalley & Midden, 2002) showed that combining goal 
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setting with feedback was more effective than goal setting alone. Information has also 
proven to be more effective when used in combination with other interventions (e.g. Van 
Houwelingen & Van Raaij, 1989).  
 
Effect sizes: Effectiveness of nudges 
Early research in the late 1970s and 1980s into the effects of non-monetary incentives in 
stimulating pro-social and in particular energy-conscious behaviour mostly focused on 
identifying significant effects of a variety of nudges. The issue of effect size has attracted 
increasing attention more recently, in particular, in studies employing field data. 
Meanwhile, an emerging literature on energy consumption has begun to measure the 
effectiveness of non-price interventions, including social approval (Dolan & Metcalfe, 
2013), and consumption feedback, goal setting, and commitment (Abrahamse, et al, 
2005).  
 
In their meta-analysis of 19 studies on the effects of commitment on pro-environmental 
behaviour Lockhorst et al. (2011) found that the average effect sizes were moderate and 
similar (r = .27) for commitment only and (r = .31) for commitment plus another 
treatment during the intervention period, and fairly robust. Also with respect to long-term 
lasting behaviour they found moderate average effect sizes for commitment only (r = .18), 
and for commitment plus another treatment (r = .26).
 18
 
 
For information provision experiments have pointed to a potential for electricity use 
reductions in the magnitude of between 5% and 20% (Stern 1992, Fischer 2008).
 19
  It is 
important to note that many of these interventions have been relatively small scale, short-
term pilots on non-representative populations. Nevertheless, Allcott and Mullainathan 
(2010) argue that the results show proof of concept. They also discuss in some detail a 
recent large scale example provided by a company called OPOWER. Between 2007 and 
2009, OPOWER partnered with utilities in Northern and Southern California, 
Washington, Minnesota, Illinois, Colorado, Virginia, and other states in the U.S. in order 
to send energy use reports to residential electricity and natural gas consumers. The 
reports displayed the household’s energy consumption, compared it to similar households 
over time, and provided energy conservation tips. The social comparisons were based on 
research that showed that descriptive social norms are better at reducing energy use than 
appeals to saving the environment and to social responsibility, despite the fact that many 
                                               
18 With the aid of the Z-scores provided by a Mann-Whitney test, the effect size can be computed, Applying 
the formula introduced by Fritz, Morris and Richler (2012) the effects size is calculated as:  /r z N . A 
value of r of 0.5 indicates a large effect; a value of r of 0.3 indicates a medium effect and a small effect is 
present when r is 0.1. 
19  "There are three main factors at the source of this heterogeneity in outcomes. First, studies have 
employed different research designs. A fair share of the estimates publicly available come from pilot 
programs implemented by electric utilities. These pilot  programs vary in size, participant selection 
procedures, duration and evaluation methods, making it difficult to reconcile the large differences in the 
statistical estimates. Second, the features of the feedback technology, such as timeliness, data display, 
interactivity, sociability, and controllability play a significant role in inducing energy reductions and have 
varied substantially across studies. Third, there is significant heterogeneity in the characteristics of the 
population of consumers participating in feedback interventions." (Houde et al., 2013: 88) 
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households claim that social norms have little influence on their behaviour (Nolan et al. 
2008). Comparing the electricity bills of treatment and control groups gave a rigorous 
estimate of the actual energy conservation caused by the reports. Subsequent analysis 
showed that OPOWER’s reports caused households to reduce energy use by about 2%, 
depending on the program’s location, frequency, and duration. 
 
Recent studies provide substantially higher estimates for effect sizes. In a study of two 
natural field experiments (NFEs) for the U.K., Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) found that 
social norms reduced energy consumption over a 15 month treatment period by around 
6% on average.
20
 Houde et al. (2013), in a field experiment in the U.S., found a similarly 
sized effect.  
 
Houde et al. (2013) also report that real-time feedback via technology in their study 
effectuated reductions in households’ electricity consumption of, on average, 5.7 %. In 
their meta-analysis of 57 studies on energy savings from various feedback approaches, 
Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010), finally, report average savings of around 12 % for real-
time feedback technology. They moreover report that median energy savings, across all 
countries in the analysis and across all decades, for studies that employed both 
daily/weekly feedback and real-time plus feedback were both above 10% (11% and 14%, 
respectively). However, they also note that most of these studies covered relatively small 
sample sizes and short durations, and conclude that future studies with large sample sizes 
and longer duration are called for. Furthermore, they report that programs that relied on 
enhanced billing strategies achieved savings of 5.5% on average. Another difference 
related to the distinction between programs focused at reducing peak load energy 
consumption versus programs aiming broadly at energy conservation across all times of 
the day. In their meta-analysis they found that energy savings from feedback programs 
focused on peak load achieved average savings of around 3%, while broader feedback 
programs achieved savings of around 10%. It should be noted, though, that these studies 
generally included some combination of feedback, time of use rates and/or incentives and 
thus do not represent savings from a single type of intervention.  
 
At an aggregate level (e.g., national, city), the total amount of energy savings from the 
different types of feedback hinges on two key factors: average household-level energy 
savings associated with a particular type of feedback and likely level of household 
participation. Therefore, they suggest that once participation rates are taken into 
consideration, the implementation of real-time plus feedback programs is likely to 
generate the most dramatic energy savings across a given regional entity (on the order of 
6%), with the second highest aggregate level of energy savings likely to result from 
aggregate, real-time feedback programs (approximately 4% savings).  
 
                                               
20 Two important differences compared to the field experiment involving OPOWER were that, first, the 
statements referred to in Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) were households’ actual energy statements, whereas 
the social norm intervention implemented by OPOWER (opower.com) was the Home Energy Report 
(HER), which was sent separately from the regular energy statement of their utility company. Secondly, 
Dolan and Metcalfe (2013)’s control group had an energy statement, although they did not have the social 
norm information. The control group in the previous studies related to OPWOER did not have a HER 
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For the specific case of the Netherlands, KEMA has forecasted energy savings on the 
order of 3,2% (for electricity) as part of a cost-benefit analysis of smart meters when 
combined with bi-monthly indicative energy statements. When feedback is directly 
provided via an real-time display, KEMA has forecasted energy savings in the order of 
6,4% (for electricity). For these effect sizes KEMA refers mainly to the meta study by 
Darby (2006). In this study a large variance of effect sizes is reported, ranging from 0% 
to 13% for indirect feedback and from 1% to 27% for direct feedback. KEMA does not 
report how the percentages for the forcasted energy savings were calculated. 
 
 
Costs: Efficiency of nudges 
A reduction in energy use has to be evaluated against the costs of the specific behavioural 
intervention. Especially in large populations, they can be extremely cost effective in 
reducing energy use and abating carbon emissions. OPOWER’s letters, for example, 
required that utility paid only for a letter and a postage stamp. Allcott and Mullainathan 
(2010) argue that, given an estimate of the cost of the reports, the cost to the utility per 
kilowatt-hour (kWh) saved is 2.5 cents, and further, that this point estimate compares 
favourably to recent point estimates of the average cost of other utility energy efficiency 
programs, which in two other recent studies ranged from 1.6 to 3.3 (Friedrich et al., 2009) 
and from 5.5 to 6.4 cents per kilowatt-hour (Arimura, Newell, & Palmer 2009). In 
considering how meaningful such reductions are, they further estimate that, if 
implemented on a national scale in the U.S., a program like OPOWER could reduce 
emissions by 12.7 million metric tons (MMT) of CO2 annually. By comparison, total 
annual U.S. emissions are estimated at approximately 6,000 MMT, of which 2,400 MMT 
are from the electricity sector. Hence, scaled nationally, the aforementioned one 
intervention alone is argued to potentially reduce US carbon emissions from electric 
power by nearly one per cent.  
 
 
Types of decision-makers and context: Managers versus private households 
Compared to individuals that take decisions in private households, managers are in a 
different position: They are accountable and have to justify their actions to shareholders; 
and they have to do so in a heavily competitive environment (in case of profit-oriented 
organizations, at least). In modern firms, the principal-agent relationship between 
shareholders and managers implies that nudging managers towards adopting energy 
conservation measures may be a more complex endeavour even, than nudging private 
households in this direction (see Appendix A.4. for an overview of the relevant theories). 
 
Using a large scale field dataset, Muthulingam, Corbett, Benartzi, and Oppenheim (2009), 
found that managers were frequently myopic about the adoption of energy-saving 
programs. Very often they failed to opt for investments which would have been profitable 
in the long-term but might have had an adverse impact on current cash flow and short-run 
performance, implying a greater need to justify such choices towards stakeholders. 
Moreover, Muthulingam et al. (2009) found that managers focused on costs rather than 
on benefits in their evaluation of energy efficiency alternatives, and on the order in which 
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options and recommendations were presented to them, favouring those which were 
mentioned early on in the list—a clear example of the impact of framing. Specifically, 
Muthulingam et al. (2009) studied the adoption and non-adoption of energy efficiency 
initiatives (process improvement recommendations) based on a database of more than 
100,000 recommendations provided to more than 13,000 small and medium sized 
manufacturing firms in the U.S: for the period 1981-2006. Even though the average 
payback period across all recommendations was just over one year, many of these 
profitable opportunities (around 50%) were not implemented. Overall, there is, hence a 
substantial gap in the implementation of actually profitable, energy-conserving measures.  
 
Prior research has advanced several explanations for this implementation gap. First, 
decision-makers within firms may have insufficient information about profitable 
investments. Collecting this type of information is time- and resource-consuming 
(Velthuijsen, 1995), and firms may face constraints in the form of scarcity of managerial 
time or lack of skilled personnel (Beckenstein, 1986; De Almeida, 1998). Indeed, several 
case studies indicate that organisational and institutional barriers are important (De 
Almeida, 1998; DeCanio, 1998). Second, when deciding about future technology, firms 
may face constraints due to market imperfections such as capital rationing (Howarth & 
Sanstad, 1995). Third, energy efficiency is often just one of many criteria affecting the 
choice of equipment, and not necessarily one of paramount importance (Reddy, 1991). 
Fourth, the assumption of optimizing behaviour may be false (Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). 
For example, decisions may be based on (very short) payback periods rather than the net 
present value criterion (DeCanio, 1998). Fifth, the economic agent who makes the 
investment decision may not be the same as the one who receives the gain (e.g., 
insulation of rented buildings). Sixth, and closely related to the first point, transaction 
costs may be prohibitively high (DeCanio, 1998; Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). Uncertainty 
about the future and about whether and how the implementation of new energy-efficient 
technology might disrupt existing production processes have also been raised as potential 
explanations of the existence of unexploited ‘profitable’ investment options in energy-
saving technologies (Hasset, 1993). Finally, Muthulingam et al. (2009) themselves 
suggest that cognitive and behavioural biases play a part in the emergence of this 
implementation gap. 
 
Conclusions from the Literature Review 
A large body of research in psychology and behavioural economics has, by now, 
documented, first, that humans’ judgment and decision-making are flawed and biased in 
systematic and predictable ways, including as well decisions on energy consumption. 
Second, by appropriately designing nudges to address these flaws and biases, policy-
makers may be able to improve people’s decisions regarding energy conservation both 
from an individual and societal viewpoint. Prior laboratory as well as field studies have 
investigated governmental interventions aimed at improving energy efficiency of private 
households, in particular, using: information and feedback about social norms, 
information about conservation measures, commitment devices, appeals to status and 
self-image concerns, and sometimes combinations of these nudges. Such governmental 
interventions may also prove exceptionally cost-effective, given that nudges as non-
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monetary incentives are often comparatively cheap to implement. However, attention to 
details is crucial. Seemingly small design features (“framing”) can have drastic 
consequences in terms of effectiveness, both regarding significance and effect sizes, as 
well as possible decay of influence and even actually reaching the specific target group). 
For example, the mode of delivery appears to be highly influential. Despite their appeal 
due to low costs and wide-ranging possibilities for customizing information and feedback, 
online interventions appear to be much less effective than offline measures.  
 
 
2.3.2 Results from the Experimental Studies 
The purpose of the experiments conducted in this project was, on the one hand, to 
complement previous research by investigating new nudges, by combining instruments, 
and by testing specific features of nudges in an empirical relevant way. On the other hand, 
the experiments served to investigate the difference in responses toward specific nudges 
by individuals as members of private households and individuals as managers of a firm. 
The following three experiments (presented in order of increasing applicability to specific 
policy instruments) were run in June 2013 in the Experimental Laboratory of Sociology 
and Economics (ELSE) at Utrecht University.  
 
Legacy Reminders as Norms 
The aim of the first experiment was to investigate the usefulness of legacy reminders as a 
way of enhancing intergenerational beneficence and stimulating pro-social behaviour (for 
a detailed description of the experimental set-up see Appendix B.1). The study tried in a 
first step to replicate the findings by Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez and Larrick (2012) 
by showing that negative legacy reminders (death anxiety) can reliably generate pro-
social behaviour. More importantly, in a second step, it aimed at investigating whether a 
legacy concern could be created differently, i.e. by reminding people of legacy in a 
positive way instead by death anxiety (positive legacy reminder). Such a reminder would 
then need to stress how legacy is a way of giving meaning to one’s life. In line with 
previous research, we expected that (1) in conditions of negative legacy reminders (death 
anxiety) individuals would allocate more resources more often to future others than to 
present-others, because of their desire to leave a legacy. Additionally, (2) we 
hypothesized that using a positive legacy prime (meaningful life) would have the same 
effects as using a death prime to induce the fear of death. 
 
The analysis of the experimental results (see Appendix B.1) revealed that overall 
participants donated significantly more often in the present-other conditions (M=.537, 
SD= .062) than the participants in the future-other conditions (M=.377, SD=.065). 
F(1,119)=3.171, p=.078. Moreover, we found that none of the two primes (positive or 
negative) did lead to significantly different donations compared to the control group. This 
finding refutes previous findings from the literature concerning the effects of negative 
legacy reminders (death anxiety). However, presented in Figures 2 and 3, we find that 
regardless of (future or present) framing, more women than men donated money in the 
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negative prime conditions, and they donated a higher amount (differences are statistically 
significant).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean amount of money donated for men and women     Figure 3: Mean frequency of 
donation for men and women 
 
We conclude that legacy concerns, regardless of whether they are negatively or positively 
evoked, do not significantly stimulate pro-social behaviour and can therefore as such not 
be considered effective ‘nudges’. The results also indicate that pro-social behaviour with 
respect to ‘distant’ others (in time or space) is much lower than with respect to ‘close’ 
others. It therefore seems important to emphasise present benefits of pro-social behaviour 
and to refer to the domain of the immediate family as immediate beneficiaries to decrease 
“social, temporal and spacial” distance. While positive legacy reminders have no 
significant effect on pro-social behaviour, we observe significantly different effects on 
women and men. The direction of the effect is to reduce donations by women and 
increase donations by men. Negative (death prime) legacy reminders have a significant 
positive effect on pro-social behaviour of women (and a slight, insignificant one on men). 
If at all, the use negative (death) legacy primes might be considered in typically women 
dominated environments while the use of positive (meaningful life) legacy reminders 
might be considered in typically men dominated environments. 
 
Commitment 
The aim of the second experiment conducted for this project was to investigate the 
usefulness of commitment devices as a nudge to stimulate future pro-social (e.g. energy 
saving) behaviour. For a detailed description of the experimental set-up see Appendix B.2. 
 
While Pallak and Cummings (1976) as well as Winett et al. (1982), used public 
commitment (in the form of signed commitment published in a leaflet, or saving goal 
signed with the experimenter), the focus in this experiment is on private commitment. 
Moreover, while previous study showed that public commitment can lower present 
energy consumption, we were interested in finding a similar positive effect of private 
commitment on future pro-social behaviour. Such an effect would allow concluding that 
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simple non-binding commitments, e.g. entering a planned maximum consumption 
together the actual meter readings, or non-binding signing up for purchase of more 
energy efficient technology in the coming year at local stores, could induce more energy 
efficient behaviour.  
 
In the experiment we found that participants in the experiment were indeed willing to 
postpone present consumption in favour of future payments to an environmentally 
oriented charity. Table B.2.1. in Appendix B.2 indicates that there are no significant 
differences between the group with a commitment device and the control group when 
decisions concern future payments. But when decisions concern present payments the 
decisions of the two groups were statistically different: the control group donated on 
average €0.84 (6,96 %), while the commitment group donated significantly more with on 
average €2.37 (19,79%).  This experiment is innovative in the sense that it is the first to 
measure pro-social behaviour with respect to future others. It allows us to conclude that 
in general pro-social behaviour with respect to ‘distant’ others (socially, in time or space) 
is much lower than with respect to ‘close’ others (participants were on average willing to 
only relinquish 7-19% of their income to future others, compared to 30-40% as measured 
in other comparable experiments on present pro-social behaviour). We also find that a 
significant share of individuals (33%-55%) exhibit similarly time-inconsistent 
preferences regarding own payments as well as regarding charity payments.  
   
Non-binding private commitment in the form of “cheap talk” does seem to have a weak 
effect into the desired direction, but this effect is only strong enough to show meaningful 
significant results when the pro-social behaviour has immediate consequences in the 
present. Decisions with pro-social consequences in the future are not significantly 
affected by the commitment “nudge”. We conclude from these findings that in order to 
stimulate energy efficiency and curtailment behaviours, non-binding commitment devices 
need to relate the consequences of these behaviours to immediate, present benefits for the 
decision maker him or herself as well as to others.  
 
 
Norms and Ranking and Individuals’ and Managers’ Pro-Social Behaviour 
The aim of the third experiment conducted for this project was to compare the usefulness 
of norms and public ranking as instruments to stimulate pro-social behaviour, and to 
specifically study the differences in effects of the two instruments on individuals and 
individuals in managerial positions (‘managers’). For a detailed description of the 
experimental set-up see Appendix B.3. 
 
Social comparison has been argued to influence pro-social behaviour (Andreoni & Petrie, 
2004) in general, and a large library of studies (Alcott, 2011; Doland and Metcalfe, 2013; 
Arimura et al., 2011; Ferraro & Price, 2011; Fischer, 2008; Friedrich et al., 2009) 
supports positive effects of norms on energy conservation behaviour of households. The 
lack of studies regarding firm and manager behaviour motivated the direct comparison. 
Combining the insights of institutional and stakeholder influence with stewardship theory 
and empirical research on power and pro-social behaviour (presented in detail in 
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Appendix A.3) leads to the expectation that individuals in managerial positions as 
individuals with power will behave more pro-socially than individuals who do not 
possess this power. Moreover, while the non-monetary rewards (pride, image, prestige) or 
punishments (shame) are relevant to all individuals, the fact that managers have more 
visibility in the organization and are accountable to the stakeholders for their actions, 
makes acquiring reputation even more important for them. Therefore, we expect social 
norms and visibility to have a higher effect on ‘managers’ than on individuals. 
Individuals in managerial positions are thus not only expected to act more pro-socially 
than individuals when such nudges are present, but also to change their behaviour more 
than individuals when social norms and visibility are salient.  
 
In the experiment pro-social behaviour is measured as the contribution of participants to a 
public good. In this strategic setting participants were allocated to groups of 4 and the 
reward of each participant depended on the decisions of all participants within the same 
group. For the purpose of comparison, participants in one set of treatments were situated 
in a business context which included priming (unconscious manipulation) and the explicit 
justification of decisions.
21
  
 
The average contributions in all treatments are presented in Figure 4, while Table 1 
summarizes the most important insights: The median contributions do not change 
significantly between the control and norm treatment for individuals. However, for 
‘managers’, there is significant increase in contributions to the public good in the norm 
treatment. Similarly, no significant change in contributions is found between control and 
ranking treatment for individuals, while again, for ‘managers’, contributions in the 
ranking treatment are significantly higher. Moreover, ‘managers’, on average, contribute 
significantly more when confronted with a norm than do individuals. When comparing 
the effect of the two nudges  in the individuals and ‘managers’ sessions, respectively, 
individuals significantly increase their contributions in the ranking treatment, compared 
with the norm treatment, but there is no significant difference in median contributions in 
the norm and the ranking treatments for ‘managers’. Based on the Z-scores from the 
Mann-Whitney test, effect sizes, following Fritz, Morris and Richler (2012), are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
 
                                               
21 Of course it would have been preferable to observe behavior of “real managers”, but as this study is the 
first to investigate the comparison between individuals and managers, given financial as well as practical 
constraints, we think that the present study serves as a valid pilot. The fact that our subjects in the manager 
treatments score significantly higher on a ex-post psychological measure regarding “Machiavellism (the 
end justifies the mean)”, indicates that the priming was indeed affective. 
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Figure 4. Average contribution in all treatments over 20 periods. 
 
 
 Z-score Effect size 
Individuals Norm vs. Control 1.056 0 
Individuals Ranking vs. Control -0.784 0 
Individuals Ranking vs. Norm. -1.974** 0.27; medium negative 
Managers. Norm vs. Control -3.114*** 0.42; large negative 
Managers Ranking vs. Control -2.478** 0.34; medium negative 
Managers Ranking vs. Norm 1.258 0 
Managers C vs. Individuals C 0.99 0 
Manager N vs. Individual N -3.246*** 0.43; large negative 
Manager R vs. Individual R 0.021 0 
*,**,*** indicate p<0.1, <0.05, <0.01 
Table 1. Effect sizes 
 
In contrast to previous (field) studies, we find that individuals’ response to a (informative 
and injunctive) norm is insignificant. We conjecture that due to the explicit strategic 
character of the setting, the potential positive effect of the norm on the individual pro-
social decision is weakened: the strategic situation increases private monetary costs of 
pro-social behaviour and increases private monetary benefits of selfish behaviour, leaving 
social costs and benefits, as well as private non-monetary benefits (positive self-image)  
and costs unaffected. Therefore the same individual is expected to respond to a 
comparison with a social norm by displaying higher levels of pro-social behaviour in a 
non-strategic setting. Further studies need to confirm this conjecture, but for the time 
being, we conclude that informative and conjunctive norms should only be used in 
explicitly non-strategic settings, and explicitly not when there are clear trade-off between 
private benefit and social benefits. However, our results also indicate that it is 
recommended to use a social norm that can hardly be affected by the individual’s own 
behaviour but is still psychologically close enough (e.g., energy consumption in the EU, 
as opposed to the broader neighbourhood). 
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We find a medium size positive effect of addressing individuals’ image concerns 
(ranking). This finding suggests using rankings in explicitly strategic settings (i.e. when 
individuals can influence the norm itself). The strategic situation directly affects private 
non-monetary benefits (positive image) and costs (negative image) of behaving pro-
socially. Addressing these image concerns in the form of “naming and shaming” leads to 
increased pro-social behaviour. It might even be more effective to increase 
competitiveness by ranking groups of individuals. Further studies need to confirm this 
conjecture. 
 
Interestingly, by comparing behaviour in the two rounds of the experiment (participants 
made two sequences of 10 decisions, in between which they were confronted with the 
norm, or rank respectively) we find that for individuals the anticipation of the 
confrontation with a norm or a ranking has similar effects as the experience of the norm 
or rank itself. 
 
Our results of the treatments with participants in the ‘managers’ setting hint at a potential 
large positive effect of managers’ response to a norm, and only a medium size positive 
effect of addressing managers’ image concerns (ranking). We attribute the difference 
between the individuals and ‘managers’ to the fact that the individuals in managerial 
positions were asked to justify their behaviour. The justification of low contributions in 
comparison to a general absolute norm might be considered to reveal more selfishness 
than the justification of a low rank, which is relative within a small group of 4 others 
(who might all have behaved selfish).  
 
While the anticipation of the confrontation with a norm has similar effects on ‘managers’ 
as the experience of the norm itself, the anticipation of a ranking has stronger effects than 
the experience of the ranking itself. 
 
These finding suggest that giving households feedback about their relative ranking in 
relation to a relevant peer group may induce more pro-social behaviour, i.e. lead to more 
energy savings. Moreover, households’ ranking based on their energy consumption in 
relation to a relevant peer group should be made publicly visible. Further research is 
needed to identify the appropriate scope of the relevant peer group (“close enough in 
terms of social distance, but not so small as to be strategic”) for such rankings to be most 
effective (e.g. a group based-ranking follow-up study). 
 
For firms our findings suggest to use informative and conjunctive norms and to let firms 
regularly justify their relevant investment decisions (justification should be publicly 
visible and explicit, and in a form that directly links the person with the content (e.g., in 
writing or speaking, rather than signing only). When applying explicit rankings, these 
should be done randomly (over time or over ranked firms or industries) to refer to the 
strong positive affect of the anticipation of the ranking.  
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Conclusions from the Experimental Studies 
 
In non-strategic contexts, time-inconsistent preferences may be a reason why energy 
consumers fail to engage sufficiently in energy conservation (even if it would be in their 
own financial interest). Consequently, we tested two nudges that address individuals’ 
assessment of costs and benefits across time, namely legacy reminders (both positive and 
negative), and commitment.  
 
Our experiments allow for two general conclusions. First, our results reveal that indeed the 
preferences of 33% of individuals are time-inconsistent, not only with respect to own benefits 
but also regarding social benefits (43%). This implies that their dislike for postponing 
benefits in the present to the near future is much larger than their dislike for postponements at 
any later moment. As a consequence, it seems important to emphasise the benefits of energy 
saving behaviour in the present in order to stimulate individuals to internalise them in their 
decision making. Second, our results indicate that low social distance to the beneficiaries of 
pro-social behaviour has a positive effect on such behaviour of an individual. 
 
With respect to the effect of private, non-binding commitment devices our results indicate 
that they only weakly increase pro-social behaviour, and that this positive effect is strongest 
(with approximately 12%) only when individuals can immediately live up to their 
commitment. With respect to legacy reminder we find no significant effect on pro-social 
behaviour. Such reminders can therefore as such not be considered effective ‘nudges’.  
 
In strategic contexts, energy consumers’ neglect of collective interests (free-riding) may 
be a reason for why they fail to engage sufficiently in energy conservation (even if it 
would be in their own financial interest). Consequently, we tested two nudges that 
address individuals’ concern for collective interests, namely social norms as reference 
points, and ranking. Moreover, we explicitly analysed decision making of individuals in a 
managerial position (‘managers’). 
 
In contrast to previous (field) studies, individuals’ response to a (informative and 
injunctive) norm in our experiment is insignificant. We conjecture that due to the explicit 
strategic character of the setting, the potential positive effect of the norm on the 
individual’s pro-social decision was weakened. While further studies need to confirm this 
conjecture, we conclude that informative and conjunctive norms should only be used in 
explicitly non-strategic settings, and explicitly not when there are clear trade-offs 
between private benefits and social benefits. Therefore, the challenge is to identify social 
norms that can hardly be affected by the individual’s own behaviour (non-strategic 
decision setting) but at the same time are psychologically still close enough (e.g., energy 
consumption in the broader neighbourhood, as opposed to in the EU).  
 
Addressing individuals’ image concerns in form of public ranking had a positive effect, 
suggesting that rankings are effective in explicitly strategic settings (i.e. when individuals 
can influence the norm itself). It might even be more effective to increase 
competitiveness by ranking groups of individuals—a conjecture that further studies need 
to confirm. 
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Social norms had an even bigger effect in raising contributions to the public good of 
individuals in managerial positions. Moreover, our results lead us to conjecture that 
explicitly asking individuals for a justification of their decisions vis-á-vis a social norm 
has a positive effect. Again, further studies would need to confirm this conjecture.    
 
 
3. Applications to Specific Instruments 
3.1 Instruments Targeted at Private Households 
 
In order to nudge the energy efficiency of private househoulds is important to give them 
feedback about their energy consumption. All households in the Netherlands receive a 
“jaarlijkse energierekening”; hereafter referred to as “annual energy bill” for their energy 
consumption during the past 12 months. 
 
 
Figure 5: Example screenshot of an annual energy bill for a private household provided by Eneco 
for the year 2012
22
 
                                               
22 Note that the example relates to the annual energy bill, not to an indicative bi-monthly energy statement. 
Hard-copy energy bills currently include only the information about the household’s own past 
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Figure 5 displays an example screenshot of an annual energy bill for a private household 
provided by Eneco for the year 2012. Interested consumers can also use additional 
services in order to compare their energy consumption with that of others during a certain 
time period.
 23
 Figure 6 displays an example screenshot of this service as provided by 
Milieu Centraal. It should be noted, however, that making full use of all this information 
requires a fairly pro-active Behavior on the part of consumers, who need to go online and 
may need to look up additional information (e.g., latest meter readings) that they are 
asked to fill in to allow for the comparison. Prior research suggests problems related to 
overcoming consumer inertia in the use of such services, especially online (e.g., Dolan 
and Metcalfe, 2013). Possible complications here are (1) that online applications, due to 
the required proactivity, tend to reach only those energy users that are already more 
aware of and concerned about energy conservation than the average consumer, i.e., those 
that are least in need of any additional information or nudge; (2) that the threshold of the 
acquired proactivity may deter consumers from seeking out the additional information; 
and (3) whether the offered reference groups (e.g., postcode area) are indeed equivalent 
to those reference groups that the individual consumer perceives as relevant peer group 
for any such comparison.  
 
 
Figure 6: Example screenshot from http://www.milieucentraal.nl/themas/energie-
besparen/gemiddeld-energieverbruik-in-huis 
 
                                                                                                                                            
consumption, whereas online billing tends to offer richer information.  A household’s annual energy usage 
is calculated by the energy provider based on an annual meter reading. Consumers either provide the meter 
readings themselves to the provider (via mail, internet, or by phone), or a firm that specializes in meter 
reading does this, or the meter itself transfers the data (“smart meter”, please see below). 
23 One such service is offered e.g., via http://www.milieucentraal.nl/themas/energie-besparen/gemiddeld-
energieverbruik-in-huis. 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that consumers like to compare themselves, in particular, 
with their neighbours (neighbourhood as reference group), and that the composition of 
the household also plays an important role (e.g., comparing households with two grown-
ups and two children in the same neighbourhood vs. single-person households within the 
same neighbourhood. Given these limitations and the fact that indirect feedback with a 
higher frequency and direct (real-time) feedback offer more opportunities to nudge enery 
saving we focus in the following section on the smart meter in combination with bi-
monthly energy statements and/or real-time displays. 
 
 
The Smart Meter with bi-monthly statements and/or Real-Time Display 
 
The term “smart meter” (or “smart energy meter”) commonly refers to an electrical meter 
that records consumption of electricity in regular intervals (usually between several 
minutes to < 1 hour) and communicates this information back to the utility at least once 
per day, in order to facilitate monitoring and billing purposes (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 2008). Smart meters are able to gather data for remote reporting and, 
therefore, allow for two-way communication between meter and central system. While 
the smart meter itself only measures, it is usually combined with a feedback mechanism 
such as a bi-monthly indicative energy statement and/or an (in-home) real –time display 
(RTD). Smart meters combined with feedback tools are a device that is of particular 
relevance for private households as consumers of energy. From the perspectives of these 
consumers, smart meters have several advantages. They provide them with detailed 
information about their annual energy bills. Also, they provide fine-grained and timely 
information about a household’s energy use. For example, a smart meter (with a display 
or usage monitor) would provide precise information about the energy used by taking a 
15-minutes shower in the morning and the associated costs. Furthermore, if desired by 
policy-makers, they allow for billing based on actual consumption rather than estimates 
throughout the year
24
, and consumers do not have to provide meter readings themselves 
anymore, adding to their convenience.  
 
More specifically, the EU has defined common requirements for smart meter 
functionalities (Van Gerwen, 2012). The Commission has included in the 
recommendation 2012/148/EU ten common minimum functional requirements for 
electricity smart metering systems. The recommendation is proposing that all electricity 
smart metering systems must be equipped with the functionalities summarized below:  
 
For the customer 
1. Provide readings to the customer and to any third party designated by the 
consumer. 
2. Update the readings frequently enough to allow the information to be used to 
achieve energy savings (at least every 15 minutes). 
                                               
24 In the case of the Netherlands, billing based on advance downpayments is considered to have substantial 
advantages in the sense that it implies that households pay an equal amount of money each month, rather 
than experience critically high bills in the winter months.  
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For the metering operator 
3. Allow remote reading of meters by the operator. 
4. Provide two-way communication between the smart metering system and external 
networks for maintenance and control of the metering system. 
5. Allow readings to be taken frequently enough for the information to be used for 
network planning. 
 
For commercial aspects of energy supply 
6. Support advanced tariff systems. Include advanced tariff structures, time-of-use 
registers and remote tariff control. 
7. Allow remote ON/OFF control of the supply and/or flow or power limitation 
 
For security and privacy 
8. Provides Secure Data Communications;  
9. Fraud prevention and detection. 
 
For distribution generation 
10. Provides Import / Export and Reactive Metering. 
 
The basic idea behind smart meters is that they may “facilitate energy efficiency by 
empowering consumers with more detailed, accurate and timely information regarding 
their energy consumption and costs, thus helping consumers, reduce any unnecessary 
energy usage and shift any discretionary electricity usage away from peak consumption 
times” (Hiscock et al., 2013, p.22). 
 
In 2006, the European parliament issued a directive to member states in order to 
introduce smart meters in private households. Specifically, the third European Energy 
Agreement specified that, given certain conditions in 2020, at least 80% of all private 
households in member countries should have a smart meter. In response, the Dutch 
government proposed in 2007 that all private households should be equipped with a smart 
meter by 2013, as part of a national plan to increase energy efficiency. However, 
subsequently, privacy and security concerns were raised by consumer groups following 
the publication of governmental plans to make the installation of smart meters 
compulsory. In particular, the publication of a report by Tilburg University researchers 
contributed to the emergence of the debate. The report, which had been commissioned by 
the Consumentenbond, concluded that there were serious privacy issues with smart 
meters.
25
 
                                               
25 Privacy issues with smart meters, related in particular to the following issues: (1) fine grained readings in 
hourly or even 15-minutes intervals might reveal information about a consumer’s habits (e.g., when s/he 
leaves the house or returns). This information could be useful to burglars. (2) The information transmitted 
by the smart meters might provide insights into a household’s living conditions and even relationships. The 
automatic and mandatory transmission of such information might, therefore, affect people's freedom to do 
as they please in the confines of their homes. (3) The risk that information about a person’s or household’s 
energy use would fall into the hands of third parties such as the police or insurance companies was judged 
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Supporters of the original legislation (making adoption mandatory) argued that privacy 
issues had been exaggerated. In particular, they compared the information revealed by 
smart meters with information transmitted during use by mobile phones, arguing that here 
providers are able to tell the exact location of a consumer, his/her identity and the identity 
of the other party, and so on. As a result of this debate, the roll-out of smart meters was 
delayed substantially and was also revised in details. The revised plans entail that the 
deployment of the roll-out is mandatory for distribution system operators (DSO), with an 
opt-out option for the consumers, that is, consumers may refuse the installation of the 
smart meter or have the option to have it administratively switched off. Furthermore, the 
revised legislation implies that, as default, the smart meter transfers data only in a very 
limited number of situations: for the purpose of the bi-monthly overview (indicative 
statement), the annual energy bill, when switching providers, and when moving house. 
Consumers do, however, have the option to explicitly give their approval for more 
frequent meter reading. 
As to the current status quo of policy-making in the Netherlands with respect to smart 
meters, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Parliament agreed in early 2011 on a 
voluntary roll-out of smart meters in the Netherlands, available to all private Dutch 
households and small businesses.
26
 At a small-scale, as a pilot in order to gain experience 
for a large-scale roll-out (planned for 2014), a first roll-out started on January 1, 2012. 
Between January and July 2012, approx. 120,000 private households received an offer for 
being equipped with a smart meter. 2,3% of these households refused to receive a smart 
meter. In total, if these figures can be extrapolated, the small scale roll-out is expected to 
ultimately cover some 400,000-500,000 smart meters.  
 
The roll-out is accompanied by a legal obligation for energy providers to provide 
households that are already equipped with a smart meter with bi-monthly usage- and 
indicative cost-statements (hereafter referred to as “indicative statement”), in addition to 
their normal annual energy bill. These indicative statements are intended to provide 
households with additional insights into, and hence control over, their energy 
consumption such that they can strive to reduce their energy consumption. The indicative 
statements contain actual consumption figures for the corresponding past two months, as 
well as a comparison with the consumption of comparable households. After the first 12 
month period, also a comparison with the household’s own historical consumption is 
possible.  
 
In recognition of the fact that smart meters by themselves do not lead to automatic energy 
savings, but that consumers may need additional information about energy conservation 
possibilities and feedback on their usage patterns, a so-called “effectmonitor” 
accompanies the small scale roll-out. This investigation is led by Agentschap NL in 
collaboration with the regional network companies and a number of large energy 
                                                                                                                                            
as non-negligible and potentially serious. For more details see “Monitor EnergiebesparingSlimme Meter 
Kleinschalige Uitrol” van AgentschapNL. 
26  The subsequent paragraph is based on the documents “Monitor Energiebesparing Slimme Meter 
Kleinschalige Uitrol”, Agentschap NL (2012) and “Stand van zaken uitrol slimme meters”, Directoraat-
generaal Energie, Telecom & Mededinging. Directie Energiemarkt (2013). 
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providers. It entails measuring the development of energy consumption of three groups of 
households: first, actual usage monitoring of a control group of approx. 300,000 
households without a smart meter; second, actual usage monitoring of a group of approx. 
30,000 households that had a smart meter installed already prior to 2012 and that received 
the bi-monthly indicative usage statements from January 1, 2012 onwards; third, a survey 
among approx. 1,000 households that received a smart meter during the first few months 
of 2012 and that have received the bi-monthly usage statement since then. Completion of 
this investigation is planned for autumn 2013, implying that results are not yet known.
27
 
 
 
3.1.1   Relevant Features of Energy Statements and Smart Meters   
From a policy-making perspective, core features of smart meters in combination with 
indicative energy statements
28
 and RTD as policy instruments for fostering sustainable 
decision-making are their information/feedback and communication functions and their 
(self-)monitoring function.  
 
As information/feedback and communication devices, they provide the individual 
household with key information (feedback) about both the amount of energy (electricity 
and gas) consumed by the household, as well as an indication of the likely corresponding 
costs. In addition, as sketched above, information is communicated to households that 
enables them to compare their consumption with other (groups of) households (e.g., 
within the same postcode) and monitor it over time (self-monitoring function). Any kind 
of policy that uses these instruments as tools for stimulating pro-social behavior (in this 
case: energy efficiency) is likely to view these different functions as inextricably 
intertwined. The question is then how to make best use of them as a bundle to nudge 
consumers’ towards the socially desired energy-saving behaviour. Compared to smart 
meters with indicative energy statements, smart meters with RTD are capable of 
providing relevant information about energy consumption more frequently; depending on 
the precise specifications, they are able to provide more fine-grained information and 
feedback (e.g., when considering changes in the displayed cumulative level of energy 
consumption in response to switching on/off individual items such as washing machines 
and water kettles, even coarse information about the energy consumption of these items 
can be gauged); they are able to provide more frequent, more detailed, and additional 
types of feedback, thereby taking the feedback function to a new level, compared to the 
indicative energy statement; and they are likely to attract more attention, because they are 
an integral part of a private home and represent interactive devices.
29
 Due to these 
                                               
27  An additional subject of investigation in relation to the smart meters concerns the effects of their 
combination with alternative information systems (this is referred to as “potentieelmonitor alternatieve 
feedback”; examples include information display via smart phones). 
28 The behavior which the bi-monthly cost and consumption statements (here referred to as indicative 
energy statements) aim at stimulating is energy conservation. This is in contrast to the behavioral objectives 
of the annual energy bill: here the idea is to ensure comparability of suppliers (e.g., same terminology) such 
that consumers find it easier to compare and possible switch energy providers.  
29 Note that the combination of smart meter and bi-monthly billing is no automatism, but specific to the 
Netherlands. As such, in theory, and in practice in other countries, they can well be separated and 
compared. 
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additional features, smart meters with RTD can potentially fulfil an additional important 
function for consumers’ self-monitoring of their energy consumption. This is an 
important issue: deliberate decisions of private consumers in order to economize on their 
energy costs by reducing their energy usage require at least a basic understanding about 
how inputs (i.e. behaviours such as temperature of heating in the home, cooking food, 
and so on) influence the usage output (total resource usage in kWh) (cf. Dolan & 
Metcalfe, 2013). This understanding most often is not present. While it is obvious that 
reducing room temperature by a degree Celsius is likely to reduce energy consumption, 
not many consumers may have a good understanding by how much. This, however, they 
would need to know in order to make an informed cost-benefit analysis—and this is not 
even taking into account any potential biases that might prevent them from adopting 
measures for which private incentives exist (i.e. individual rationality would suggest 
taking these measures). On the other hand, if a consumer would conclude that it would be 
worthwhile striving to save say 100kWh, she might not necessarily know which 
behaviours could be modified and in which manner in order to reduce her energy 
consumption by this amount (cf. Dolan & Metcalfe, 2013). Smart meters with RTD 
potentially address these issues.  
 
 
3.1.2   Application of Results from the Literature Study  
As indicated in the previous section, core features of both smart meters with indicative 
energy statements and RTD are their information/feedback, communication and (self-) 
monitoring functions. The following conclusions are drawn from recent studies 
(discussed in Section 2.3.1) that have analysed the effects of devices such as (indicative) 
energy statements and smart meters with RTD on consumers’ energy conservation. 
 
Information and feedback are provided by both smart meters with RTD and indicative 
energy statements, but the precise functionalities differ and so do, to some extent, the 
empirical results. Feedback through enhanced billing programs and indicative energy 
statements is estimated to generate energy savings in the order of 2% at the aggregate 
level (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010). For the specific case of the Netherlands, KEMA 
has forecasted  energy savings on the order of 3,2% (electricity) as part of a cost-benefit 
analysis of smart meters when combined with bi-monthly indicative energy statements. 
Especially when accounting for the low costs associated with such programs, they 
constitute an effective and efficient means of providing consumers with meaningful 
feedback about their energy consumption. A recent study by Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) 
is directly related and highly instructive, especially as it also addresses the critical issue 
of online or web-based services. vs. offline provision of feedback. The disappointing 
results from their first large-scale natural field experiment regarding the low effectiveness 
of online feedback are particularly noteworthy in view of the substantial enthusiasm for 
the online handling of feedback and information provision services. This enthusiasm is 
likely to partly be due to cost reasons, and partly to enhanced possibilities of providing 
tailor-made, frequent feedback. The findings by Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) on the lack of 
effectiveness of online information/feedback are also in keeping with the results of a 
large U.K. field study (the Energy Demand Research Project, EDRP) in which none of 
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the implemented web-based interventions resulted in any energy savings. Lack of 
engagement (consumers do not actually use the online services) was regarded as the 
major reason for this failure, rather than an ineffective design of the websites themselves. 
 
In terms of which specific information to provide, the findings EDRP suggest that 
providing energy conservation advice may lead to reductions in annual energy 
consumption of up to 5%, but also that effects are not very robust. In the EDRP study, 
information on energy conservation was most effective when information provision (on 
energy conservation measures as well as on historic usage feedback) was minimal but 
well-presented and easy to absorb. Furthermore, benchmarking (comparative or 
normative feedback including social norms) showed even stronger effects than historic 
feedback. Specifically, only one of the suppliers in the study (SSE) used benchmarking 
(without any additional devices such as smart meters with RTD devices). The provision 
of benchmarking information was associated with a significant additional reduction of 
electricity consumption (compared to trial groups with advice, and groups with historic 
feedback) of around 1%. This is also in line with Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) who found 
that when social norms were included with the energy statement, energy consumption 
was reduced over a 15 month treatment period by around 6% on average.  
 
Smart meter with RTD allow for more frequent, more fine-grained, more immediate and 
more direct feedback. Information provided through such RTD devices, according to 
prior literature, typically appears to bring about a reduction in energy consumption but 
percentage savings have been found to vary widely, and appear to depend on climate (and 
consequently the main uses of energy—cooling or heating, and whether the heating is 
electric). Also, the initial installation itself appears to trigger a (modest) reduction already, 
presumably due to the immediacy of the feedback. Results from the EDRP suggest that 
the pure experience of getting a smart meter with RTD can itself prompt a small 
reduction in energy consumption. This seems to be particularly true for gas consumption 
where simple one-off changes (e.g. reducing a thermostat setting) can have big effects on 
demand. The study also shows that experience of getting a smart meter with RTD is 
likely to prompt some initial action (e.g. turning down a thermostat) but the effect may 
require support over time from other interventions (e.g., advice or billing information) to 
be sustained for longer periods. These findings clearly point at the (self-) monitoring 
function of smart meter with RTD. 
 
The EDRP findings for reductions in electricity consumption were generally in line with 
expectations, based on prior research: They showed a modest effect of clip-on RTDs (a 
small significant effect of 1% reduction in one trial). Results for main (network) devices 
with smart meters were in the range of 2-3% reduction for electricity (and even higher in 
some trials which used more effective devices with 4% overall and even 7% for 
electricity-only customers). Moreover, the reductions were persistent. For gas, the effects 
were less clear and generally weaker, with little incremental effects of RTDs on gas 
consumption above the positive effect resulting from the initial installation of the smart 
meter (see also below the discussion of smart meter’s self-monitoring function). This 
result is, however, in line with theoretical considerations, that real-time feedback is more 
relevant for electricity consumption than for gas consumption, as applications of gas tend 
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to be subject to occasional adjustments with long-term effects. These applications are 
much less amenable to influence by real-time feedback. In terms of the information 
displayed by the devices, electricity information attracted more attention than gas 
information; cost information was generally used and valued more than unit (kW) 
information. Displays of CO2 emissions were not widely noticed, nor used, nor perceived 
as useful. Adding to these results, a recent study by Houde et al. (2013) found that 
reductions in energy consumption were likely to primarily occur during peak household 
activity periods, but on average did not always persist over time. The overall observation 
seems to be that direct feedback via an RTD leads to somewhat higher levels of energy 
savings. In line with this finding, KEMA has forecasted energy savings (electricity) in the 
order of 6,4% for the specific case of the Netherlands. 
 
Overall, Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) argue that the most effective forms of feedback 
are likely to include both products (e.g., smart meters) and services (e.g., compilation of 
data, targeting and tailoring of recommendations) that provide consumers with timely and 
detailed information, which is presented in multiple ways, specifically tailored to the 
individual household, and contextualized to provide meaning and motivation (e.g., use of 
social norms—e.g., average consumption of comparable households). However, 
programs focused on peak load savings generally tend to shift energy use from peak to 
off-peak periods, but are not very successful in generating energy savings throughout the 
billing cycle. Programs focused on reducing consumption during specific time periods 
save substantially less energy than programs which a broader focus on energy 
conservation as such.   
 
Motivational elements: Incorporating motivational and behavioural elements—such as 
commitments, goal setting, social comparisons, and competitions—appears crucial to 
fully exploit the savings potential both in terms of participation rates and magnitude of 
savings. Despite the evidence of enhanced savings, however, relatively few feedback 
projects have incorporated these non-economic levers. Among the few such studies is an 
investigation by Pallak and Cummings (1976) who found that public commitment 
promoted gas and electricity conservation among households. The same does not seem to 
apply for private commitment: In the EDRP study  in the UK, private commitment did 
not have any detectable effects on consumption. The study by Winett et al. (1982) 
confirms both these findings. 
 
Overall, the reviewed literature generally suggests that information and feedback 
interventions have a substantial potential to yield energy savings. However, they are best 
combined (e.g., smart meters and social norms including injunctive norm information) 
and the specific design matters crucially in determining both the magnitude and 
persistence of these effects. This complexity implies that more future research is needed: 
both for investigating the precise to-be-expected effects of those interventions for which 
there is more literature already available (e.g., indicative energy statements), and even 
more so for analysing possible effects and successful designs of behavioural and 
motivational interventions for which there is little literature to date, such as, for example, 
commitment, framing, or ranking. Finally, in addition to the need to corroborate, check, 
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and extend prior research on individual types of interventions, future research will have 
to focus on the multiplier effects of combined usage.  
 
 
3.1.3   Application of Experimental Results  
Our own experimental findings suggest that by incorporating motivational and 
behavioural approaches, such as commitments, goal setting, social comparisons, and 
competitions, households’ energy efficiency and curtailment behaviours may be 
effectively stimulated. 
 
In order to increase savings potential both in terms of participation rates and magnitude 
of savings, our findings suggest that commitment devices indeed should not be entirely 
private, and should be related to immediate, present benefits for the decision maker him 
or herself as well as to others. This could, e.g., mean that when providing meter readings 
the consumer is asked for saving goals which would then be included in the indicative 
energy statements and are translated into cost savings or reductions in CO2 emissions. 
Including (non-binding) saving goals on Smart meters with RTD may serve as a 
commitment device that is to some extent non-private and closely related to immediate 
benefits in form of cost savings, and may stimulate households’ energy efficiency and 
curtailment behaviours. 
 
With respect to the inclusion of informative and conjunctive norms, either on the 
indicative energy statements or on smart meters wih RTD, our findings suggest that it is 
crucial to ensure that the norm cannot be affected by the household’s own energy 
consumption, but at the same time is still psychologically close enough (e.g., energy 
consumption in the broader neighbourhood). Additionally composing rankings of 
households or neighbourhoods with respect to average energy savings may even be more 
effective. These rankings (of neighbourhoods) could be included in the indicative energy 
statements or could occasionally be published in local newspapers. Obviously, a careful 
assessment of privacy aspects would be required.  
 
 
3.1.4 Example Case Studies: Large-scale Roll-outs of Smart Meters in Ireland and 
Sweden 
As reference for future research, empirical evidence from large-scale rollouts in several 
countries/regions is available from first studies, specifically regarding experiences with 
smart meters. 
 
The case of Ireland. In a recent policy report, Hiscock et al. (2013) report about the 
experiences made in Ireland from 2009 onwards with the installation of over 6,000 smart 
meters in private households and businesses as part of a national pilot for a subsequent 
nation-wide roll-out. This pilot (led by the Commission for Energy Regulation, CER) 
focused primarily on how energy users responded to smart meter specific efficiency 
measures by changing (potentially) their energy consumption. Note that these measures 
were (partly) coupled with time of use (TOU) tariffs and informational stimuli (detailed 
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energy statements, in-home displays, and so on). Specifically, 5375 private households 
participated as well as 700 small businesses and commercial enterprises. The specific 
goals of this pilot were to gauge the potential for smart meters to induce behavioural 
changes that would reduce or shift peak electricity demand and overall reduce electricity 
consumption.  
 
In terms of the implementation (field study design) of the pilot (for further details, see 
Hiscock et al., 2013), four different sets of tariffs (each of them with day, night, and peak 
rates; all designed as neutral in comparison with the standard tariff such that an “average” 
participant who did not alter his/her electricity consumption pattern was not penalized 
financially) and four associated stimuli (monthly and bi-monthly detailed bills, in-home 
displays, and an overall load reduction reward) were used in the trial with private 
households. The other three types of stimuli (energy statement, the electricity monitor, 
overall load reduction incentive) were just as well as the tariffs designed specifically for 
the trial. 
 
Further, in terms of the study’s procedures, all participants in the stimulus test groups 
received a bill, combined with an energy use statement (first page: bill similar to the 
existing supplier’s bill, with additional lines for TOU tariffs; second page: energy use 
statement) and additional information on usage and on energy reduction. The majority of 
participants received this energy statement on a twice monthly basis. One grouping 
however received the statement more frequently, that is, on a monthly basis, in order to 
test for the effect of frequency. The electricity monitor (also referred to as in-home 
display), was designed to provide additional information on how much electricity 
consumers were using and how much it was costing them. The electricity monitor also 
included a budget setting mechanism, where consumers could set a maximum they 
wanted to spend on electricity per day. A usage bar on the home screen showed 
consumers their usage against their daily budget. For this purpose, prior to installation of 
the smart meter, historical daily consumption of each participant had been calculated and 
converted into a monetary value based on the new tariffs. Participants also received 
further information (fridge magnet, sticker), outlining the different time-bands and cost 
per band, customized for each tariff group. 
 
In order to establish benchmark information on use and costs of energy, data collection 
(half-hourly basis from the smart meters) started in July 2009 for six months. In the 
beginning of 2010, the behavioural stimulus trials began and were run for the full year 
2010. During this period, participants were in either a test group or the control group. 
 
In terms of results, the study delivered the following key findings with respect to smart 
meters in particular: Smart meters with an in-home display reduced energy consumption 
by 3.2% overall and by 11.3% at peak times. Monthly detailed information statements 
(instead of bi-monthly statements) delivered significant reductions of 2.7% and 8.4%, 
respectively. In terms of cost-benefit analysis, the estimated total net present values 
(NPVs) of the interventions were generally positive. However, the report by Hiscock et al. 
(2013) does not provide any more detailed information on this issue. Based on the results 
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from the pilot study, in July 2012, the CER announced that there would be a national 
smart meter rollout.  
 
Anecdotal evidence surrounding the pilot provides further insights into obstacles for 
consumers’ energy conservation. For example, apparently, consumers had difficulty in 
accurately estimating their actual cost reductions and tended to have exaggerated 
expectations of savings (and similarly exaggerated expectations of cost consequences). 
Specifically, 40% of participants in the pilot who believed that they had reduced their 
usage simultaneously felt that reduction in the bill was not to the degree they had 
expected. Details 
 
The case of Sweden. In the aforementioned policy report, Hiscock et al. (2013) also 
provide information on Sweden’s large scale installation of Advanced Meter 
Infrastructure which started in 2003, with the aim that by 2009 all electricity customers 
should have monthly billing based on actual consumption from monthly meter readings 
for private households and small businesses. Overall, a full scale installation of 
AMR/AMI systems was implemented for nearly all Swedish consumers (5.2 million) at a 
total cost for the full roll out of approximately €1.5 billion. 
 
The Swedish AMR/AMI system architecture consists of the smart meters, data collectors 
and the network company’s data management system for billing. Over the six years of the 
roll-out, the smart meter technology advanced significantly. As a result, different types of 
smart meters have been installed throughout Sweden over this period. In 2012, a bill was 
passed in the Swedish parliament which required hourly metering at no extra cost for any 
consumers who would subscribe to an hourly-based electricity supply contract. Note that 
there was no regulation with respect to the specific functionalities of the metering system. 
Instead, the use of smart meters rather became a consequence of the regulation for billing 
based on actual consumption, as this has been argued to require automatic and remote 
meter reading. Since July 2009, customers receive monthly bills based on their actual 
consumption, as opposed to energy statements on a yearly basis with billing based on the 
previous year’s consumption. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there was not 
much public opposition to the Swedish smart meter roll-out, neither from energy 
companies nor from consumers (e.g., about data accuracy and privacy). 
 
The roll-out triggered substantial increases in consumer awareness for energy 
conservation, following the move from annual meter readings to monthly readings. In 
terms of energy corporations, the experiences of Vattenfall can be considered as 
instructive. Vattenfall is Sweden’s largest network operator and began with the roll-out in 
2003. Between 2003 and 2008, they installed 860,000 smart meters for private 
households and small businesses. In retrospective, their assessment of this roll-out has 
been that it delivered more network benefits than expected, for example in the following 
areas: reduced customer complaints due to improved customer service experience with 
increased transparency; reduced costs from remote connect/disconnect switching (e.g., 
empty apartments or overdue accounts can be disconnected efficiently); power outage 
compensation;  low voltage (LV) network quality monitoring due to more accurate 
network documentation.  
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3.2 Instruments Targeted at Firms and Managers 
 
Long-term Agreements (LTAs) 30 
 
Since the early 1990’s, the Dutch government has been making long-term agreements (or 
covenants) with various industrial and non-industrial sectors as part of Dutch energy 
policy. In particular, as of 1 November 2007, the Sustainability Accord 
(Duurzaamheidsakkoord) between the national government and the business community 
was agreed upon, stipulating a need to pursue an active and progressive climate policy in 
the Netherlands and in Europe. This Sustainability Accord forms the framework into 
which additional concrete long-term agreements for various sectors such as built 
environment, energy, industry, traffic and transport, agriculture and horticulture, are 
embedded and for medium-sized and small businesses. These voluntary long-term 
agreements (LTAs), aim at improving energy conservation in the Netherlands. 
Specifically, the goal is to substantially reduce the required energy per unit product or 
service. The current LTAs cover the period 2005 to 2020. Of specific interest for this 
report is the sector accord Industry which forms part of the Sustainability Accord. The 
sector accord Industry entails two types of long-term agreements (which together are 
henceforth referred to as LTAs) that apply to different firms:  
 
(1) The “Long-Term Agreement on Energy Efficiency for ETS enterprises” (LEE 
Covenant) covers about 100 companies that are obliged to participate in the 
European system of trade in greenhouse gas emission rights (ETS enterprises). 
These are typically larger energy-intensive companies. 
(2) The “Long-Term Agreement on Energy Efficiency” (LTA3) covers about 1,000 
for organizations not participating in EU emissions trading, i.e. non-ETS-
enterprises. These are typically medium-sized and even some smaller companies. 
Unlike the LEE, the LTA3 contains concrete objectives relate to specific 
percentage improvements in average energy efficiency over the course of the 
agreed upon time period.
31
 
 
The current covenant agreements were signed in 2008 (LTA3) and 2009 (LEE) and cover 
the time period up to 2020. The LTAs were signed by two Government Ministers (a: 
Economic Affairs and Infrastructure & Environment), the provincial authorities, the 
Association of Dutch Local Authorities (VNG), the participating enterprises and relevant 
                                               
30 This section is based on the documents “Long-term Agreement on Energy Efficiency for ETS enterprises 
(LEE)” (October 2, 2009); “LTA3—Long-term agreement on energy efficiency 2001-2020” (2008); “LTA: 
Long-Term Agreements on energy efficiency in The Netherlands” (2011); “Covenants results brochure 
concerning long-term agreements on energy efficiency” (2012). 
31 For example, as part of the LTA3, the following objectives have been agreed upon: an average Energy 
Efficiency Improvement for the relevant facilities of the participating enterprises of 30% in the period from 
2005 to 2020. Out of these 30%, 20 percentage points should be realized within the Facility and 10% 
outside of the facility. 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 54 
trade organizations. In total, more than 1,000 firms from over 40 sectors have signed the 
LTAs so far. The overall energy consumption of these companies is approx. 839 PJ, 
which is equivalent to around 80% of total industrial energy consumption in the 
Netherlands, and around 25% all energy consumption in the Netherlands. The overall 
energy consumption of the companies covered by the LEE covenant is approx. 600 PJ 
(which therefore constitutes a large part of the overall sum of 839 PJ).  
 
From a procedural perspective, it is important to note that the LTAs involve three 
different procedural elements and phases. The first stage concerned the initial setting up 
and signing of the agreements by the involved parties.  
 
Second, the LTAs imply an obligation for participating firms to draft an Energy 
Efficiency Plan (EEP) for its facilities every four years, and to implement these plans. 
The EEPs map out the enterprise’s energy efficiency goals, the intended measures to be 
employed, and a schedule for reaching these goals. Specifically, the minimum 
requirement in terms of content is that an EEP includes an overview of:  
 
(1) possibilities for adopting “profitable measures” at existing facilities at the time of 
joining and the result of those measures, expressed in the percentage of energy 
efficiency improvement per year and the avoided CO2 emission related to that; 
(2) the goal for the energy efficiency improvement (and the avoided CO2 emission 
related to that for ETS enterprises) during the period to which the EEP applies, 
including an indication of which measures are to be taken at which time. 
 
Note that “profitable measures” in the LTAs are defined as measures “that have a positive 
net cash value at an internal interest rate of 15 percent”, or, “alternatively, a cost recovery 
period of 5 years”. These measures may include simple measures such as, for example, 
automatic lighting regulation that automatically switches off lights at night or insulation 
of cables. Firms should take into account not only measures that directly improve energy 
efficiency at their own facilities (energy improvements within the company’s own 
production process), but also chain efficiency and renewable energy (i.e., energy 
management that relates more broadly to a firm’s striving for product and supply chain 
efficiency).  
 
Third, participation in the LTAs goes beyond compliance with regulations. The EEPs are 
tools for planning internal processes. For example, the EEPs list when which specific 
measures will be taken within the period of the EEP (see above). The company is then 
required to (self-)monitor whether these measures are implemented on time, and which 
progress is made as a result of the implementation. This (self-)monitoring element 
implies that the participating firms oblige with an annual reporting requirement. 
Specifically, for example, ETS enterprises need to provide explicit justification (“give 
sound reasons”) in case the result of the annual monitoring round indicates that the 
achieved energy efficiency improvement is less than the planned one as indicated in the 
EEP. Generally, every participating firm has to submit an annual report before April 1
st
 to 
a so-called competent authority, i.e., the corresponding public agency that is the 
competent authority for the relevant facility. This annual report details the progress made 
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over the course of the previous calendar year with the implementation of the EEP. The 
annual reporting requirement includes completion of an energy management checklist 
and its submission to the independent expert agency (AgentschapNL) before April 1
st
 of 
each year. In addition, every year, the independent agency orders a random audit of a 
sub-sample of participating firms. Initially, reporting requirements in the annual report 
related to the following elements: 
 
 Energy Efficiency Index (EEI) = quotient of the energy consumption in the year 
under review and the energy consumption that would have been required to 
realize the same production volume with the specific energy consumption for the 
products concerned in the reference year, as well as the CO2 emissions avoided as 
a result; 
 Renewable Energy Index (REI) = the level of deployment of renewable energy; 
 Energy Efficient Product Development Index (EEPDI) = a measurement of 
improvement in energy efficiency; 
 efforts made (projects implemented) in relation to the activities planned; 
 total fossil fuel energy conservation of the enterprise expressed as a single index 
(Total Energy Efficiency Index, TEEI), which consists of the EEI (related to 
process improvements), EEPDI (related to product development improvements), 
and REI (related to deployment of renewable energy). 
 
Importantly, in practice, implementation of and monitoring based on this fairly complex 
set of indices proved difficult. As a result, they were replaced by a system in which 
energy conservation is assessed based on the specific measures adopted by a firm 
(“genomen maatregelen”). 
 
Based on firms’ submissions, the independent expert agency (AgentschapNL) aggregates 
the data from the enterprise monitoring reports and reports every year by June 1
st
 to the 
relevant Energy Conservation Consultative Group, in aggregated form, about the energy 
conservation progress during the previous calendar year with regard to the 
implementation of systematic energy management measures; the implementation of 
EEPs; the energy efficiency improvement realized through the former two parts; the CO2 
emissions avoided as a result of the former two parts. It is important to note that 
deviations from EEPs may give rise to re-negotiations and/or the conclusion of additional 
agreements. Importantly, the resultats have to be sent to the “Tweede kamer” each year in 
September. 
 
In terms of results, for the year 2011, firms under the LEE covenant have undertaken 
measures that together have resulted in annual savings of some 9.6 PJ (equivalent to the 
annual energy consumption of approx. 150,000 Dutch private households). LTA3 firms 
over this time period contributed annual energy savings of 6.7 PJ (equivalent to the 
energy consumption of approx. 100,000 Dutch private households.)  
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Finally, it is important to note that the sketched long-term agreements rest on the 
assumption of voluntary participation, rather than regulation that obliges firms across the 
board (e.g., mandatory adoption of energy conservation measures).
32
  
 
 
3.2.1 Relevant Features of LTAs   
Unlike the previous two instruments, the (indicative) energy statements and smart meters, 
which address energy efficiency in the domain of private households, the LTAs relate to 
organisations and managers acting on behalf of these organisations.  
 
From a policy-making perspective, core features of the LTAs as policy instruments for 
fostering sustainable decision-making are their (self-)monitoring, commitment, and goal 
setting features.  
 
As a self-monitoring device, they force firms to take stock of their current practices in the 
domain of energy use. This implies, first, that firms have to gather the relevant internal 
and external information on both the status quo as well as potentially energy-saving 
(future) investments. Second, the annual reporting requirements force firms to 
continuously assess the development of their energy consumption. Third, importantly, the 
LTAs also imply that firms need to consider and improve energy efficiency along the 
value chain. That is, downstream firms, for example, are explicitly encouraged to include 
in their (self-)monitoring efforts the energy efficiency of their suppliers as upstream 
firms.
33
  
 
As a monitoring device, the LTAs and the implied annual reporting requirements provide 
governmental agencies with the necessary information to monitor firms’ progress in the 
domain of energy efficiency; enable dialogue between firms and the government and 
inform policy-makers about specific challenges that firms may face and that may arise 
and lead to deviations from plan; and—at least in theory—enable governmental agencies 
to assess the relative performance of firms in terms of improving their energy efficiency.  
 
As commitment devices, the LTAs enable firms and the managers that are heading them 
to overcome procrastination challenges and barriers to investing in future energy saving 
measures. However, it also has to be noted that the manner in which the LTAs are 
currently set up (e.g., little exogenous guidance in and fairly non-ambitious requirements 
for the formulation of the initial energy efficiency improvement plan), implies that firms 
have an incentive to not aim high in their plans for energy efficiency progress. Instead, 
                                               
32 It should be noted that organizations that participate in the LTAs (“MJAs”) are entitled to a (limited) 
exemption/(partial) refund of their energy tax for electricity consumption (“Energiebelastingteruggaaf”) 
that is linked to their participation in the LTAs. 
33 The inclusion in the LTAs of requirements for firms to take into account in their self-monitoring chain 
efficiency recognizes the difficulties associated with capturing such a comprehensive perspective in 
detailed regulation. Based on individual regulation, firms can only be obliged to undertake measures 
directed at improving process efficiency within the individual firm. The LTAs allow for including an 
overarching value chain obligation.  
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they have an incentive to formulate decidedly non-ambitious goals in order to make sure 
that they have a good chance of fulfilling the plan (commitment) over the subsequent 
years to which the LTA applies.
34
 In recognition of this potential problem, the plans are 
get evaluated and, if judged to be too non-ambitious, discussions with the firm are 
initiated. In case of a negative outcome of these discussions, the firm could ultimately be 
excluded from the convenant.   Regarding the LTAs function as goal setting devices, it is 
important to take into account the processes that underlie the setting and adaptation of 
corporate goals. In particular, the organizational behaviour literature has related learning 
processes and adjustment of behaviour to aspiration levels (goals of the organization).  
 
Following March and Simon (1958), a basic assumption of many models of 
organizational behaviour is that individuals and organizations learn and adjust their 
behaviour in response to experience. The main assumption made is that organizations set 
goals and adjust behaviour in response to favourable and unfavourable feedback in 
accordance with simple decision rules (Cyert & March, 1963). The role of goals, or 
aspiration levels, is a critical part of these models (Lant, 1992) and aspirations determine 
whether past performance is framed as a success or failure, thus influencing the 
interpretations of the managers and subsequent organizational behaviour (Lant, 1992). 
Two major determinants of the formation and adaptation of organizational aspiration 
levels are historic feedback on a firm’s own past actions (similar to the historic feedback 
about a private household’s own past energy consumption), and feedback related to social 
comparisons, that is, the actions of a firm’s relevant peer group (similar to the 
benchmarking by providing private households with information about comparable 
neighbors’ average energy consumption).     
 
 
3.2.2 Applications of Results form the Literature Study  
Compared to studies on stimulating energy conservation among private households, 
research dealing with the stimulation of energy conservation by firms and organizations 
is much more limited.
35
 The following lines of arguments do, however, emerge clearly 
from this limited body of literature (see Section 2.3.1 and Appendix A.4 for more detail).  
 
First, the profit motive is likely to drive firms more strongly to overcome inertia in the 
adoption of cost-saving energy conservation measures. However, prior research has 
identified substantial barriers to firms’ investment even in such cases (Maon et al., 2009). 
These barriers together result in a serious implementation gap with respect to investments 
in energy-saving technology. In fact, the observation that firms do not always implement 
profitable investments in energy-saving technology constitutes one of the most pervasive 
anomalies in energy economics.  
 
                                               
34 First effects of introducing LTA’s as goal setting devices can already be seen in the increased energy 
efficiency of approximately 25%, recently published by Dutch universities.  
35 There is, of course, the vast literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Covering this literature 
extensively is beyond the scope of this report. However, we do summarize main lines of research in this 
area here in as far as they are relevant for the current research project.  
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Second, competition and the need to justify decisions towards shareholders imply that 
investments in energy conservation measures that are not actually cost-saving but require 
firms to sacrifice some of their profits face even higher barriers—unless, that is, failure to 
implement socially desirably investments in energy conservation becomes a threat to 
profits, too, by hurting a firm’s reputation and relative standing. A firm’s reputation 
combines everything that is knowable about a firm. As an empirical representation, it is a 
judgment of the firm made by a set of audiences on the basis of perceptions and 
assessments that are assembled and made available via a ranking system, which defines, 
assesses, and compares firms’ reputation according to certain predefined criteria (Schultz, 
Mouritsen & Gabrielsen, 2001). While the exact profit implications of a firm’s reputation 
and of any damage to it may be difficult to gauge, prior literature tends to agree that a 
positive reputation, that is, a relatively better standing and image of a firm compared to 
its relevant competitors, constitutes an asset that can generate future rents and above-
average profits in the medium and long run (e.g., Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Weigelt & 
Camerer, 1988; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Profit-oriented firms can, therefore, be 
assumed to care about avoiding damage to their reputation and image.  
External sources (e.g., media, governmental regulation) provide valuable feedback to 
firms about the extent to which society values energy-efficient behavior of firms and the 
degree to which, in turn, failure to engage in energy conservation may hurt a firm’s 
profits by damaging its reputation. However, given difficulties in operationalizing the 
concept of reputation, and in view of the typically qualitative nature of feedback provided, 
for example, by media coverage, it is difficult for firms to gauge the optimal amount of 
investment in non-cost-saving energy conservation technologies. Unambiguous indicators 
of relevant benchmarks can, therefore, help firms substantially in their assessment of their 
relative position vis-à-vis their peers, and, hence, their reputation. An example is the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) family. In 1999, the Dow Jones Sustainability World 
Index was launched as the first global sustainability benchmark.
36
 The family of indices 
tracks the stock performance of the world's leading companies in terms of economic, 
environmental and social criteria. In essence, they provide a ranking with respect to these 
criteria and thereby convey social norms among relevant peers (e.g., competing firms in 
the same industry). Companies appear to take their relative position in these indices 
seriously. Anecdotal evidence shows that, for example, automobile firms like BMW 
extensively use information on their position in the sustainability index in advertising. 
Indeed, more generally, Cho, Guidry, Hageman, and Paten (2012) showed that a firm’s 
DJSI designation was positively associated with perceptions of corporate reputation.  
The social norm expressed in the DJSI ranking, therefore, contains information about the 
opinions and performances of peers. As such it acts as important feedback factor for the 
past behavior of the firm, relative to its competitors, and can constitute an important input 
for adjusting the firm’s aspiration level for the next period. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, 
social norms constitute a promising type of nudge, a type of non-monetary incentive to 
positively influence energy consumption of individual consumers. The competitive 
environment of firms, managers’ accountability vis-à-vis shareholders and other 
                                               
36 See http://www.sustainability-indices.com/index-family-overview/djsi-family.jsp 
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stakeholders, and managers’ greater visibility within organizations and in society all 
imply that, while non-monetary rewards (such as reputation, image, prestige) or 
punishments (such as shame) are relevant for all individuals, we may expect equally 
strong or even stronger effects of relevant social norms on the Behavior of managers who 
act on behalf of their firms. (Public) visibility of managerial actions, for example, is 
something that follows directly from the position of managers’ in the hierarchy. Since 
managers are the most visible members of an organization and outsiders see them as 
representative of the organization itself, it is their task to present with their actions the 
organization’s core values and purpose to the world (Scott & Lane, 2000). Besides 
achieving the desired corporate image outside the organization, managers’ visibility 
affects their decisions within the organization itself. A direct relationship exists between 
power and visibility—the more powerful a manager is, the more visible his or her actions 
will be (Ortega, 2003). Therefore, it seems likely that for any type of ranking nudge or 
social norm to affect managers’ decisions (by affecting reputation, self-image and 
perceived status) public visibility is crucial. Prior evidence suggests that, indeed, “naming 
and shaming” tends to have a positive effect on pro-social Behavior in general. Besley, 
Bevan, and Burchardi (2009) analysed the effect of a “naming and shaming” approach 
used in 2001 to reduce long waiting lists for hospitals in England. They found that this 
policy did indeed reduce waiting times.  
 
However, overall, despite the importance of the issues, and compared to the literature on 
the effects of nudges on energy-related behaviors of private households, there is very 
little prior research on the impact of non-monetary incentives such as, for example, social 
norms and rankings, on managers’ striving for energy conservation.  
 
 
3.2.3 Application of Experimental Results 
Our own experimental findings suggest that by incorporating motivational and 
behavioural approaches, such as commitments, goal setting, social comparisons, and 
competition, into the various phases of the long-term agreements (LTAs) may effectively 
stimulate organisations energy efficiency and curtailment behaviours. 
 
At the first stage of the initial setting up and signing of the LTAs by the involved parties, 
already serves as public commitment and goal setting and already seems to have positive 
effects on organisations’ energy efficiency. Our experimental results suggest that the 
more these goals are formulated in terms of net present values, the larger is the expected 
psychological effect on the managers’ decision making in the implementation phase.  
 
Our results further suggest that confronting top managers with an informative and 
conjunctive industry norm, and more spefically asking the top management to justify the 
Energy Efficiency Plan (EEP), in comparison to such a norm, in writing or speaking 
towards relevant stakeholders may have an additional positive effect. At the first stage of 
the initial setting up and signing of the LTAs, these stakeholders may be the Government 
Ministers, the provincial authorities, the Association of Dutch Local Authorities (VNG), 
or relevant trade organizations. 
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This justification could also be included in the reporting requirements in the annual 
report submitted to the independent expert agency (AgentschapNL). This independent 
agency should, next to conducting random audits of sub-samples of participating firms, 
also be able to compose rankings of organisations (within their relevant industries) with 
respect to achievments. The anticipation of such rankings, published at random points of 
time, may induce extra energy efficiency and curtailment behaviours.  
 
4. Conclusion 
While the global challenges related to sustainability are manifest, defining how 
governments can meet the challenges is a daunting task. Sustainability encompasses a 
broad range of issues, it involves the interaction of a broad range of decision makers, and 
it includes all parts of the world. If there is any agreement, then it is on the insight that 
behaviour collectively needs to change towards more sustainable, and more pro-social 
decision-making. In stimulating more sustainable and more pro-social decision-making, 
attention has turned away, in recent times from the creation of price incentives and 
disincentives (monetary rewards and punishments, e.g. subsidies) towards non-price 
interventions such as making sustainable decision alternatives the ‘default’ choice, rather 
than requiring deliberate opt-in. This development rests on a growing body of academic 
research in behavioural economics and psychology which suggests that non-monetary 
incentives can potentially be just as powerful as prices in changing choices and 
behaviour—and potentially much less costly. 
 
Understandably, this idea has attracted the attention of policymakers,  as the prospect of 
enhancing sustainable decision-making, both more effectively and efficiently, is 
compelling, especially at times of fiscal constraints. Policy should be based on sound 
research and avoid applying non-price interventions without good evidence of whether 
the measures they introduce do in fact work. Unfortunately, until now only scattered 
evidence from laboratory experiments and isolated field studies is available. Without 
further research, getting it right might be the result of luck rather than foresight.  
In the light of this, the present study specifically focused on sustainable decision-making 
to increase energy conservation. It aimed at (1) improving upon existing studies by taking 
stock of the current state-of-the-art in the field and, on that basis, suggesting and testing 
ways in which non-price interventions (‘nudges’) that have shown or argued to be 
promising can be further improved upon in their effectiveness. Furthermore, the study 
aimed at (2) incorporating new insights from recent psychological research that have not 
been analysed in this domain. And finally, (3) the behaviour of individuals that are in a 
“managerial” position received special attention. 
 
An overview of the main findings and conclusions of the present study is presented in 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 below. The literature is rather extensive regarding studies that analyse 
the effects of various nudges on energy efficiency of households. A translation—of both 
these findings and our own laboratory results—to the specific instruments that were 
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identified to be of immediate relevance for the Dutch context
37
 leads to the main 
conclusion:  
 
Information, feedback, and monitoring features of the bi-monthly (indicative) energy 
statement and the smart meter can possibly be used to increase energy conservation 
efforts.  
 
The following general do’s and don’ts for stimulating energy conservation can be 
tentatively summarized: 
 
• Emphasise present benefits of energy efficient behaviour for the individual in 
order to avoid strong discounting. 
• Emphasise present benefits of energy efficient behaviour for close others to 
reduce social, temporal, and spacial distance—perceived distance drastically 
decreases pro-social decision-making.  
• Don’t use “cheap talk” commitment—rather introduce a small (social) cost for not 
living up to the commitment (goal setting), i.e. public (costly) commitments.  
• Use informative and injunctive social norms in explicitly non-strategic settings. 
• Use rankings in explicitly strategic settings, i.e. when actors can influence the 
norm itself. 
• Use offline, not online delivery of feedback information. Online feedback has 
shown to have low effectiveness. 
• Apply the KISS-principle when providing information: Information must be easy 
to grasp and immediately relevant. Information on energy conservation, for 
example, is most effective when only a minimal amount of information is 
provided but it is well-presented and easy to absorb. 
• Emphasize cost information rather than energy unit savings information: Cost 
information generally attracts more attention and is valued more than unit (kW) 
information.  
• If the goal is to save energy: Do not focus on savings during specific time periods 
– such campaigns tend to shift rather than reduce overall consumption.   
 
With respect to nudges affecting energy efficiency of firms, there is hardly any literature 
available at present. Own experimental results indicate that it might be possible to use the 
LTA’s that are signed by top managers and organizational leaders to implement relevant 
non-price interventions: In the experiments, accountability and a need to justify one’s 
decisions vis-à-vis others (visibility) made decision-makers particularly susceptible to the 
positive impact of social norms on pro-social decision-making, that is: these features 
increased the power of social norms substantially. While future research is needed to 
corroborate these results, the findings suggest that designing nudges that combine a 
salient and public need for justification with feedback on social norms may substantially 
increase pro-social choices of individuals in managerial positions.  
 
                                               
37 This refers to instruments that are under the direct or indirect influence of the EZ.  
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The following do’s and don’ts for stimulating energy conservation by firms and 
organizations can be tentatively summarized: 
 
• Use informative and injunctive social norms for (top) managers of firms. 
• Let (top) managers of firms justify (explicitly, in regular intervals, and in a form 
that directly links the person with the content (e.g., in writing or speaking; rather 
than signing only); with public visibility) their energy-related investment 
decisions. 
• Use the anticipation effect—anticipation of being ranked works almost as well as 
the experience of being ranked.  
 
The application of behavioural economic theory in policy making is not without its critics. 
Some deride it as manipulative and paternalistic. But even under the most positive 
perspective, there is little reason to believe that policies that are inspired by research on 
behavioural patterns observed in the laboratory would be successful in the real world, and 
that behavioural patterns observed in isolated field studies in one country are relevant for 
other countries. There are several reason to assume that causal mechanisms may not be 
transposable (due to cultural differences, or because the specific context matters, or 
because of unintended side effects when transposed to other contexts). Only (randomized 
controlled trial) field studies in the Netherlands that (1) study behaviour for a longer 
period, and that (2) use nudges that are related to the discussed instruments and 
consciously designed, will allow to draw quantitative conclusions about the potential 
effect on changes in energy efficiency of such non-price interventions.  
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Instrument: Smart Meters with Indicative Energy Statements38  
Relevant 
nudges 
Results from the literature review
39
,  laboratory 
experiment, and case studies 
Unresolved questions Implications for further 
research 
Informa-
tion 
feedback 
 Consumption feedback through advanced billing practices 
has a positive effect (max 11% in the field, and max 20% 
in lab). 
 Saving advice has a positive effect (max. 5% in the field). 
 Information provided on-line has no significant effect, 
unlike offline information provision which has a 
significant positive effect. 
 Information needs to be provided timely, minimal but 
well-presented and easy to absorb. 
 Information needs to emphasise savings/benefits in the 
present. 
It is not clear how to reach those consumers 
who are least interested, as information can 
easily be ignored. Probably a combination of 
very specific advice and related monetary 
consequences (potential gains and losses from 
change in behaviour) may be effective, e.g. 
“You are currently losing €x each month by 
not consistently turning off your light.” The 
aim should be to change habits in order to 
achieve lasting effects. 
The analysis of data provided 
by the first roll-out in 
comparison to control group 
will give insights about the 
saving potential in the 
Netherlands. Market research 
should reveal how information 
can be provided in an effective 
and efficient way, and how 
awareness of energy 
consumers is best stimulated. 
Commit-
ment and 
goal 
setting 
 Private commitment has positive effect (max 12% in the 
lab). 
 Public commitment (e.g. signed statements) has moderate 
positive effect (max 15% in the field). 
  
Voluntary commitment to specific saving 
goals could be included in subsequent 
indicative energy statement, but it is not clear 
whether this will lead to a lasting effect i.e. 
change of habits. 
Randomized controlled trial 
field studies in the 
Netherlands using 
commitment and goal setting. 
Social 
norms 
 Social norms reduced energy consumption (2%-6% in the 
field)  
 Informative and injunctive norms have no significant 
effect on individuals in strategic settings (in the lab) 
Which social norm is perceived as “relevant” 
is difficult to predict. Individuals may identify 
with the immediate neighbourhood or with 
demographically similar households.  
Survey to identify relevant 
norms. After that, randomized 
controlled trial field studies in 
the Netherlands using the 
identified norm(s). 
Ranking  Public rankings increase pro-social behaviour of 
individuals in strategic settings (max. 15% in the lab). 
Addressing individuals’ image concerns 
(‘naming and shaming’) has potentially large 
and lasting effects. It may be effective to rank 
smaller communities (e.g., neighbourhoods, 
postcode areas) instead of individual 
households and publish rankings regularly in 
Laboratory study to test public 
ranking of groups vs. control 
groups, and compare to effect 
of ranking individuals within 
groups. 
                                               
38 Estimates for the effects of different nudges on energy saving vary dramatically. In this tabel we report average effect sizes. In doing so we applied two 
principles: 1) There where studies report large differences the reported numbers are based on the most representative research. 2) Within a group of 
representative studies we chose not to weigh studies but rather report the maxima of the average effect sizes found in these studies. Findings are also applicable 
for comparable kinds of instruments with indirect feedback.  
39 The results from the literature review include findings from prior laboratory studies as well as field studies and field experiments.  
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local newspapers. 
Framing  Precise framing (e.g., presentation) matters crucially and 
can make or break the effectiveness of the particular 
nudge. 
 Deviation from norm could be framed in (monetary) 
losses, should have a positive effect (no evidence yet). 
The effect of feedback information depends 
crucially on the precise presentation. Not 
living up to a goal, or consuming more than 
the norm could be communicated in terms of 
losses, e.g. “You spent €x each month more 
than the average household in your 
neighbourhood”. 
Survey to identify relevant 
norms. After that, randomized 
controlled trial field studies in 
the Netherlands using the 
identified norm(s) with 
different frames. 
Table 2: Main research findings with specific relevance for instruments: Indicative energy statements 
 
 
 
Instrument: Smart Meters with Real-Time Display40 
Relevant 
nudges 
Results from the literature review
41
,  laboratory 
experiment, and case studies 
Unresolved questions Implications for further 
research 
Informa-
tion 
feedback 
 Installation of smart meter has a small non-lasting effect 
(max. 5%). 
 Consumption feedback via RTD has a positive effect 
(max. 8%). 
 Installation of smart meter reduces customer complaints 
due to improved customer service. 
Consumers need to see an effect of their 
energy savings on their energy bill to achieve 
lasting effects. 
If technically feasible, during 
the next rollout in the 
Netherlands an RTD should 
be provided  and the effects of 
the inclusion of an informative 
(and preferably also 
injunctive) social norm should 
be tested against a control 
group (randomized trial field 
study). 
Social 
norms 
 Informative and injunctive social norms should have a 
positive effect (no evidence yet). 
Which norm is perceived as “relevant”  is 
difficult to predict (see above). 
Framing  Deviation from social norm could be framed in (monetary 
or kW) losses, should have a positive effect (no evidence 
yet). 
The effect of feedback information depends 
crucially on the precise presentation (see 
above). 
Table 3: Main research findings with specific relevance for instruments: Smart meters 
                                               
40 Estimates for the effects of different nudges on energy saving vary dramatically. In this tabel we report average effect sizes. In doing so we applied two 
principles: 1) There where studies report large differences the reported numbers are based on the most representative research. 2) Within a group of 
representative studies we chose not to weigh studies but rather report the maxima of the average effect sizes found in these studies. Findings are also applicable 
for comparable kinds of instruments with direct feedback.  
41 Idem. 
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Instrument: LTAs 
Relevant 
nudges 
Results from the literature review
42
,  laboratory 
experiment, and case studies 
Unresolved questions Implications for further 
research 
Social 
norms 
 Informative and injunctive social norms increase 
pro-social behaviour of individuals in managerial 
positions (max 45% in the lab). 
The results were derived from observing students in 
managerial positions, the representativeness of the 
findings for managers’ decision making needs to be 
confirmed.  
Which social norm is perceived as “relevant” for 
managers is difficult to predict (same industry, similar 
firm size, country or region-specific etc.). 
Survey to identify relevant 
norms among Dutch top 
managers.  
Field experiment to test effects 
of informative and injunctive 
social norm information on 
managers’ decision making in 
simulations of real-life 
decisions. 
Ranking  Public rankings increase pro-social behaviour of 
individuals in managerial positions (max 40% in 
the lab). 
The results were derived from observing students in 
managerial positions, the representativeness of the 
findings for   managers’ decision making needs to be 
confirmed.  
Field experiment to test effects 
of public ranking on 
managers’ decision making in 
simulations. 
Justifica-
tion 
 Recurring (written) justification of decisions in 
relation to a social norm should have positive 
effects (no clear evidence yet). 
The results were derived while justification was 
combined with a social norm. It is not clear to what 
extent justification alone has an effect. Provided that 
results are transferable to managers’ decision-making: 
Energy efficiency needs to be high on the agenda of 
CEOs. Probably only a verbal justification in front of 
highly ranked policy makers would achieve this effect. 
It is unclear where in the process of signing an LTA 
this intervention would be meaningful and feasible. 
Laboratory study to test 
managerial justification 
contest vs. private justification 
context. 
Commit-
ment and 
goal 
setting 
 The public binding commitment character of 
LTAs has first positive effects (no systematic 
evidence yet). 
 The analysis of data provided 
by the firms’ reports based on 
first LTAs in comparison to 
(possibly foreign) control 
group will give insights about 
the saving potential in the 
Netherlands. 
Table 4: Main research findings with specific relevance for instruments: LTAs 
                                               
42 Idem. 
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Appendix A: Literature Review  
 
“Failure to act for the public good has created major social problems. As the population 
continues to explode, acting in ways that suit our own self-interests – or whims – without 
considering the consequences for others has led to crisis after crisis: trash-littered public parks, 
streets, and highways; polluted rivers and streams; dropping water tables and shrinking 
reservoirs; vanishing rain forests; the continuing slaughter of whales; reduced social services 
and underfunded schools; free riders who enjoy public TV but do not ante up.” Batson (1994, p. 
603) 
 
A.1 Foundations of Human Motivation for Pro-Social Behavior 
Theories about pro-social behavior have a long history in psychology, and only more 
recently have been addressed in the field of behavioral economics. In the latter area, 
researchers look mainly to these psychological theories in order to explain effects that 
cannot be explained through standard (neoclassical) (micro-)economic reasoning.  
 
A Psychological Perspective 
In order to understand the motivation behind several forms of pro-social behavior, such 
as giving to charity, the underlying principle of goals and unintended consequences needs 
to be addressed. Batson et al. (2008), analyzing the psychological literature on the subject, 
state that “if a negative discrepancy is perceived between a current or anticipated state 
and a valued (desired, preferred) state, then obtaining or maintaining the valued state is 
likely to become a goal”. Using this statement, it is possible to distinguish between 
ultimate goals, instrumental goals, and unintended consequences. Ultimate goals are 
these valued states that a person is seeking at a given time. Instrumental goals are 
stepping stones towards these ultimate goals, in other words, these are partial goals. 
Unintended consequences are effects of action that in themselves are not goals. In 
analyzing people’s motivation for pro-social behavior, these three broad categories need 
to be taken into account. Batson et al. (2008) also state that “the more directly a given 
behaviour promotes an ultimate goal, and the more uniquely it does so among the 
behavioural options available, the more likely it is to occur”. It is, then, the value of the 
different valued states that directs people towards behaving in a certain way. This 
direction of one’s behavior towards a specific goal is called motivation, and the larger the 
step to the ultimate goal, the stronger the motivation. Lewin (1951) argued that motives 
are changeable, goal-directed forces, and that, therefore, they can conflict or augment 
each other.  
 
Following this Lewinian perspective on human motivation, Batson (1994) determined 
four specific ultimate goals for behaving pro-socially or in favor of a public good. These 
four goals are (a) egoism, (b) altruism, (c) collectivism, and (d) principlism. They are 
ultimate goals in that they determine for each specific person the motives that underlie 
pro-social behavior. As Lewin (1951) stated, these goals can at times augment each other, 
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and at other times conflict with each other. The conflict arises, for instance, in social 
dilemmas: situations in which choosing to allocate resources to oneself is going to 
provide more utility to the individual than allocating those resources to a group, but the 
total utility can only be maximized by allocating resources to the group. The individual 
goals present in these situations are discussed in detail below. 
 
Egoism. The most basic and well-supported of goals of behaving pro-socially is, perhaps 
somewhat paradoxically, egoism. It is defined as benefiting someone else in anticipation 
of self-benefit. This self-benefit, in turn, has many different forms, as indicated by Table 
A1. There are three broad categories, each of which has specific examples supported by 
empirical evidence (Batson et al. 2008). Within the framework of egoism, pro-social 
behavior thus always exists as an instrumental goal: it is used to receive rewards, avoid 
punishments, or reduce aversive arousal. In itself, therefore, pro-social behavior is not an 
ultimate goal in the context of egoism. It is merely instrumental. To illustrate how egoism 
as an ultimate goal can motivate pro-social behavior, consider the simple example of 
children only receiving their candy if they share it with their friends. Ordinarily an 
exercise to teach children how to share, in essence this behavior is motivated purely by 
egoism: the child promises to share so he can get candy himself. In Table A.1, this 
example would fall under ‘Gifts’ in the first distinct category. This simple form of 
egoism, however, is not very prevalent in the realm of adult life. There, more subtle 
forms of egoism are predominant. One such subtle form of egoism is that of avoiding 
social sanctions for norm violation. If a specific form of pro-social behavior, such as 
cleaning up a shared kitchen, is considered as the norm, violating this norm is usually met 
with certain social sanctions, such as exclusion or gossip. Another example of a subtle 
form of egoism is that of mood-enhancement. Cialdini et al (1973) and Isen (1970) 
argued, respectively, that people behave more pro-socially both when they are in a 
negative mood (enhancement) and when they are in a positive mood (maintenance). In 
this way, behaving pro-socially can be motivated by trying to feel better or avoiding to 
feel worse.  
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Table A.1.Possible self-benefits from benefiting another person 
(adapted from Batson et al., 2008) 
 
While the specific goals in the first two categories are relatively clear-cut, the goals in the 
last category (see Table A.1), which are referred to as “escape from unjust situation”, 
demand more specific attention. This goal is derived from Lerner (1980), who stated that 
“all people that we consider normal, i.e. are able to function in their respective society, 
develop a certain just world view” (p. 137). This just world concept is the idea that 
people always feel the consequences of their actions, or, as Batson et al. (2008) state 
“people get what they deserve and deserve what they get” (p. 137). The people that have 
a high belief in a just world see unjust situations as aversive, and thereby try to escape 
from it. They do this either by rationalizing victimization (i.e. giving an explanation that 
would fit with their view) or by actually engaging in pro-social behavior.  
 
Experiments on this subject by Miller (1977a, 1977b) have shown that people are more 
likely to opt for the pro-social behavior when they perceive the problem as solvable and 
when they perceive their actions as having a large impact towards solving the problem. In 
an applied way, this is a matter of framing the problem in such a way that the actor 
believes the problem can be solved through pro-social action and that he actually can 
exert a significant influence. Consequently, for example, charity organizations have long 
worked with visual cues that focus on a single person rather than a group, thereby 
framing the problem of for instance starvation as a solvable problem.  
 
Altruism. This is the ‘purest’ goal linked to pro-social behavior in the sense that here pro-
social behavior itself is the ultimate goal, and not an instrumental goal or an unintended 
consequence. The existence of altruism and measurement thereof is debatable: even 
though altruism might exist, one will always tend to feel pleasure by helping others. This 
pleasure can either be an ultimate goal (egoism), or it might be a by-product of the 
1. Receiving material, social, and self-rewards 
 Payment Praise 
 Gifts Honor 
 Reciprocity credit Enhanced self-image 
 Thanks 
Esteem 
Mood enhancement 
(maintenance) 
 Heaven Empathic joy 
2. Avoiding material, social, and self-punishments 
 Fines/imprisonment Recrimination 
 Attack 
Hell 
Sanctions for norm 
violation 
 Censure Shame 
  Guilt 
3. Reducing aversive arousal 
 Escape from distressing situation 
 Escape from discrepant situation 
 Escape from unjust situation 
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ultimate goal of altruism. The two possibilities are separated merely by a differing 
assumption of hedonism: Advocates of egoism assume a strong form of hedonism: 
attainment of personal pleasure is always the goal of human action. Therefore, true 
altruism exists only as an illusory by-product of one of the egoistic reasons for helping 
others. Advocates of the existence of ‘true’ altruism, on the other hand, assume that only 
a weak form of hedonism exists: attainment of personal pleasure is, in itself, a result of 
goal attainment. It is therefore compatible with the idea of altruism: even though people 
feel better by helping others, this is not necessarily their ultimate goal. The most 
influential hypothesis behind the existence of altruism is called the “empathy-altruism 
hypothesis”.  According to this hypothesis, “purely altruistic action can occur reliably, 
provided that it is preceded by a specific psychological state: empathic concern for 
another” (Cialdini et al., 1997: p. 481). Empirical evidence for the existence of empathy 
in itself is strong, naturally, with research spanning several academic fields besides 
psychology. In addition to supporting the mere existence of empathy, psychological 
literature also supports the hypothesis that empathy might play an important role as a 
motivator of pro-social behavior (see Eisenberg & Miller, 1987 for a review). 
 
The difference between the empathy-altruism hypothesis and several egoistic motivation 
based hypotheses, the largest of which is the aversive-arousal reduction, is in the 
direction of causality to personal pleasure. While the empathy-altruism hypothesis 
proposes that pleasure is a result of altruism, the latter ones suggest that altruism is a 
result of the desire for pleasure. This is in essence a rephrasing of the discussion 
described above. Observing behavior, however, can never be the perfect measure for 
underlying constructs of motivation: an action can be motivated by egoism, altruism, or 
both (Batson et al., 2008). Even though the concept is hard to test, the literature supports 
the empathy-altruism hypothesis marginally better than the egoistic alternatives. The 
tentative conclusion can then be drawn that there is indeed such a thing as ‘true’ altruism.  
 
The empirical support for both collectivism and principlism as underlying goals of pro-
social behavior is less strong than for the aforementioned two types of goals. 
 
Collectivism. Collectivism implies that the ultimate goal of pro-social behavior could be 
benefiting a group of people of which the actor is part. Here, too, the dilemma arises: are 
pro-social actions truly motivated by collectivism, or merely by a subtle form of egoism? 
To date the literature on this question is ambiguous (Batson et al., 2008). 
 
Principlism. The ultimate goal for pro-social behavior that is associated with principlism 
is that of upholding (abstract) moral principles. The hypothesis underlying this motive is 
that humans act in a way that is good for the public because they hold a set of moral 
principles, such as “it is bad to litter the park” or “it is my duty to vote”, and they wish to 
uphold these motives (Batson, Ahmad, & Tsang, 2002). Again, mere observation cannot 
give unambiguous conclusions on whether this motive in fact exists, and the actions that 
seem motivated by principlism can also be explained by subtle egoism. For instance, the 
egoistic motive associated with Lerner’s (1980) just world view, as described earlier, 
could be an explanation in many cases where principlism could apply. 
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An Economic Perspective 
While conceptually, the four sketched types of goals form a comprehensive basic 
psychologically-motivated model of the motivation behind pro-social behavior, recent 
economic research has developed theoretical frameworks that closely parallel the one 
suggested by Batson et al. (2008).  
 
Most prominently, Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2008) provided an integrative, general 
view of pro-social behavior motivation from a business and economic policy perspective 
rather than from a purely psychological perspective. Their theoretical framework draws 
from classical motivation theory applied to pro-social behavior. According to this theory, 
motivation in pro-social behavior can be divided into the three broad categories of 
motivation, that is: intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and image motivation.  
 
Intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation includes categories such as pure altruism and 
other forms of pro-social preferences (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2008). In reference to the 
Batson et al. (2008) framework, this category contains altruism, collectivism, and 
principlism motives, as shown in the top panels in Figure A1. Intrinsic motivation is 
assumed not to be influenced by external factors: it is an inherent motivation for or 
tendency towards acting for the public good. 
  
Extrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation has to do with any material reward or benefit 
associated with giving to others. This category of motives is largely based on the egoism 
motivation of the Baston et al. (2008) framework, but is not synonymous with it: extrinsic 
motivation is based more on basic, first-order egoism, such as the material and self-
rewards and punishments shown in Table A.1, and does not include the more subtle, 
often social forms of egoism. Extrinsic motivation, unlike intrinsic motivation, is easily 
influenced, as rewards are often (but not always) externally regulated. A principal could 
easily increase the extrinsic motivation of an agent to whom he delegates a task by, for 
example, adding or increasing a monetary reward contingent on pro-social action. 
  
Image motivation. Image motivation is very important in pro-social behavior, as it is for a 
large part a determinant of the extent to which the behavior will be performed, as will be 
discussed in the following sections. Image motivation is otherwise known as signaling 
motivation, as it has to do with the fact that people are at least partially motivated by 
other’s perception of their behavior. This category of motives can be aligned with the 
more subtle forms of egoism, those forms that have to do with the social rewards and 
punishments in Table A.1. For example, one might help a person in need because it is 
considered to be the social norm: not performing the pro-social action could be met with 
exclusion. Changing a person’s image motivation is harder than changing extrinsic 
motivation: the image motivation is based on social norms and values, which are 
relatively stable across time. The saliency of the observation by society, however, is 
something that can be altered, thereby raising or lowering image concerns in pro-social 
behavior. A concept mainly prominent in economic sociology, highly related to this last 
motivational category of image motivation is ‘conspicuous consumption’ (Veblen, 1899). 
The idea of conspicuous consumption is that individuals emulate the consumption 
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patterns of other individuals situated at higher points in the hierarchy, and in this way try 
to signal a certain status (Trigg, 2001). Consumption is in this case motivated for a large 
part by the just described image motivation, and is changed according to the social norms 
that exist. In pro-social behavior, conspicuous consumption can for instance be seen in 
donations to charity: donating a large amount of money to charity signals a certain 
selfless, generous character trait that is associated with high social standing. 
 
A Synthesis of the Psychological and Economic Perspectives 
Figure A.1 relates to two sketched theoretical frameworks to each other. Note that the 
model suggested by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2008) is more focused on the well-
supported different forms of egoistic motives, and less on the debatable motives of 
altruism, collectivism, and principlism. In the context of influencing the motivations 
behind pro-social behavior, or changing the relative importance of different types of 
motivations, the focus should indeed also be on these factors: they are most easily 
changeable and most clearly defined. In accordance with this statement, Batson (1994) 
also mentions that egoistic motives as a source of action for the public good shows 
promise because they are easily aroused and they are potent. 
 
 
Figure A.1. Integration of the Theories of Pro-social Behavior Motivation 
  
In order to understand how to encourage pro-social behavior through stimulating these 
motivations, it is crucial to understand how monetary and non-monetary rewards in 
general affect human motivation and propensity to act. The following section will 
therefore describe the theories and frameworks that exist in the area of motivation science 
regarding the effects of and interactions between incentives and punishments. 
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A.2 The Role of Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives in 
Stimulating Motivations for Pro-Social Behavior 
 
Reeve (2009) defines incentives as environmental events that attract or repel a person 
toward or away from initiating a particular course of action. Incentives thus incorporate 
all types of rewards and punishments in existence. The system of effects associated with 
these incentives is an intricate one, with differing effects of the specific incentive 
characteristics on the different types of motivation. In addition, there are effects of one 
type of motivation affecting another.  
 
The Hidden Costs of Reward 
The first basic effect originates in the psychology of human motivation and has had many 
different names throughout history, such as “the hidden cost of reward”, the “over-
justification effect”, and the “corruption effect” (Frey & Jegen, 2001). The hidden costs 
of rewards form one of the most well-established findings in psychology. It shows that 
besides the possible intended primary effect of promoting behavioral engagement in a 
desired activity, external rewards may have several unintended and possibly adverse side 
effects. Reeve (2009) notes three such side effects, in particular. The first is that rewards 
can undermine intrinsic motivation; the second is that rewards interfere with the quality 
and process of learning; and the third is that rewards interfere with the capacity for 
autonomous self-regulation. Each of these effects has a direction opposite to the primary 
goal of incentivizing certain behavior. The most prominent and relevant side effect is the 
first one: (external) rewards undermine intrinsic motivation. In an early study, Lepper & 
Greene (1975), for example, showed in an experimental setting that children showed less 
intrinsic motivation for a certain action after doing this action for a reward: their intrinsic 
motivation for doing the activity, in this case solving puzzles, was undermined.  
 
Using a similar type of experimental research setting as Lepper & Greene (1975), Reeve 
(2009) was able identify and disentangle two limiting conditions under which rewards 
will exhibit the three types of unintended side effects. A reward has to be (a) tangible and 
(b) expected. If a reward is expected or if the actor knows beforehand that he or she gets 
a reward after doing a certain action, intrinsic motivation is more quickly undermined 
than when a reward is unexpected. This means that in order to externally regulate 
behavior through rewards without undermining the intrinsic motivation for that behavior, 
it is essential that the reward is unexpected. A problem here, of course, is repeated 
behavior: the second time, a reward is already expected. Even if the reward is not 
mentioned explicitly, the actor might still to a certain extent expect a possibility of a 
reward. If a reward is tangible, such as money, food, or a trophy, the intrinsic motivation 
is also undermined more strongly than with intangible rewards, such as smiles or 
compliments. This means that when designing rewards, it is always important to think of 
ways to either make the rewards (more) intangible or to frame a reward in an intangible 
way, such as giving a day off instead of paying a day’s worth of money (Lacetera & 
Macis, 2008). 
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In addition to the expectancy and tangibility factors, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) 
identified a third factor that influenced the strength of the intrinsic motivation-
undermining effect: contingency. In their meta-analysis of 128 prior studies, they showed 
that different types of contingencies have different effects: when a reward was task-non-
contingent, no effect was shown, even when the rewards were tangible and expected. 
When a reward was engagement-contingent, completion-contingent, or performance-
contingent, the effect of the reward on subsequent free-choice behavior (such as, e.g., 
puzzle solving) was significant and negative. 
 
These factors are, of course, of most concern when it comes to tasks that have high 
intrinsic appeal. Tasks with inherently low intrinsic appeal are much more suited to be 
guided by extrinsic rewards of any kind. Reeve (2009) argues that this fact applies 
especially to the context of several types of pro-social and sustainable behavior, citing 
examples such as preventing drunk driving, participating in recycling, and energy 
conservation. In addition, Reeve (2009) argues that in these examples, the argument can 
be made that the society’s concerns for promoting the socially desirable behavior 
outweighs the concerns for preserving or protecting an individual’s autonomy, intrinsic 
motivation, quality of learning, and autonomous self-regulation. Table A.2 summarizes 
the sketched arguments 
 
 
Table A2. Reward factors undermining intrinsic motivation 
 
Table A.2. Reward factors and effect on intrinsic motivation 
 
Internalization  
Another (side) effect that incentives can best be understood when interpreted as part of a 
conceptual framework referred to as ‘Self-Determination Theory’ (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Ryan and Deci (2000) interpret motivation and the regulation of behavior not as a 
categorical variable, but rather as a continuum, with on the one hand external regulation, 
and on the other hand internal regulation. This relationship is displayed in Figure A.2 
below.  
 
Reward Factor 
 
Undermines intrinsic motivation 
when: 
 
Review authors 
 
Tangibility 
 
Rewards for the task are tangible, 
such as money, food, or prizes 
 
Reeve (2009) 
 
Expectancy 
 
Rewards are expected by the actor 
before performing the task 
 
Reeve (2009) 
 
Contingency 
 
Rewards are contingent on 
performance, engagement, or task-
completion 
Deci, Koestner, 
& Ryan (1999) 
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Figure A2. The self-determination continuum. 
(adapted from Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
 
 
Figure A.2. ‘Self-Determination Theory’ (Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
 
Ryan and Deci (2012) argue that different types of extrinsic motivation exist: first, there 
is externally regulated motivation; For example, monetary incentives in themselves 
encourage an external regulation type. Second, introjected regulation is more self-
determined, meaning that the regulation and motivation comes more from within the 
actor, even though it is still extrinsic motivation in the sense that it is triggered by an 
external event. It is also a social motivation: you feel good when you do something that 
others see as doing well (pride, self-esteem) and you feel bad when you do something 
that others see as bad (guilt, shame). Third, identified regulation is a voluntary acceptance 
of behavior as instrumental for a goal: you do something because you feel that it brings 
you good in your relationship with others. Fourth, integrated regulation is when someone 
does something because it is in line with his or her values (Ryan & Deci, 2000). This 
explanation can be associated with some subtle forms of Batson’s (1994) egoism (see 
Table A.1) or even principlism. The movement from external regulation towards 
integrated regulation of behavior (see Figure A2) is called internalization. The level of 
internalization of an activity is thus determined by the level of agreement with the 
reasons for performing that activity. 
 
Reeve (2009) explicitly relates this theory of self-determination to pro-social behavior. 
He argues that it is important to make the sensible reasons behind certain behavior clear 
and explicit in order to motivate a person, as this will enhance the level of internalization 
and self-determination this person will hold for this behavior. In other words: a person 
will regulate his or her behavior more internally when he or she knows the reasons and 
agrees with them. Thus it is crucially important to clearly and explicitly communicate 
these reasons. In the context of sustainable decision-making in the energy domain, for 
example, this would imply that it is important to educate people about what happens 
when people make non-sustainable decisions and why, then, it is important to conserve 
energy.  
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Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) constitutes an extension of self-determination theory 
and is based on two fundamental needs: the need for competence and the need for 
autonomy. These needs are argued to be inherent in every human and to influence the 
amount of motivation a person has for a certain activity. These needs are almost always 
affected by incentives from an external source, and therefore incentives have an indirect 
effect on motivation through cognitive evaluation. According to Reeve (2009), each 
reward, therefore, has a controlling aspect and an informational aspect. The controlling 
aspect has a negative influence on the need for autonomy (“I feel that what I do is 
because of the reward I get.”) and the informational aspect has a more positive effect on 
the need for competence (“Getting a reward means that I did my job well so I can feel 
confident.”). Almost all rewards have both of these aspects, but it is the relative salience 
of the controlling aspect (negative) compared to the informational aspect (positive) that 
determines the effect of the incentive used. These negative and positive effects work 
mainly through the internalization process and self-determination described above. 
 
The salience, in this case, is adjustable, since this is a matter of perception on the agent’s 
part. In other words: if a principal wants to incentivize an activity, he can choose to frame 
it either in a controlling way or in an informational way (Reeve, 2009). For example, a 
supervisor could offer the following, more informational and less controlling praise for 
an employee: “Excellent job, your productivity increased by 10%”. In turn, “Excellent 
job, you did just as you should” would be more controlling and less informational. Hence, 
for both competence and autonomy to be high, an external event should be presented in 
both a non-controlling and informational way (Reeve, 2009). It is important to note, 
therefore, that ultimately the motivational effect that a certain incentive exerts can stem 
from the way an incentive is administered rather than the content of the incentive itself. 
 
Empirical studies offer support for these theories. Of particular relevance for pro-social 
behavior in the energy domain, Staats, Van Leeuwen, and Wit (2000) conducted a field 
experiment in which they tested the effect of information interventions and feedback on 
aggregate energy use in an office building. The information interventions mainly 
included the explanation that acting in a certain way would reduce energy consumption. 
As their interventions, they used (a) a brochure asking participants to save energy by 
performing a specific behavior, (b) weekly updated collective feedback on how many 
employees already performed the behavior, (c) a poster with reminding information, and 
(d) individual feedback on specific behavior. Two four-week intervention periods were 
administered and were separated by a withdrawal period of 1 year. In addition to 
measuring behavior prior to the interventions as a benchmark, behavior was assessed one 
year after the first intervention period in order to measure behavioral maintenance; and as 
well one year aft the second intervention. Staats et al. (2000) hypothesized that the 
interventions would have a positive effect on the energy saving behavior of the 
participants. They also examined the persistence of this saving behavior. At the end of the 
two-year testing period, the target behavior had led to an energy (gas) consumption 
reduction of approximately 6% over the two-year period. The data does show, however, 
that the participants needed to be reminded of the energy-saving aspect of the target 
behavior in order for them to display this behavior in the long term. In other words, 
internalization takes time. Ultimately, at the end of the project, internalization of the 
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behavior did occur, as evidenced by a survey showing that more people believed that the 
target behavior helped conserve energy.  
 
Motivation Crowding Theory  
Frey and Jegen (2001) proposed an integration of the aforementioned psychological 
theories into an economic model of the effects of incentives on motivation. Specifically, 
they outline circumstances under which presumably intrinsic motivation is either 
undermined or strengthened, identifying both a crowding-out effect, as well as a 
crowding-in effect, which, together, constitute the key ingredients of the “motivation 
crowding theory” (see Figure A.3 for an illustration).  
 
 
Figure A3. The crowding effect along the motivation axis 
 
Figure A.3. Motivation crowding theory 
 
If an incentive shifts observable behavior towards the intrinsic pole, the effect is defined 
as crowding-in, the opposite movement is defined as crowding-out, which is similar to 
the aforementioned psychological notion of the hidden cost of reward. Both of these 
effects are effectuated through external (incentive) interventions. Frey and Jegen (2001) 
assume that all incentives, first, may affect intrinsic motivation, and, second, may either 
have a crowding-out or crowding-in effect. The authors state that the mere incidence of 
an incentive induces the crowding-out effect, but once all intrinsic motivation has been 
crowded out, normal economic relative-price-thinking takes over: raising a reward will 
then raise performance. In total, therefore, only those people who receive a considerable 
amount of money work as well as people who work for free. The net total effect is 
ambiguous as the level of crowding out is not known for each specific situation, but the 
existence of it is rather undisputed. The crowding-out effect happens through the two 
possible psychological processes of impaired self-determination and impaired self-esteem, 
the latter of which can be seen as a rephrasing of the negative effect of unsatisfied 
competence and autonomy needs. 
 
Preliminary Summary: Effects of Incentives on Motivation 
In conclusion, incentives can have several effects on motivation. The most important 
negative effect is that of the hidden cost of rewards which implies that intrinsic 
motivation is undermined when an external incentive is present. This negative effect is 
most likely to prevail when an incentive is tangible, expected, and contingent on 
performance, completion, or engagement. Incentives can also have an effect on the level 
of internalization of behavior. One of the most important modulators of this effect is 
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information intervention, which explains the reasons behind a desired action. 
Internalization leads to more intrinsic regulation, which in turn leads to self-
determination. The more self-determined an action is, the more an action is performed, 
and the higher the level of autonomy. In addition to this, CET indicates that incentives 
can have either a positive or negative effect on regulation type through the relative 
saliency of the informational and the controlling aspect. The more informational and non-
controlling the manner in which an incentive is presented, the more the needs for 
autonomy and competence will be supported. This leads to a more internal regulation 
type and better performance on the incentivized task. In other words, when applying this 
theory to real-life situations, it is important that an incentive has the following features, 
depending on the characteristics of the behavior to be incentivized: 
1. It is intangible. 
2. It is not a reward (if it is, then it should be presented in an unexpected and task-
non-contingent way). 
3. It is presented in a non-controlling way, thereby supporting autonomy and 
competence. 
4. It is presented in an informational way, thereby supporting autonomy and 
competence. 
5. Information intervention accompanies the incentive. 
 
Inter-temporale Choice and Time–inconsistent Preferences 
Pro-social behavior relating to sustainable decision making in general, and to energy 
conservation specifically, often has an inter-temporal aspect to it. An individual’s 
decision in the present has an effect on her or his costs and benefits in the future. When 
looking at the inter-temporal aspects of pro-social behavior, the fact that individuals may 
have time inconsistent preferences is a major problem. Consistent time preferences imply 
that individuals should stick to plans for future consumption, unless there is a good 
reason to do otherwise (Strotz, 1955). However, we know from a broad set of studies 
(Buchel & Peters, 2011), that most humans as well as animals display some degree of 
time inconsistency.
44
 
 
Time inconsistency can be incorporated into discounting. An individual’s discount rate 
measures his or her disutility from delaying consumption from sooner to later periods. 
When people delay outcomes, they tend to have present-biased preferences (Shefrin & 
Thaler, 1981), i.e. they behave as if the discount rate has become higher for shorter than 
for longer periods. By using a hyperbolic discount function instead of an exponential one, 
we can incorporate these biased preferences into discounting. By assuming a hyperbolic 
                                               
44 There are two different kinds of time inconsistency, cross-sectional time inconsistency and longitudinal 
time inconsistency. Cross-sectional time inconsistency means that when people are offered a smaller-
sooner reward and a larger later reward, the larger-later reward will be preferred after only a small increase 
in delay of both options (Herrnstein & Kirby, 1995). Longitudinal time inconsistency, also called 
impulsivity, means that when a reward becomes closer in time a smaller-sooner reward will be preferred 
over a larger later one (Read, 2004).  
 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 92 
discount functions one can explain why individual’s preferences can change from a 
larger-later to a smaller-sooner reward (Read, 2004). 
 
Inter-temporal choice is characterized by several anomalies, which are all summarised as 
time-inconsistency. First, there is the delay effect that shows that when an outcome is 
delayed people tend to add a higher discount rate to shorter than to longer periods. 
Furthermore, there is the interval effect, which means that when the interval between two 
outcomes is large, higher discount rates are used for the shorter outcome. The magnitude 
effect indicating that the discount rate will be higher for smaller amounts. Additionally, 
there is the discretion effect, indicating that people add higher discount rates when 
increasing an outcome than from expediting the same outcome (Loewenstein, 1988). 
Likewise, there is the sign effect that explains that the discount rate is lower for losses 
than gains, showing that people tend to be loss-averse. At last there is the sequence effect, 
which shows that even though the outcome is the same, people generally prefer constant 
or increasing sequences over decreasing ones (Read, 2004).  
 
There are several proposed mechanisms and theoretical models to explain the anomalies 
in inter-temporal choice, as e.g. the value function approach (Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1992)), the attribute-comparison models (Read (2004)), the cognitive/representation 
models (Becker & Mulligan, 1997), temporal construal theory (Trope & Liberman, 2000, 
2003). So far the proposed theories and models are unable to provide explanations for all 
described anomalies simultaneously and more research is needed to develop a conclusive 
explanation.  
 
Another major problem that arises within inter-temporal decisions is the presence of the 
commitment problem. People need to commit to do something at this present point in 
time, while they do not receive any benefits or see any results yet. The outcomes of the 
decisions made today will only be visible in the future and future utility is valued less 
than current utility (Brocas, Carillo & Dewatripoint, 2004). As a result, people may not 
be able or willing to stick with their initial commitment. The commitment problem can 
arise for two different types of goods: investment goods and leisure goods. Investment 
goods are goods which require immediate costs and delayed benefits. Leisure goods have 
immediate benefits and delayed costs. We can also distinguish two types of agents, 
sophisticated agents and naïve agents. Sophisticated agents are aware of their time 
inconsistency and naïve agents are naïve about it (DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2004). In 
general agents are almost always (partially) naïve.  
 
To overcome the commitment problem, incentives can be used to help people stick to 
their commitment. For example, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg introduced a new 
policy in 2006 involving monetary incentives to increase commitment. He provided poor 
families conditional with cash transfers to incentivize them to make the ‘right’ decisions 
concerning doctor’s appointments and other basic tasks that cost money, but are positive 
in the long-term (Charness & Gneezy, 2009). In 2009, Charness and Gneezy (2009) 
devised a laboratory test to find out whether it is possible to improve people’s decision 
making in this way. Specifically, they investigated whether the development of good 
habits can be encouraged by the financial incentive of paying people to attend a gym a 
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specified number of times per month. They did this in a field study by investigating three 
different groups of students and comparing their behavior. All groups received handouts 
with the benefits of exercise, one group did not receive anything else, people in the 
second and third group both received $25 to attend the gym one time per week and in one 
of these groups students were paid an extra $100 if they went to the gym eight more 
times in the four weeks after that. The results showed that the high incentive group had a 
higher and long-lasting post-intervention attendance compared to the other groups, 
suggesting that good habits, once developed in response to initial financial incentives, 
might become persistent. However, given the time frame of the study, no real conclusions 
regarding long-term effects could be drawn.  
 
 
A.3 The Manager as an Individual who has Decision Making 
Authority 
 
In the scope of this study the manager is seen as an individual who has decision making 
authority which arises from his position in the organizational hierarchy. Among the 
activities in which managers are involved are: acting as a representative of a work unit, 
disseminating information necessary for the functioning of work units, networking, 
negotiation, planning and scheduling work, allocating resources which may include 
people, money, materials and equipment, directing and monitoring the work of 
subordinates, problem solving and handling disturbances to work flow (Hales, 1999). 
Responding to the institutional pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which will be 
clarified in the next section, managers will undertake different actions when dealing with 
contingencies. Oliver (1991) identifies different ways in which organization might 
respond to the outside influence. He suggests that management choice can shape the 
direction in which organization develops and this depends on the nature and context of 
the pressures. Therefore, it would be useful to recognize the managerial power in moving 
the organization towards the desired outcome. According to Hall et al. (2004) in order for 
the organization to perform its functions, some members should have more power than 
other so that organizational goals are met. Before identifying the effects of this power on 
the decisions that managers make, we will start our analysis with a proper definition of 
power. The simplest one is provided by Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) and denotes power as 
the ability to get things done in the way one wants them to be done. Even earlier, 
Emerson (1963) describes power as a relational property that gives one actor the 
possibility to control the behavior of another one by manipulating rewards important to 
the other. In the organizational setting, this translates into the manager’s ability to 
produce strategic change by utilization of organizational resources and thus affect the 
outcomes for actors who have vested interests in the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The 
former characteristic of managerial power relates to the definition of formal power, 
which arises from a position in a hierarchy and the decision-making authority that one 
has been given. On the other hand, informal power results from personal, relational and 
situational characteristics (Blau, 1964). Among other sources of informal power are 
possession of information which is important for others, expertise resulting from long 
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tenure, and history of past accomplishments (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007). Informal power 
emanates from social capital and differs among individuals to the extent to which others 
feel an obligation to reciprocate a favorable action.  
 
In the organizational setting, Finkelstein (1992) distinguishes between four types of 
power: structural power, ownership power, expert power, and prestige power. Structural 
power is related to the definition of formal power and results from the position in the 
hierarchy and the authority that stems from that position. Ownership power identifies the 
strength of the position of the manager in the principal-agent relationship. Managers who 
have the ability to respond in adequate manner to environmental contingencies that leads 
to organization’s survival have expert power. Finally, prestige power is achieved from the 
reputation in the institutional framework and among stakeholders. The different types of 
power that managers can possess can affect their orientation towards achievement of their 
goals. According to Guinote (2007), high-power individuals, such as managers, regulate 
in a better way their actions towards accomplishment of their objectives. Facing fewer 
constraints and greater freedom (Galinksy, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008), 
high-power individuals can focus on the tasks they have to complete and are not 
disturbed by other individuals’ actions (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011). As a result, they 
are more confident and this increases their ability to update relevant information, 
initiative- and risk-taking. Even if they have the power to make decisions and act on 
behalf of the stakeholders, managers need to justify their decisions and the investments 
they choose to stakeholders. Providing accounts (or explanations) for the decisions is a 
part of the manager’s position. These help them to remove themselves from situations 
which could have negative effects on their image or claims for legitimacy (Ashforth 
&Gibbs, 1990). Through excuses and justifications (which are types of accounts) 
managers are kept responsible for their actions and social order is maintained (Hall et al., 
2004). 
 
Stewardship Theory  
The intrinsic need of managers to act responsibly and in the interest of stakeholders is 
incorporated in the stewardship theory developed by Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 
(1997) to suggest that managers possess intrinsic characteristics such as collectivism, 
trustworthiness and pro-organizational behavior. Other features of stewards include 
other-regarding perspective, long-term orientation, affective commitment building, self-
efficacy and self-determination (Hernandez, 2012). Furthermore, stewards identify 
themselves strongly with the organization and thus possess higher power in their 
relationships with individuals below and above them in the hierarchy. Another distinctive 
quality of stewards is their high self-efficacy and motivation by higher order needs. The 
orientation of the manager toward the collective good and the advancement of social 
interests is related to what McClelland (1975) terms socialized power orientation. It can 
serve as a good example of the stewardship theory because individuals with such power 
orientation take into account collective interests and power is used in a more cooperative 
way.  
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As it was proposed earlier, powerful individuals are more likely to take risks and are less 
loss averse (Inesi, 2010) than those who have lower power. Another dimension of 
managerial risk taking relates to framing of the outcomes and the way in which they are 
presented to decision making individuals. According to March and Shapira (1987) 
managers are more prone to risk taking when questions are framed in a business context 
than when they are framed in a personal context. The important effect of framing is also 
recognized by DeMarree, Briñol, and Petty (2012), who suggest that if thoughts are 
framed in pro-social terms, then powerful individuals will make more pro-social 
judgments and behave more pro-socially than individuals with lower power. This finding 
is also supported by Piff et al. (2011). In their experiments, they start from the fact that 
powerful people are more focused on current goals and internal motives than those with 
lower power (Guinote, 2007). After priming individuals with power, Piff et al. (2011) 
show that these individuals behave in a pro-social way when pro-social tendencies are 
salient. The fact that an individual with high-power is more likely to pay close attention 
to information about others and act pro-socially than the one with low power has also 
been established (Overbeck & Park, 2006). In all these studies, the main idea is that 
power can lead to pro-social behavior and consideration of the interests of other people 
when such pro-social tendencies are present. If, on the other hand, such tendencies are 
not noticeable, then powerful individuals will exhibit self-serving behavior. In such 
occasions, powerful individuals will be less accurate in assessing the interest and 
situation of others and are more likely to act in a self-serving way (Galinsky, Magee, 
Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006).  
 
Another study (Chen et al., 2001) which used priming individuals with power to compare 
their responsibility towards community goals concluded that those high-power 
communals show social responsibility and adhere to the values of the society. Another 
explanation is proposed by Jacobs et al. (2003), who suggests that right and wrong 
considerations of people placed in a position of power may allow them to focus on the 
moral implications of their behavior rather than on self-interest. 
 
Institutional and Stakeholder Influence  
While the manager can make choices regarding investments due to the power granted to 
him by the owners of the company, he is also constrained to some extent by the 
institutional environment and the stakeholders (the broad society) who can keep him 
responsible for his actions. Each organization operates within an institutional framework. 
The institutional environment consist of many actors which may have conflicting 
interests and exert influence on the organization, and comprises key supplies, resource 
and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar 
products or services (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The primary concern of this framework 
is the organization’s relationship or fit with the institutional environment, the effect of 
social expectation on the organization and the inclusion of these expectations in the 
organization’s characteristics (Dacin, 1997). Hawley (1950) was the first one to suggest 
that variation in organizational forms result from diversity of the environment. This is the 
isomorphism principle that DiMaggio and Powell (1983) use to propose that 
organizations will resemble the environment within which they operate and each other 
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over time. A proper definition of isomorphism is provided by the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary, which describes isomorphism as ―being of identical or similar form or shape 
or structure‖. In their study DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three mechanisms that 
drive institutional isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive 
isomorphism results from formal and informal pressures which could be political 
influence and organizational legitimacy. While political influence includes laws, 
regulations, and accreditation processes, legitimacy represents the extent to which the 
organization’s actions are deemed desirable, proper and adequate within the socially 
constructed system of norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995). Mimetic isomorphism 
is present when firms mimic or copy each other’s behavior if they consider the actions of 
the competitors to be more legitimate or more successful when there is uncertainty in the 
organizational environment. Normative pressure can also lead to resemblance of 
organizations to each other and over time. It represents professional norms and values 
that have influence on organizational behavior.  
 
In the institutional environment an important role is also played by the stakeholders of the 
company. Different organizational theories place different importance on the extent to 
which stakeholders should be managed, but a unifying point of these theories is that the 
organization is related to many groups which exert influence on them. The simplest and 
at the same time broadest definition of a stakeholder is provided by Freeman (1984): 
―any group or individual who can affect or [be] affected by the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives‖. This definition shows that the relationship can go in both 
directions; it could be the case that stakeholders affect organization’s decisions but it also 
means that outcomes of managerial decisions affect them. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
explain the existence of stakeholders as support that the organization needs to receive 
from the environment. In turn, the environment imposes some constraints on the actors 
within the organization, such as those identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), which 
inhibits their behavior and hence creates dependence. Clarkson (1995) distinguishes 
voluntary from involuntary (direct from indirect, Rowley, 1997) stakeholders, putting 
emphasis on the fact that voluntary stakeholders are any individuals that have invested in 
the firm and are placed at risk as a result of firm’s actions. Involuntary stakeholders, on 
the other hand, have not invested in the company, but still bear some risk. The notion of 
risk indicates that stakeholders are those parties that have legitimate claims. Identifying 
stakeholders includes recognition of two attributes: a claim and the ability to influence 
the firm (Savage, Nix, Whitehead, & Blair, 1991).  
 
A model developed by Donaldson and Preston (1995) recognizes that stakeholders in the 
firm can be the government, investors, political groups, customers, suppliers, 
communities, employees and trade associations. In turn, there is a constant interplay 
between the firm and each of these actors, which is shown in Figure A.4. 
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Figure A.4. The stakeholder model. Adapted from ―The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
Concepts, evidence, and implications, by T. Donaldson and L.E. Preston, 1995, Academy of 
Management Review, 65-91. 
 
Clarkson (1995) identifies stakeholders as the most salient group of people that observes 
managers’ actions due to the fact that they have direct control on organizational 
performance and survival. In their analysis of stakeholder salience, Mitchell, Agle, and 
Wood (1997) recognize that stakeholders’ power is present when managers perceive 
them to be able to impose their will on the organization. In addition to power, other 
stakeholder attributes include legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997). Similar to 
the definition of legitimacy suggested earlier, stakeholders can be said to have legitimacy 
when managers assess their actions as proper and adequate, relative to standards 
prevalent in the institutional framework. The idea of urgency depends on the degree of 
immediacy of stakeholder claims. As a result, Scott and Lane (2000) propose that the 
extent to which managers perceive stakeholders’ needs, values and beliefs in creating the 
organizational image is contingent on the power, legitimacy, and urgency of 
stakeholders’ claims. The problem with satisfying stakeholders’ interest is exacerbated 
from the current business environment in which challenges such as climate change, 
environmental sustainability and corporate social sustainability are present. This creates 
additional pressures on managers and addressing multiple stakeholders’ interests 
becomes of even greater significance.  
 
Given the complexity of stakeholders’ attributes, managers can use the Mendelow 
framework (as cited by Johnson and Scholes, 1989), in which stakeholder influence is 
presented in a 2 by 2 grid depending on the power and interest in the firm that these 
groups have, to assess the importance of each stakeholder and choose the appropriate 
action. While power represents the ability to influence firm’s goals, interest represents the 
willingness to do so. For the purpose of our analysis, which is to identify the extent to 
which stakeholders influence firm’s decisions, it is useful to make a distinction between 
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high- and low-power and high- and low-interest of stakeholders. The grid is presented in 
Figure A.5.  
 
 
Figure A.5. Stakeholder mapping, the power/interest matrix. Adapted from ―Exploring 
corporate strategy, by G. Johnson and K. Scholes. 1989, London: Prentice Hall. 
 
The stakeholders with low interest and low power are those who cannot exert influence 
on the organization and therefore they should receive minimal attention from the 
managers. The next group is those stakeholders who have high interest but lack power 
and therefore management should convince them of their strategic decisions. If it fails to 
do so, they may try to gain power and join another party from the grid. Managers could 
satisfy those with high power and low interest by assuring them of the outcomes of the 
strategy. The most influential stakeholders are those with high interest and high power. 
Since they have both the ability and willingness to affect management plans, managers 
should communicate their intentions to them and discuss the implementation of their 
plans. As a result of this analysis that managers make, namely identifying to which part 
of the matrix the stakeholders in question belong, they can plan ahead how to deal with 
the stakeholders and satisfy their claims. 
 
Pro-Social Behaviour by Firms: Corporate Social Responsibility 
Discussions of the responsibilities of corporations and their roles in society have been 
motivated by the growing awareness of unfair or discriminatory business behaviour and 
an increasing number of social and environmental scandals (Epstein, 1987; Matthews, 
1985). Nowadays, companies are expected to become socially committed even in areas 
not directly related to their business (Harman, 1997). Relevant to know is what the 
mechanisms are, how corporations become more socially committed, and how society 
can use these mechanisms to induce this wanted pro-social behaviour by firms. Since the 
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firm behaviour is determined largely by the managers of the firm, considering the 
motivations of managers to change behaviour might shine some light on possible 
incentives that can be used to ‘manipulate’ the managers to change firm behaviour. The 
vast literature about the phenomenon ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ gives a clear 
picture what the possibilities are for pro-social behaviour by corporations. Therefore, a 
more thorough look into the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its 
position within the firm and society is given in the first part of this study. 
 
Following McWilliams et al. (2006), the definition of CSR in firm perspective is when 
the firm goes beyond compliance and engages in ‘actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law’. However, 
this is just one interpretation of CSR. The European Commission deﬁnes CSR as ‘a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’. 
Numerous other definitions of CSR have been proposed and often no clear definition is 
given, making it difficult to give one cohesive definition of CSR. Anything from 
environmental management, health and safety rules and human rights to community 
capacity building and philanthropic activities has been considered under the CSR 
umbrella (Newell & Frynas, 2007). CSR activities have been posited to include 
incorporating social characteristics or features into products and manufacturing processes 
(e.g. aerosol products with no fluorocarbons or using environmentally-friendly 
technologies) (Williamson et al., 2006), adopting progressive human resource 
management practices (e.g. promoting employee empowerment) (Sharma et al., 2011), 
and achieving higher levels of environmental performance through recycling and 
pollution abatement (e.g. adopting an aggressive stance towards reducing 
emissions)(Sarkar, 2008). Indeed, CSR Europe, a membership organisation of large 
companies across Europe, in its reporting guidelines looks at workplace (employees), 
marketplace (customers, suppliers), environment, community, ethics; and human rights 
(Moir, 2001).  
 
What the CSR definitions and activities show is that the corporation and society are 
intertwined. According to the societal approach, companies are responsible to society as a 
whole, of which they are an integral part. They operate by public consent (the license to 
operate) in order to ‘serve constructively the needs of society, to the satisfaction of 
society (Van Marrewijk, 2003). Therefore it is important to companies what the factors 
are that matter the most to their customers and other members of the society. 
Traditionally, the most important factors for customer when forming an opinion of a 
company were product quality, value for money, and financial performance. Now, across 
a world-wide sample of the public, the most commonly mentioned factors relate to 
treatments of employees, community involvement, ethical issues and environmental 
issues (Dawkins & Lewis, 2003). Following Dawkins and Lewis (2003), 69% of the 
British public agrees that industry does not pay enough attention to its responsibilities. In 
the post-Enron business world, no company needs to be reminded of the vulnerability of 
corporate reputation and therefore the company itself. Also on the environmental part of 
CSR the society demands certain standards and punishes the firms that cannot live up to 
these standards. Since the leak in the oil pipe of BP in the Mexican Golf and the 
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corresponding environmental disaster, the share price of BP dropped by 55% in the 
months after the disaster.  
 
So it is not sufficient to manage corporations to optimize production variables, such as 
profits, productivity, jobs, and growth. Corporations must manage risk variables, such as 
product harm, pollution, waste, resources, technological hazards, and worker and public 
safety (Shrivastava, 1995). People in communities all over the world have been 
experiencing these negative externalities in the form of visible negative influences on 
their quality of life. These risk variables are the negative externalities of production. 
Externalities occur when ‘costs and benefits are imposed on others yet are not paid for by 
those who impose them or receive them’ (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1992). When firms, 
for example, invest in energy-saving technologies in context of a CSR-policy, the 
externality for the society are a reduction of pollution by carbon-dioxide emission. By 
taking into account that the firm was the cause of the pollution in the first place, the 
reduction of pollution by the investment in energy-saving technologies only reduces the 
negative externality ‘pollution’ for the society instead of creating a positive one. One 
other example of CSR is when a firm increases the facilities for day-care in order to 
attract more female employees. By doing so, the women that are working at the company 
may affect other women to start working again.  So it seems that CSR not only affects the 
company and its direct stakeholders but also society as a whole. Also society, now more 
aware of the existence of (aspects of) CSR seems to demand more CSR activities from 
the firms.   
 
Principal-Agent Theory 
The principal-agent setting can be briefly described as follows. The principal concludes a 
contract with an agent who is providing the principal with certain services. The problem 
is that the principal cannot achieve to be fully informed about the agent’s behaviour. In 
order to overcome this lack of knowledge, the principal can at least try to improve his/her 
state of information or can try to moderate the consequences of not being informed. This 
latter strategy will result in offering the agent suitable an incentive to do what is asked of 
him/her (Schneeweiss, 2003). Conflicting objectives and asymmetric information are the 
two basic assumptions of the principal-agent theory. The conflicting objectives arise 
when the principals have different objectives than the agents. Asymmetric information 
means that one party has more or better information than the other party. One theory that 
deals with the difficulties that arise from conflicting objectives and asymmetric 
information is the principal-agent theory. Common examples of this relationship include 
managers (agent) and shareholders (principal), or politicians (agent) and voters 
(principal). Or consider a dentist (agent) and his patient (principal). As a patient you 
expect the dentist to do his job properly without giving you unnecessary expensive 
treatments with the only benefit of generating extra income for the dentist.   
 
Within a firm setting, realizing that owners of a firm may have different objectives than 
the managers of a firm, the aligning of the different objectives seems problematic 
(Laffont & Martimort, 2001). The objective of the principal in the firm setting is that the 
agent should maximise the profits of the principal. Every allocation of funds to non-profit 
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maximising investments by the agent should be avoided (Friedman, 2007). In the 
literature there is an on-going discussion if investing in CSR is desirable because it comes 
with benefits (Reinhardt et al, 2008; Friedman, 2009) or if investing in CSR is allocating 
money to non-profit maximising investments and should be avoided (Friedman, 1962; 
Carson, 1993). (Note the fact that Friedman changed his mind about this topic. In his 
book Capitalism and Freedom (2009) he explains what made him change his mind). In 
the next two sections the arguments for these two views are given.  
 
For the principals to push the agents into investing in CSR, sufficient arguments are 
needed to support the line of reasoning that investments in CSR can lead to increase in 
profits. Reinhardt et al. (2008) developed a list of economically suitable circumstances 
under which a firm can invest in CSR and even increase profits. The first option is that 
the action is not costly for the firm. For example, no objects are allowed to be placed on 
the central heating when it is turned on. This increases the efficient circulation of the 
warm air and the heater can be turned down a little. In a large office space this can save 
energy considerably. The second condition is that the socially beneficial actions may 
reduce a firm’s business expenses by an amount greater than the cost of the actions 
themselves. For example, installation of energy-saving (climate friendly) technologies 
may generate long-term cost savings that outweigh upfront costs. Third, some firms may 
use over-compliance to spur future regulation, which would provide a competitive 
advantage over less adaptable firms. Porter and Kramer (2006) add to this argument that 
if a firm incorporates CSR into the business model of the firm by using the same 
framework that guide their core business choices, the firm would discover that CSR can 
be much more than a cost, a constraint, or a charitable deed but that it can be a source of 
opportunity, innovation, and competitive advantage. Having CSR as an integrated part of 
the business strategy, it can be used to successfully establish a strong international name 
for the company as is the case with car-manufacturer BMW. When comparing BMW 
(which has the best overall reputation in the world in 2012) with Toyota, BMW has 9% 
more willingness from consumers to buy products, 13% more recommendation from 
consumers, and 8% higher willingness to welcome the company in the local community
45
. 
The fourth argument is that in some cases socially and environmental beneficial actions 
may yield an increase in revenues. It is easy to think of goods and services that are 
differentiated along environmental lines, such as clothing made of organic cotton, or 
wood from forests managed in accordance with some principles of sustainability. Socially 
beneficial actions could also generate goodwill, improving a firm’s reputation and sales. 
One last important argument for firms to engage in CSR is that firms may be better at 
solving an issue it caused itself than society can. What if the firm causes a social problem 
that cannot be reversed (such as energy consumption, carbon-dioxide emission, etc.)? It 
may well be efficient for society to let the firm solve these problems even if it comes at a 
cost for the shareholders (Davis, 1973). This is because firms could distribute the profits 
as dividends and the shareholders could then distribute the revenues to social causes 
(Friedman, 2007). When the firm can solve the issue it created in a more efficient way 
                                               
45
 See for more information http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2012/12/10/the-companies-with-
the-best-csr-reputations/3/ 
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than the shareholders, it will cost less money than if the shareholders were solving the 
issue. By distributing the difference as a dividend, the shareholder will benefit more than 
if he had to solve the problem himself. Also, when applying the principal-agent 
framework on a firm’s decision to invest in CSR, the agent can opt to invest in CSR 
because his/her personal opinion is that CSR is worthwhile investing in, or it can give the 
agent personal satisfaction or the agent gains respect from other parties (Bondy, 2008). 
  
Limits for CSR within the Principal-Agent Theory 
The arguments above show that CSR can improve their position relative to their 
competitors and even increases profits. So why do so little firms pursue an active CSR 
strategy? When applying the same principal-agent framework as above, some arguments 
can be found against investing in CSR. 
 
Managers, in particular, are not equipped to identify appropriate objects for CSR, quite 
apart from the definitional laxity. They are trained in the art of business, not social 
welfare. They do not possess the specialist skills necessary to identify social purposes nor 
do they possess the allocation skills required to effectively apply the company’s resources 
(Davis, 1973).  Further, such a process would conflict with the corporate culture of most 
companies. Due to the principal-agent framework, most managers are orientated towards 
making money, and it goes against the grain to give it away. Also are most corporations 
naturally socially conservative and hence will not experiment unless they can see a clear 
profit from the endeavour (Devinney, 2009). So, unless there is ‘hard proof’ of positive 
financial returns when investing in CSR, these firms will not invest in CSR. Another 
argument is that involvement in CSR might dilute business’s emphasis on economic 
productivity, divide the interests of its leaders, and weaken business in the marketplace, 
with the result that it would accomplish poorly both its economic and its social roles 
(Davis, 1973). So it is of great importance to recognize the potential of CSR within the 
firm’s strategy and possibilities to avoid unpleasant surprises.  
Friedman (2009) suggests that by spending money on social objectives, executives are 
effectively imposing a tax on shareholders (in the form of reduced dividends) and 
customers (in the form of higher prices) and employees (in the form of lower wages). 
From this point of view, the firm imposes taxes on society instead of the public officials. 
The power to act in the public interest however, ought to be confined to the government. 
Governments are accountable to the community for their actions, and are subject to 
establish procedures controlling the exercise of their powers. They are far better suited to 
the business of managing the welfare of society than are corporations (McCabe, 1992). 
Moreover, any acts of social responsibility that consume resources effectively deprive 
individual stockholders of the chance to be socially responsible themselves. In 
contradiction of the view that firms are better able to solve some issues than the 
shareholders can, Posner and Scott (1980) argue that shareholders are the appropriate 
ones to expend resources on charitable contributions, environmental saving funds and the 
like. It is their prerogative to give individually, since it is their property (Posner & Scott, 
1980).  
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Implementation Gap 
Even though firms within the principal-agent theory should invest in CSR, not all firms 
are eager to implement CSR in their corporate strategies. Barriers to the development of a 
CSR orientation include threats to stability, fear of change, the belief that a CSR 
orientation is inappropriate for the organization, or the belief that focusing on CSR will 
result in the organization losing sight of its core values (Maon et al., 2009). In one aspect 
of CSR, the implementation of energy-saving technologies, this implementation gap is 
particular visible.  
 
One of the most pervasive anomalies in energy economics is the fact that ﬁrms do not 
always implement proﬁtable investments in energy-saving technology. The potential 
energy savings that can be achieved cost-effectively may be substantial and therefore can 
be considered an important field of interest and is in line with the argument that 
investments in CSR/energy savings do increase profits. Due to this anomaly in investing 
in energy-saving technologies by firms, a large potential for gaining profits by investing 
in energy-saving technologies lies ahead and need more attention.  According to NAS 
(1991) substantial reductions in US energy use can be achieved cost-effectively, resulting 
in a 37% decrease in energy-related carbon emissions. This is in line with the expected 
10–35% range of cost-effective emission reductions, when implementing new energy-
saving technologies, for non-US OECD countries (Bruce et al., 1996). Several 
explanations for this implementation gap have been raised in the literature. First, 
decision-makers within the ﬁrm may have insufﬁcient information about proﬁtable 
investments. Collecting this type of information is time- and resource-consuming 
(Velthuijsen, 1995), and ﬁrms may face constraints in the form of scarcity of managerial 
time or lack of skilled personnel (Beckenstein, 1986; De Almeida, 1998). Indeed, several 
case studies indicate that organisational and institutional barriers are important (De 
Almeida, 1998; DeCanio, 1998). Second, when deciding about future technology, ﬁrms 
may face constraints due to market imperfections such as capital rationing (Howarth & 
Sanstad, 1995). Third, energy efﬁciency is often just one of many criteria affecting the 
choice of equipment, and not necessarily one of paramount importance (Reddy, 1991). 
Fourth, the assumption of optimising behaviour may be false (Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). 
For example, decisions may be based on (very short) payback periods rather than the net 
present value criterion (DeCanio, 1998). Fifth, the economic agent who makes the 
investment may not be the same as the one who receives the gain (e.g. insulation of 
rented houses). Finally and closely related to the ﬁrst point, transaction costs may be 
prohibitively high (DeCanio, 1998; Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). Uncertainty about the 
future has also been raised as a potential explanation of the existence of unexploited 
‘proﬁtable’ investment options in energy-saving technologies (Hasset, 1993). However, 
in his research DeCanio (1998) finds that in general, the data reinforce the view that there 
is a large potential for profitable energy-saving investments that is not being realized 
because of impediments that are internal to private and public-sector organizations. 
Following Bunse (2011) it is necessary to develop efficient and effective energy 
management in production to close the gap between theory and practice. With this, 
decision makers in firms may become aware of the energy performance in real-time 
facilitating more effective business decisions based on accurate and timely 
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information. One way to achieve this increase in awareness of energy savings by the 
managers is by the use of incentives. 
 
 
Causality between CSR and Financial Performance 
Since there are arguments for and against CSR-investments by firms it would interesting 
to see if there is empirical evidence on the relation between CSR-investments and an 
increase in financial performance by firms. Hundreds of published empirical studies have 
tested the relationship between various types of CSR and the financial performance of the 
firms. Some have found a negative relationship (Vance, 1975; Wright & Ferris, 1997). 
Some have found a mixed relationship (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Hillman & Keim, 2001). 
Some have found no relationship of signiﬁcance (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Patten, 
1992). Many have found a positive relationship (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Nonetheless, 
limitations in these myriad studies leave room for skepticism and confusion (Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003). This led Barnett (2007) to surmise ‘that after more than thirty years of 
research, we cannot clearly conclude whether a one-dollar investment in social initiatives 
returns more or less than one dollar in beneﬁt to the shareholder.’ However this statement 
is correct because we cannot make this link, the possible reasons for the underlying 
arguments are the problem. The use of different statistical techniques gives different 
outcomes (Nelling & Webb, 2009), so there is no continuity in the results. Also the fact 
that CSR-investments have different impacts on different industries is not taken into 
account. Also not considered in the literature is that the different industries report their 
CSR activities in different ways (Sweeney & Coughlan, 2008). Most research on CSR 
has focused on the consequences of CSR implementation—or lack of implementation—
on financial performance with little attention to comparative issues (Williams & Aguilera, 
2008). The expectation is that for manufacture industries the gain of implementing CSR, 
especially the energy-saving part of CSR, is larger than in the service industry and 
therefore, it would be wise for the manufacture industries to explore the possibilities of 
profit-enhancing CSR-investments.  
 
What is not taken into account in most of the literature mentioned above is whether the 
firms become more profitable when investing in CSR or if profitable firms do invest 
more in CSR than their not so much profitable competitors. However, there is consensus 
in the literature about the observation that it seems that profitable firms do invest more in 
CSR than less profitable firms (Margolis et al., 2007; Lougee & Wallace, 2008).  
 
 
A.4 From Psychological and Economics Theories to the Practice of 
Policy-Making: The Role of Nudges 
 
The term ‘nudge’ refers to an idea that was developed in recent studies in behavioral 
science, psychology, economics, and political theory (e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The 
basic idea is that indirect and subtle (non-monetary) interventions and positive 
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reinforcement (‘nudges’) may be able to affect individuals’ (and groups) motivations and 
induce them to change their choices and behavior at least as effectively—and possibly 
even more effectively—than direct instruction, legislation, or enforcement—possibly 
even at lower cost. Not surprisingly, the prospect of increasing either the effectiveness of 
policy-making in domains such as, for example, health, safety, and energy, or its 
efficiency or even both has, meanwhile, begun to attract increasing attention from policy-
makers around the world. For example, the UK government has recently in 2010 installed 
a so-called Behavioural Insights Team (often referred to as the ‘Nudge Unit’). This team 
“applies insights from academic research in behavioural economics and psychology to 
public policy and services. In addition to working with almost every government 
department, we work with local authorities, charities, NGOs, private sector partners and 
foreign government, developing proposals and testing them empirically across the full 
spectrum of government policy.
46
 One of the team’s previous projects concerned the 
striving to increase the rate of loft insulation in the UK. This rate was deemed (too) low 
despite the fact that it involved little risk for private households, in view of generous 
subsidies that would yield pay-back times of a few months (The Telegraph Online, Feb 
11, 2013). The nudge unit identified “the sheer hassle of clearing an attic before you can 
insulate it” (The Telegraph Online, Feb 11, 2013) as a key obstacle (’friction cost’) to 
people’s taking advantage of the opportunity to insulate their lofts at virtually no cost. 
The director of the unit, David Halpern, explained this as “If there is ‘friction cost’ in the 
way of doing something, it’ll never happen. We’ll put it off. So a lot of what we do is 
about making life easier for people” (The Telegraph Online, Feb 11, 2013). Consequently, 
in a pilot trial in September 2011, insulation firms were requested to offer to clear the 
lofts first, and dispose of unwanted junk stored in the lofts. This extra service came at an 
additional cost for consumers. Nevertheless, the uptake of the insulation increased 
threefold. When the loft-clearing service was subsidized to cost price, there was even a 
fivefold increase (The Telegraph Online, Feb 11, 2013). Other projects of the team 
included an advisory project for the tax office, which resulted in a change of the wording 
on income tax letters, and, allegedly in an extra £200million being collected on time. In 
2012, the nudge unit suggested that tax authorities would send out letters to non-payers of 
car taxes formulated in simpler English and with a banner headline suggesting “pay your 
tax or lose your car”. In response, the number of people paying the tax doubled, and even 
tripled when the letter was personalized with a photo of the specific car in question 
depicted (The Telegraph Online, Feb 11, 2013).  
 
                                               
46 See https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team 
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A.5 Selected Nudges in the Current Project 
A.5.1 (Inconsistent) Time Preferences and Commitment Devices 
Temporal framing is the mechanism that can influence the inter-temporal decisions that 
people make and thus help overcome the time inconsistency problem. When two 
outcomes are the same, but framed differently, people tend to add different values to it. 
The reasoning behind this is that people look at outcomes as departures from a reference 
point or as gains and losses, instead of looking at the outcome as a final level of wealth 
(Loewenstein 1988). Malkoc and Zauberman (2006) show in experiments that there is a 
greater present bias, seen by a greater decline in consumers’ discount rate, with time 
horizon when consumption is deferred compared to when it is expedited. People require a 
higher premium, when an outcome is delayed then when they expedite the exact same 
outcome (Loewenstein 1988). Using this knowledge, people can thus frame an outcome 
in the most optimal way to get the desired outcome.  
 
Overall, though, research in psychology and economics indicate that humans 
procrastinate, that is: they put off actions today that in the long run they know would be 
good for them, such as exercising, eating healthfully, saving for retirement (for a concise 
overview, see, e.g., Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010). Since “tomorrow” is always a day in 
the future, procrastination may cause individuals to indefinitely delay actions or 
investments that yesterday they said they wanted to undertake today. Therefore, 
“commitment devices” are interventions that allow individuals to “lock” themselves 
today into the action that they want to take tomorrow. According to Abrahamse et al. 
(2005), a commitment is an oral or written pledge or promise to change behavior (e.g. to 
conserve energy), which is often linked to a specific goal, for instance, to reduce energy 
use by 5%. This promise can be a pledge to oneself, in which case it may activate a 
personal norm (viz., a moral obligation) to conserve energy. The promise can also be 
made public, for instance, by means of an announcement in the local newspaper. Then, 
social norms (viz., expectations of others) may play a role as determinants of 
conservation behavior (see also the sub-section below on social norms).  
 
Most of the work by economists on commitment devices has focused individuals’ savings 
decisions, but the phenomenon is no less relevant in the energy domain. The following 
situations provide some examples: Can individuals be induced to commit to reducing 
energy consumption or to engage in energy-saving investments and then stick to these 
commitments, for example, stick to a commitment to invest in solar panels or insulation 
of their home within a specific time period; stick to a commitment to buy compensation 
for CO2 generation when booking their next flight?  
 
In an early study, Pallak and Cummings (1976) used commitment to promote gas and 
electricity conservation among households. Those who had signed a public commitment 
(i.e. publication in a leaflet) showed a lower rate of increase in both gas and electricity 
consumption than those in either the private commitment or the control group. This effect 
was maintained over a period of 6 months following discontinuation of the intervention. 
 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 107 
Recent research indicates, though, that groups’ time preferences and time-related 
decisions (e.g., commitment) may differ fundamentally from individuals’ time 
preferences and decisions. In a recent working paper, Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, and 
Paraschiv (2013) experimentally analyzed decisions involving delayed outcomes, first, 
for each of two partners individually and, second, for the couple together. This allowed 
them to directly compare the couple’s behavior and the individual partners’ behavior in 
choices over time. Using Fishburn and Rubinstein’s (1982) discounted utility model and 
inferring measurements of utility and discounting at both the individual and the couple 
level, they showed, first, that the determinants of inter-temporal decisions, such as 
financial decisions, made by couples are distinct from determinants of individual such 
decisions. Second, more specifically, they found that while utility was found to be similar 
for couples and individuals, in decisions over time, couples discount future amounts of 
money much less than do individuals. According to Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, and 
Paraschiv (2013), this finding suggests that making joint decisions significantly reduces 
revealed impatience. Their findings are consistent with an earlier experimental study by 
Milch et al. (2009) who found that participants discounted more when they acted as 
individual decision-makers rather than in group decision context. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that the distinction between individuals and couples might as well 
translate to the household level, and that households discount future consequences less 
than individuals. In terms of savings this would mean that they are less impatient, while 
in terms of energy conservation, they might attach greater weight, compared to 
individuals, to the negative externalities of (excessive) present-day energy consumption. 
 
A.5.2 Social Norms  
Social comparison has been argued to influence pro-social behavior (Andreoni & Petrie, 
2004). Festinger (1954) explains social comparison as a human need to evaluate their 
abilities. Individuals do this by choosing as a standard of comparison others who are 
perceived to have similar or slightly better attitudes and abilities (Goodman, 1974). 
Social comparison theory posits that people strive to present themselves in a way that 
would give them social approval (Cason & Lui, 1997). If people observe the average 
tendency in the society, then they would like to act in a more favorable way than the one 
prevalent among all individuals. As a result, individuals constantly adjust their behavior.  
 
Various mechanisms may underlie individuals’ adherence to social norms (Allcott & 
Mullainathan, 2010). They may conform to others’ behavior because they believe in the 
wisdom of crowds, i.e.  that others took an action because they had more or different 
information about its benefits. Or they may perceive that there is some external 
approbation or inner comfort from conformity. In a recent study, Goldstein et al. (2008), 
partnered with an upscale hotel in Phoenix, Arizona, to induce guests to reuse their 
towels. The researchers tried several different messages: “Save the Environment,” 
“Preserve Resources for the Future,” “Partner with the Hotel to Save the Environment,” 
and “Join Your Fellow Citizens in Helping to Save the Environment.” The final card, 
which included the information that the majority of hotel guests do reuse towels – i.e. that 
conservation was the social norm – yielded a significantly higher towel reuse rate 
(44.1%) than the environmental protection conditions (35.1%) This result illustrates an 
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important broader point (see also Dolan and Metcalfe, 2013): social norms in particular 
appear to be a very powerful nudge (see for details the subsection on effect sizes). Legacy 
norms and the concerns about them, the psychological cue that we are interested in this 
study, can be interpreted as fitting into a broadly interpreted framework of social norms 
that extends the group of social “peers” that evaluates an individual to future generations. 
While little is known to date about the effects of such legacy concerns on energy use 
behavior, successful marketing campaigns in the private sector have been making use of 
this potentially very powerful type of cue for quite some time already. 
 
The instinct to follow social norms has also proved compelling. Tax letters, for example, 
were recently changed to include a headline statistic: a percentage of how many people in 
the local area had already paid their taxes. Repayment rates increased by 15 per cent. () 
(The Telegraph Online, Feb 11, 2013).  
 
The effect of social norms on firm behaviour 
Many studies are performed on individual behaviour and norm incentives, however not 
much is known about the firms position relative to the norm and firm behaviour. The 
norm within the individual is part of the learning and adjusting of behaviour in response 
to experiences. Within the organizational behaviour literature this learning and adjusting 
of behaviour is linked to aspiration levels (goals of the organization). Following March 
and Simon (1958), a basic assumption of many models of organizational behaviour is that 
individuals and organizations learn and adjust their behaviour in response to experience. 
The main assumption made is that organizations set goals and adjust behaviour in 
response to favourable and unfavourable feedback in accordance with simple decision 
rules (Cyert & March, 1963). The role of goals, or aspiration levels, is a critical part of 
these models (Lant, 1992). In the literature on managerial interpretations, aspirations 
determine whether past performance is framed as a success or failure, thus influencing 
the interpretations of the managers and result in subsequent organizational behaviour 
(Lant, 1992). So aspirations are a critical variable that affects future behaviour of 
organizations. Considerable research has shown that these aspiration levels serve to 
simplify the cognitive processes associated with managerial decision making (Mezias et 
al., 2002). For example, the setting of aspiration levels in organizations serves to direct 
efforts and affect strategy generation, choice, and implementation (Morecroft, 1985; 
Milliken & Lant, 1990).  
 
In a field study where data were gathered from four Markstrat industries comprised of ten 
teams of managers in an executive education program and ten teams of MBA students 
enrolled in a marketing strategy course at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, Lant 
(1992) finds that the aspiration formation process seems to be best described as a process 
of adjustment in response to past aspirations and past performance. Based in the results, 
Lant suggests that adaptive, history dependent models are more accurate descriptors of 
aspiration formation than a rational model of expectation formation. This result is 
highlighted by the significant effect of past aspiration in conjunction with the rational 
expectations model, as well as the fit of the adaptive model (Lant, 1992). 
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The norm contains information about the opinions and performances of peers. So the 
norm could act as an important feedback factor for the past behaviour of the firm, relative 
to its competitors and adjust the aspiration level for the next period. Due to the fact that 
the manager is an individual in the firm, it is likely that the manager will reflect his/her 
position relative to managers of other firms. By doing so, reputation and self-image are 
important intrinsic motivators to behave pro-socially in order to measure up to the norm. 
In this view, the norm can act as an important ‘learning factor’ that changes firm 
behaviour. So, within the principal-agent framework, the norm-incentive can be used by 
the principal to induce an increase of CSR-investments.  
 
As is argued in Section A.2, reputation and self-image are important intrinsic motivators 
for people to behave pro-socially. For managers reputation is an important intrinsic 
motivator. This is because the stronger the manager’s reputation, the more powerful he is 
within the firm and the more influence he has in the decision making process (Finkelstein, 
1992). Since investing in CSR can be viewed as a form of reputation building of a firm 
(McWilliams et al., 2006), the manager who made the decision to invest in CSR can 
thereby increase his own reputation when it becomes visible that the firm is performing 
better than before the CSR investment decision. This results in the manager being more 
powerful and influential than before. If the level of CSR investments of the firm is lower 
than it peers, it can cause reputation damage of the firm and its managers. Therefore it 
can be expected that the social norm acts as a feedback factor to adjust the aspiration 
levels of the firm. Also the effect of the social norm on the self-image of the manager is 
expected to have an influence on the pro-social behaviour of the managers. The effect of 
the norm incentive on the self-image of the managers is expected to be stronger than the 
effect on the individual. This stronger effect is expected because the manager’s actions 
are visible to a substantial greater amount of people than the individual’s actions and 
therefore have stronger implications on the self-image and reputation of the manager. 
 
A.5.3 Legacy Reminders 
A legacy reminder is a method of instilling an individual with the desire to leave 
something behind for future generations. The words themselves have been developed 
specifically for the experimental purposes of this study, yet the concept behind it is not 
novel, it relies heavily on research on the motivational properties of legacy (Wade-
Benzoni & Tost, 2009; Wade-Benzoni, Tost & Hernandez, 2012). These authors state 
that the psychological mechanism should activate “individuals’ inherent desires to 
generate a positive legacy [that] can transform the expected barriers to intergenerational 
beneficence (i.e., social and temporal distance) into conditions that promote beneficent 
allocations to future others” (Wade-Benzoni, Tost & Hernandez, 2012, p.3). This 
psychological solution relies on forming a psychological bond with future others as a 
response to the desire to create a legacy. People try to symbolically extend themselves 
into the future and in this way immortalize themselves through their legacy, a 
phenomenon defined in the literature as ‘immortality striving’ (Tost, Hernandez & Wade-
Benzoni, 2008; Dickinson, 2009; Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009). As these authors point 
out, this use of legacy as a means to strive for immortality is a good way to reduce both 
the interpersonal and inter-temporal distance and discounting (Wade-Benzoni, Tost & 
Hernandez, 2012). First, the desire for a legacy brings the future closer to an individual, 
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given that he should particularly be mindful of those that exist after him. Second, this 
automatically helps him to bring the other close by, since he himself will die and other 
people therefore will necessarily have to be the ones to carry on his existence, albeit 
symbolically. It is in this way that the concern for legacy creation reconciles individual 
interest with collective interest: the beneficence towards the future other (the collective 
interest) is essential to leaving a positive legacy (individual interest).  Legacy reminders 
are therefore particularly useful in any attempt to solve an intergenerational social 
dilemma. This section, however only provided a short description of the concept, and 
leaves questions on the meaning of legacy, and the way of creating the desire for a 
legacy. Hence, a more thorough explanation of the mechanism in the next part will 
attempt to shed light on these issues.  
 
The workings of the legacy reminder 
In order to understand how a legacy reminder works, it is imperative to gain a deeper 
insight in the “inherent desire” of a person to leave a legacy. This part will therefore 
elucidate on the motivational characteristics of legacy.  
 
Wade-Benzoni and Tost define legacy as “an enduring meaning attached to one’s 
identity” (2009, p.183). It serves, according to the researchers, to pass on the meaning of 
an individual’s life to the future. This personal life meaning can be perceived as the 
culmination of all kinds of relationships, or set of relationships, that are perceived as 
exemplary for a person’s life. In particular, two types of relationships are distinguished: 
firstly, relationships between a person’s existence and the existence (real or symbolic) of 
another individual, and secondly the relationship between one’s existence and that 
person’s cultural worldview, his values or value systems (Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009). 
In line with Bakan’s theory (1966, as cited in Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009), the 
researchers connect these two types of relationships that establish someone’s personal life 
meaning with two fundamental needs in life: argentic and communal needs.  These are, 
respectively, the need to exist as an individual, as shown by self-assertion, self-expansion, 
and self-protection, and the need to be part of a large group or collective.  People then 
achieve a meaningful life in two ways. In the first place, they serve their argentic needs 
by adopting certain values and views and exhibit behavior that is thought to fit these as 
best as possible. For example, a person who values tidiness will make sure to clean his 
house frequently. In this case, achievement is the scoreboard that links someone’s 
identity with his values. In the second place, people satisfy their communal needs by 
attempting to create relationships with other people through affiliation.  For instance, an 
individual joins the local soccer club to become part of a larger overlapping identity. 
 
In sum, passing on a legacy means passing on personal life meaning. An attempt to 
transfer this meaning to future generations means that one wants to teach others about the 
two types of things his life stood for: 1) different kinds of relationships with other people, 
and 2) various relationships with value systems. Both of these actions are born from the 
fundamental, or rather “inherent”, needs for agency and communion. Part of the 
motivational properties of legacy can therefore be said to be enclosed in these two needs 
that form one’s personal life meaning.  Yet, this only leads to another question: why do 
people have these needs? The answer to this will be provided in the next part. 
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The workings of the legacy reminder: death awareness and reflection 
This study argues that the underlying source of motivation that creates argentic and 
communal needs is death. This means that human awareness of their own mortality is of 
fundamental importance in explaining people’s behavior. In adopting this view,  this 
study draws upon important bodies of work in psychology called the Terror Management 
Theory (TMT) (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) and the Generativity theories 
(Erikson, 1950). 
 
Both theories discuss the impact of death awareness on people’s life, but each theory 
comes to different conclusions. TMT states that death awareness is translated into fear 
and self-serving defensive reactions whereas the Generativity theories predict productive, 
creative, generative behavior (Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 2009). Some psychologists have 
recently been pondering about why there is such a difference between the theories 
(Cozzolino, Staples, Meyers & Samboceti, 2004; Grant & Wade-Benzoni, 2009). 
 
Grant and Wade-Benzoni theorized that the different effects that thoughts of death have 
on people can be attributed to the concepts of anxiety and reflection.  The principle 
thought is that in many cases death leads to fear and attempts to suppress that fear, but in 
other situations it may lead to a fundamental rethinking of one’s life. This discrepancy 
can in turn be explained by the degree of exposure to the mortality cue, i.e. how long is 
someone aware of death in his mind. On the one hand, a short, sudden exposure to death, 
when reading in the newspaper about a terrible accident for example, results into death 
anxiety: people become afraid when they think of the end of their lives and instead of 
contemplation, they respond by suppressing the death related thoughts, pushing them out 
of their consciousness.  A long, chronic exposure on the other hand, for example in the 
case of illness of a relative or certain professions, causes death reflection: people 
“contemplate their meaning and purpose, and review how others will look upon them 
after they have passed” (Grant & Wade-Benzoni, 2009, p.605).   
 
The latter notion of death reflection then ties with the Generativity theories that were first 
developed by the psychologist Erik Erikson. The most prominent thought is that when 
people can overcome their fear of death, instead of denying it, they strive to make a 
meaningful contribution to the next generations (Grant & Wade-Benzoni, 2009). This is 
possible because the shocking effect of death wears of over time: a person becomes 
habituated to the stimulus or becomes less sensitive to its effects.  It is then that people 
become capable of looking death in the eyes and feel , in the words of Cozzolino, Staples, 
Meyers and Samboceti, “a sense of realization or learning of some important truth, as 
well as a meta-awareness of the life they had been living” (2004, p.289). Instead of death 
then being a source of fear, it becomes a source of learning in order to live a better life 
according to one’s own standard in the time that is left.  This betterment then often leads 
to contributions that have a lasting impact on other people and allow for personal 
connections with them.  Reflecting upon death then increases motivation to act pro-
socially, by helping, protecting and promoting the well-being of another.  
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Indeed, the above is consistent with the thoughts that a person has when considering his 
legacy. He too wants to leave a lasting impact (achievement) and establish relationships 
with others (affiliation). Death reflection therefore generates a legacy concern that makes 
people behave more pro-socially towards others. However, this is not exactly the way in 
which legacy reminders create the legacy concern. In this case, there is no long exposure 
to mortality cues but instead a stimulus of a short duration, very much in line with the 
Terror Management Theory.  
 
The workings of the legacy reminder: death anxiety 
The basic premise of TMT holds that the fear of death underlies most of human behavior. 
This idea was first coined by cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973, as cited in 
Dickinson, 2009). He states that “human beings are predisposed to suppress thoughts of 
death to manage anxiety about the inevitability of mortality” (Dickinson, 2009,p.2). 
Having thoughts of death, Becker claims, is so costly that most people attempt to deny 
death. That is, the repression of death related thoughts by putting them away outside of 
consciousness, for it is the awareness of one’s own mortality that is most difficult to cope 
with. One way of coping is focusing on socially created systems of meaning in which 
they can strive for self-esteem. In practice, this boils down to the adoption of particular 
worldviews and values that prescribe what is good to do, and from this it then becomes 
possible to derive self-esteem and create a meaningful place in the world. Another way to 
cope with thoughts of death according to Becker is projecting a “power and importance 
onto something larger that will save us” (Dickinson, 2009, p.3). Becker’s ways of 
repressing thoughts of death then seem to relate closely to Bakan’s concepts of agency 
and communion that create personal life meaning. The one crucial difference however is 
that Becker sees these concepts as necessary for the denial of death. 
 
This rather philosophical idea was then picked up by the psychologists Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg and Solomon (1986), who desired to put it up for empirical scrutiny. In such a 
way, the Terror Management Theory was created.  In accordance with Becker, this theory 
holds the denial of death to be of utmost importance in human motivation: humans are 
aware of the inevitability of death which creates an existential terror that needs to be 
controlled.  It then expands on Becker’s theory by positing several testable hypotheses 
that have been supported by several hundred’s studies over the past 20 years 
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon & Maxfield, 2006). Specifically, five relevant 
hypotheses have been examined. Firstly, research showed that increasing a person’s self-
esteem decreases the chances of becoming anxious when thinking of death. Secondly, 
small, subtle reminders of death cause more positive reactions to those who support a 
person’s worldview and values (in-group) and more negative reactions to those who 
oppose it (out-group). Thirdly, strengthening self-esteem, through the validation of one’s 
worldview, cancels out the previous effects.  Fourthly, this effect also works the other 
way around. Boosting self-esteem decreases the accessibility of death related thoughts, 
whereas threats to self-esteem are known to augment the accessibility. Fifth and finally, 
providing people with evidence of the existence of a literal (that is to say, not a 
symbolical) afterlife eliminates the impact of death related thoughts on self-esteem and 
worldview (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon & Maxfield, 2006). Apart from the 
findings themselves these studies showed the prevalence of death in daily life as a whole 
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plethora of stimuli can be used to generate thoughts of death in experiments. Among 
others subliminal priming methods, texts and poems containing death related messages, 
videos displaying images of death, or even walking past a cemetery have been shown to 
elicit a behavioral response (Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Fritsche et al., 2009). 
 
The usefulness of these findings is their wide applicability: every type of worldview or 
value system and the self-esteem derived from it is in principle susceptible to the 
influence of death related thoughts or mortality salience, the mere presence of death. 
Therefore, TMT can be used to explain social phenomena such as prejudice, nationalism, 
evaluative biases, and greed to name a few. However, Vail et al. (2012) claim that TMT 
has traditionally been too much focused this negative side of the presence of death as 
something that fuels “the dark underbelly of human social functioning”(p.1).  Instead, 
these researchers stress that TMT could also present more positive messages, that is those 
outcomes that show that when under mortality salience people try to minimize harm to 
the self and other, and promote well-being on different domains. The trick to using death 
anxiety in a more positive fashion is the fact that individuals will try to reinforce a 
worldview that is positive for others. Indeed, under mortality salience a person may then 
become greedier, because money is of value to him (Kasser & Sheldon, 2000).  However 
other studies show that people who value nature and the environment will exhibit 
behavior that is aimed at protecting these values (Vess & Arndt, 2008; Fritsche & Häfner, 
2012). It is therefore of great importance to ascertain that the mortality salience effects 
someone with a worldview that is beneficial to others. In fact, Cialdini et al. (1991) in 
their norm focus theory suggest that a person can hold multiple sets of values that 
determine behavior to the extent that emphasis (focus) is placed on the one and not the 
other (1991). Using this theory Fritsche, Jonas, Kayser and Kornayi (2009) demonstrate 
that when pro-environmental norms are made salient people are more likely to display 
more positive attitudes towards the environment and moreover act accordingly. In one of 
their experiments, participants to whom an environmental norm was salient would pick 
reusable cups over disposable cups. This experiment suggests that people have several 
worldviews and values and they will defend one of them under mortality salience.  
 
In a similar fashion to most experiment within TMT, legacy reminders also seek to use 
mortality salience, the sudden presence of death, to incite death anxiety.  Also, like the 
experiments above, legacy reminders attempts to use this anxiety for a positive cause: 
beneficence toward future others. The way in which it does this is quite unique, in the 
first part of the mechanism the fear of death spurs people to deny the terrifying thoughts, 
and they do so by trying to boost their self-esteem and their feelings of affiliation with 
others by relating to a specific worldview. In the second part people are offered an 
opportunity to leave some form of legacy, which allows their meaningfulness to 
symbolically persist through time, similar to people who are offered an opportunity to 
behave in favor of the environment. In order to then gain the psychological security of 
legacy in the face of death they exhibit pro-social behavior towards future others.  The 
legacy reminder then is that which induces some form of death anxiety in order to 
generate a legacy concern, which should then be given an opportunity to materialize into 
beneficence towards others. 
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However, Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez and Larrick (2012) point towards an 
interesting option: would it be possible to use other mechanisms than death to create a 
legacy? Especially since instilling death anxiety is inappropriate and undesirable in many 
policy situation, it would be interesting to examine whether options exists to generate 
legacy concern in a positive way, by reminding people of how one can live a meaningful 
life and how this can be passed on to others. Some of the evidence below points in this 
direction. 
 
Empirical support and anecdotal evidence 
Even though the theoretical rationale of legacy reminders draws upon the well validated 
findings of TMT, it is imperative to know whether it withstands empirical testing. Two 
papers by Wade-Benzoni provide the little known support for this explanation. In 2009, 
Wade-Benzoni,Tost, Hernandez and Larrick conducted a study in which they showed that 
mortality salience could reverse intergenerational discounting. When death related 
thoughts were induced people acted more generously towards other in the future than 
others in the present. 
 
In a later study in 2012, the researchers conducted two experiments to test the 
relationship between mortality salience, legacy and pro-social behavior (Wade-Benzoni, 
Tost, Hernandez &Larrick, 2012). In the first experiment, they demonstrated that similar 
to their previous study, those primed with death behave more pro-socially towards future 
generations than those participants in the control condition. Moreover, participants who 
were primed with death displayed specifically more generosity towards others in the 
future than towards others in the present. In a second experiment Wade-Benzoni and 
colleagues set up a scenario in which the participant had to attribute resources to either 
himself in the present, himself in the future, another in the present or another in the future. 
In this experimental setup it was again shown that those who were primed with death 
were nicer to future others (i.e. they attributed more resources) than to other groups. 
Moreover, those in the death prime condition exhibit less beneficence towards themselves 
in the future than those in the control condition. In these experiments, death priming 
consistently lead to more beneficence towards others in the future, implying that indeed 
death priming activates a form of concern for the future (and leave a legacy) and that 
people therefore spend more resources on those in the future than others now. 
               
Although empirical evidence is not very extensive as of yet, there are plenty of examples 
of the use of legacy reminders in society. Several websites provides anecdotal evidence 
for the use of a positive legacy reminder. These sites try to convince visitors to do 
something meaningful with their money and give it to a charity as part of their legacy 
(here meaning a monetary gift after death). These websites want to encourage people to 
donate money to a charity as part of their will and stress that their contribution would 
have a lasting impact on those they would help
47
. Another particularly striking example 
of the death related legacy reminder this time, is a 2011 Dutch advertising campaign 
meant to raise attention and money for a deadly, yet little-researched motor neuron 
                                               
47 For several examples, please visit : http://www.rememberacharity.org.uk/; http://www.legacytrustuk.org/; 
http://www.leavealegacy.org/ 
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disease. Large posters were suspended in train stations and other crowded public areas 
and showed a face looking intensely at the viewer. Underneath this face there was written 
“by now, I will have died” (Dutch: “Ik ben inmiddels overleden”).  This campaign makes 
viewers realize that this poster is that person’s legacy, his way of projecting his message 
into the future. The fact that these people are dead and used their lives for this last effort 
should then mobilize people to make a lasting impact on others’ lives by donating money 
for research. 
 
A.5.4 Ranking, Competition, and Tournaments 
Prestige is used by Harbaugh (1998) to describe the utility that an individual derives from 
making his donations publicly known. Ariely et al. (2009) term this propensity of an 
individual to be concerned about other people’s opinion and approval image motivation. 
This term incorporates the need for acknowledgment and respect by the others. Therefore, 
an individual who strives for social approval should stick to the norms of the community. 
Pride and shame could be other motivations for donating when identities of individuals 
are revealed (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004). Shame is described as an emotion associated 
with one’s negative evaluation either by the self of others due to the fact that he has not 
met certain criteria regarding what is good, right, appropriate and desirable (Lewis, 1971). 
Thus, the individual tries to avoid this feeling. Pride, on the other hand, is a feeling of 
self-respect and self-value (Andreoni & Petrie, 2004) that the individual actively pursues.  
 
The desire for social approval is one of the reasons why individuals will act more 
generously in public if their generosity is viewable by others (Hollander, 1990). It has 
been generally acknowledged that recognizing contributors by revealing their identity 
increases contributions to public goods (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 
2004). Social groups, charity organizations and online communities publicize 
individuals’ contributions for this reason, and very few contributions are actually done 
anonymously. Social recognition has also been found effective in disparate settings that 
include voter turnout and blood donation (Gerber et al., 2008; Lacetera and Macis, 2010). 
While there is agreement among researchers and practitioners that recognizing 
contributors has a positive effect, the reasons for this effect are less clear. 
 
The organization of the societies following a hierarchical structure is prevalent in almost 
all societies, so a strong preference for higher positions in social ranking is likely to be an 
important motivation of human social and economic behaviour (Barankay, 2012). This 
preference is also likely to influence the way in which we evaluate our outcome and the 
outcome of others, and finally the way we choose. Rankings and league tables, where 
people are ranked relative to others in terms of a performance measure, are a pervasive 
feature of life (e.g. employers use them to measure employee performance and determine 
bonuses and promotions) (Grote, 2005). Beyond the monetary benefits that may go along 
with high rankings, it has also been argued that people may care about their ranking per 
se, even when rankings have no financial consequences, also called rank incentives, as 
they directly affect self-image (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Köszegi, 2006) and  convey 
status (Moldovanu et al, 2007, Besley & Ghatak, 2008). When individuals undertake 
actions in order to increase their self-image when faced with the ranking incentive, the 
motivation to undertake this action is intrinsic. For ranking to affect self-image and 
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convey status it is necessary that other people are aware of the rank of the individual. 
Without this naming and shaming there is no incentive for the individual to make the 
effort to increase his/her rank.  
 
While social groups, charities and online communities endeavor to publicize all 
contributors’ information, this is often difficult, if not impossible, for several reasons. 
First, when there are many contributors, publicizing the names of all of them may not be 
feasible. In this case, organizations that rely on philanthropic donations often publicize 
the names of the largest contributors, e.g. by naming a building after the highest 
contributor or by publicly announcing contributors in categories by size of contribution 
(Harbaugh, 1998; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Li and Riyanto, 2009). Second, it is 
improbable that every member of the social network will view all of the contributor’s 
information, especially when the list of contributors is long. Organizations may recognize 
all contributors by publishing lists on websites and in other media, but it is not clear that 
this information is always viewed due to the time and effort that must be spent in order to 
locate information about specific contributors. 
 
Samak and Sheremeta (2013) find in a recent laboratory experiment that contributions to 
a public good are significantly increased when contributors are recognized (i.e., photos 
and names of all contributors are displayed after the contribution stage) relative to when 
contributors are not recognized. When viewing information about contributors is costly, 
there is no  significant difference in contributions as compared to the case where all 
contributors are recognized by default, suggesting that just the possibility of being 
recognized is sufficient to drive the increase in contributions. This effect holds even 
though the identities of contributors are viewed less than 10% of the time. They also 
pinpoint which information is most effective at increasing contributions. Recognizing 
only the highest contributors is not significantly different from not recognizing 
contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing 
all contributors. This finding suggests that it is the fear of shame, rather than the 
anticipation of prestige, that drives the identification-related increase in contributions in 
their experiment. 
 
Also other evidence shows that naming and shaming has a positive effect on pro-social 
behaviour. For instance, in 2001, the problem of long waiting lists of hospitals in England 
was approached in a different way: failure resulted in sanctions in the form of the naming 
and shaming process. Besley, Bevan, and Burchardi (2009) analysed the effect of this 
naming and shaming on the waiting lists of hospitals in England. They found that this 
policy did indeed reduce waiting times in England. Naming and shaming is also used as 
international pressure to increase human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Murdie & Davis, 
2012).  
 
  
The effect of the ranking incentive on firm behaviour 
While the non-monetary rewards (pride, image, prestige) or punishments (shame) are 
relevant to all individuals, the fact that managers have more visibility in the organization 
and are accountable to the stakeholders for their actions, makes acquiring reputation even 
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more important for them. Visibility of managerial actions is something that follows 
directly from the position in the hierarchy that they occupy. Since the managers are the 
most visible members of an organization and outsiders see them as the organization itself, 
it is their task to present with their actions the organization’s core values and purpose to 
the world (Scott & Lane, 2000). Because of this higher visibility and higher level of 
interaction, managers are more likely to identify themselves with their organizations. 
Besides achieving the desired corporate image outside the organization, managers’ 
visibility affects their decisions within the organization itself. A direct relationship exists 
between power and visibility – the more powerful a manager is, the more visible his 
actions will be (Ortega, 2003). Once visibility increases, managers realize that they are 
more accountable for their decisions. Consequently, they will exert more effort in 
increasing the value of the firm and the decisions they make will be balanced against 
shareholders’ interests because of career concerns.  
 
Reputation combines everything that is knowable about a firm. As an empirical 
representation, it is a judgment of the firm made by a set of audiences on the basis of 
perceptions and assessments that are assembled and made available via a ranking system, 
which defines, assesses, and compares firms’ reputation according to certain predefined 
criteria (Schultz, Mouritsen & Gabrielsen, 2001). So it in the interest of the manager to 
make sure that his firm is highly ranked in order to receive a high reputation. Since 
investing in CSR can be viewed as a form of reputation building of a firm (McWilliams 
et al., 2006), the manager who made the decision to invest in CSR can thereby increase 
his own reputation when it becomes visible that the firm is performing better than before 
the CSR investment decision. It even appears that a higher ranking on a CSR-rating list 
increases the firm’s financial performance. In their research, Barnett and Salmon (2012) 
examine empirically the relationship between CSR and financial performance. The 
method of rating the CSP (Corporate Social Performance) for the sample firms is the 
KLD rating. Publicly traded ﬁrms are tracked by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD). 
KLD is an independent agency with a long history of tracking, and rating, ﬁrms based on 
a number of corporate social responsibility dimensions
48
. Figure 1 graphically depicts the 
non-monotonic, curvilinear relationship between social and ﬁnancial performance.  
 
 
A.6 Evidence on Effects Sizes of Nudges in Related Areas 
 
An illustration of the effectiveness of framing is provided by a recent paper by Bertrand, 
Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, and Zinman (2010). They quantified the importance of 
theoretically-grounded psychological cues in dollar terms by partnering with one of the 
largest banks in South Africa to offer new loans to existing clients, via letters that varied 
both the interest rate offer and other psychological cues. In particular, they varied the 
number of different potential loans that were presented (to test whether greater choice 
could overload decision-making), how the interest rate was compared to some market 
benchmark, the race and gender of the person in a photo on the offer letter, the expiration 
                                               
48 Information about this database is available online at http://www.kld.com/socrates/indes.html 
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date of the offer, whether the offer was combined with a promotional giveaway, and 
whether the letter mentioned suggested uses for the loan. They found that consumers that 
had been offered lower interest rates were much more likely to take up the loans. They 
also found, however, that any one psychological cues could affect take-up by almost as 
much as a one to two percentage point change in the monthly interest rate. Allcott and 
Mullainathan (2010) argued that these findings are striking in a cost-benefit framework: 
psychological cues cost very little, while price changes (e.g. subsidies) cost a lot. 
 
Considering the effects of default options Madrian and Dennis Shea (2001) found that 
participation rates in a corporate retirement savings plan jumped from 65 percent to 98 
percent when the default option was changed to enrollment from non-enrollment, 
showing the substantial power of the default setting. Furthermore, since only a handful of 
employees opted out of the program once they were automatically enrolled, this suggests 
that setting enrollment as the default option was “correct,” in the sense of enrolling the 
vast majority of people in the option they actually wanted. 
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Appendix B: Detailed Overview of Experimental 
Studies 
 
B.1: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Legacy Reminders 
Experimental Design and Procedures  
 
In the experimental laboratory, the baseline treatments for legacy reminders in non-
strategic settings were designed as follows: (1) After having filled in a short general 
questionnaire (inquiring about, for example basic, demographics such as age, gender and 
nationality), participants received one of three legacy treatments: positive, negative, or 
neutral (control group). The treatment consisted of reading one of three newspaper 
articles depending on the specific condition that either primed them with a negative 
legacy reminder (death cue), a positive legacy reminder (meaningful life cue), or an 
unrelated topic (control condition). In order to induce priming effects newspaper articles 
were used (see appendix). Similar to a previous study (Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez 
& Larrick, 2012) participants in the death prime conditions read an article titled “Person 
killed in aircraft brake failure accident” that was meant to create death anxiety. This 
article discussed an airplane crash on a highway killing one person. Additionally, in the 
control conditions participants read “Has Russian math whiz solved $1M puzzle?” which 
described a Russian mathematician who had published the solution of a renowned math 
problem on the Internet. However, in order to create thoughts of legacy without death, a 
specific prime had to be developed for this experiment. In the positive legacy conditions 
then, participants read an article titled “Lexington celebrated birthday local hero” that 
described how a community hero gave meaning to his live by dedicating himself to his 
town. After reading, participants were asked to comment on the writing style used in the 
article. (2) After this priming stage, we administered two non-strategic behavioural 
measures in order to assess pro-social Behavior of participants and whether it was 
influenced by the specific legacy reminder they received. One behavioural measure 
assessed participants’ trustfulness and trustworthiness by using a hypothetical trust game. 
Our main behavioural measure assessed participants’ social preferences (altruism) by 
using a so-called dictator game, in which participants unilaterally decided how to divide 
their final experiment earnings (€12) between themselves and a charity. A second 
manipulation consisted of a change in the text on the flyer that promoted the charity (see 
Appendix C2). Participants in the present-other conditions read a description of a 
charitable organization that provided solar panels for people in sub-Sahara Africa to 
relieve poverty. The organization was described as helping to provide the immediate 
needs and survival of the recipient. In the future-other conditions on the other hand, the 
same charity was described somewhat differently, focusing instead on the long-term 
effect by stressing how a donation will help future generations to develop.   
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Between these two behavioural measures participants answered several questionnaires in 
order to check for pre-existing differences in the sample as well as giving the prime some 
time to take effect. The questionnaires included a generativity questionnaire (McAdams 
& de St. Aubin, 1992), a survey on regulatory focus (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002), 
and a questionnaire about public service (Kim, 2011).  Moreover, in the control and death 
anxiety conditions, participants also answered a questionnaire assessing death anxiety 
(Templer, 1970). The questionnaires used in the experiment were all used in previous 
studies and are well validated. These questionnaires were secondary to the actual 
manipulations and served to check for pre-existing differences between groups that may 
have been the cause of possible effects found in the experiment. The design is visualized 
in Figure B.1.1: 
 
 
Figure B.1.1: Sequence of treatments in the “legacy reminder experiments” 
 
Hundred-and-twenty-five (43 male and 82 female) students at Utrecht University, the 
Netherlands, agreed to participate in the experiment. The age of the participants ranged 
from 18 to 35 with a mean of 22. The participants were paid 12 Euro for their efforts. The 
participants were all subscribed to an online data base and received invitation to the 
experiment by e-mail. Those willing to participate registered for an experimental session. 
No participants were excluded from the analyses. The experiment had a 3 (Positive 
legacy prime vs.  death  prime vs. neutral prime) by 2 (present recipient vs. future 
recipient) between-participants design. At the beginning of the experiment, all 
participants who were in the same condition were each seated behind a computer. The 
instructions and materials needed were in front of them on their desk or were provided by 
the computer. The experimenter’s only task was to make sure that the instructions were 
clear and that all participants would stick to the rules of the experiment. No further 
communication between the experimenter and the participants was necessary. 
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the literature study (see Appendix A.5.3) the following hypotheses can be 
formulated: 
(1) Participants in the death prime condition give more to future-others,  
(2) Participants in the control condition give more to present others, and  
(3) Participants in the legacy prime condition give more to future-others. 
Results 
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Given the 2x3 between-subject design, the analysis focusses on comparing the means of 6 
groups in total. Selecting Prime and Frame as independent variables and using amount of 
money donated and frequency of donation alternatively as dependent variables, the main 
direct effects of just Prime or Framing were tested, and interaction effects between Prime 
and Framing. These interaction effects are important because subsequent pairwise 
comparisons are able to test whether all three main hypotheses find support in our data. 
 
A two factor Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that our dependent variables, i.e. 
the amount of money and frequency of donation, are not normally distributed. Therefore 
direct effects are analysed by performing non-parametric test.  
 
However, testing for the interactions between several variables is impossible using non-
parametric tests. Therefore, as a first step, the two ANOVAs were conducted in order to 
assess the existence of interaction effect that could confirm the hypotheses. Promising 
results from these ANOVAs are then followed by more focused non-parametric tests that 
do not assume normality or homogeneity of variance, so as to gain more reliable results. 
The first two-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effects of Prime or Framing on 
the amount of money that was donated, nor was there a significant interaction effect 
between these two independent variables. The second two-factor ANOVA was conducted 
to assess for main and interaction effects of Prime and Framing, but this time using the 
frequency of donation as a variable. Again no effect was found for Prime and no 
interaction effect could be detected for the two independent variables.  
 
However, it could be carefully concluded that there is an effect of Framing on the 
frequency of donation in a group regardless of what prime they received, F(1,119)=3.171, 
p=.078. Specifically, participants in the present-other conditions (M=.537, SD= .062) 
donated more often than the people in the future-other conditions (M=.377, SD=.065).  It 
is important to note that participants who donated received a score of 1 whereas those 
who did not received a score of 0. Consequently, the mean of each group lies between 0 
and 1 as the means consist of the amount of people who donated divided by the total 
amount of people in the group. Therefore a mean of .537 indicates that 53.7% of the 
people in present-other donated to charity as opposed to 37.7% of the people in the 
future-other condition. 
 
In addition, because of the inability to detect differences, two other ANOVAs were 
conducted to test whether gender is a modulating factor for beneficence. The first three-
factor ANOVA examined whether a combination of one or both of the independent 
variables Prime and Framing with Gender has an effect on the amount of money donated. 
The analysis revealed a significant interaction effect between Gender and Prime, F 
(2,113) =3.666, p=.029. Also the second three-factor ANOVA tested for the same effects 
but this time for the other dependent variable. It was discovered that there was an 
interaction effect between Gender and Prime on the amount of people who donated, 
F(2,113)=5,948, p=.003. An inspection of the means of both dependent variables (Table 
1) reveals that, regardless of Framing, more women than men donated money in in the 
death prime conditions, and they donated a higher amount. Subsequent t-tests shows that 
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this difference is significant: t(35)= 3.125, p= .004 and t(35)=2.057, p=.047 respectively. 
Figures B.1.2 and B.1.3 below clearly display the discrepancy between men and women. 
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  Men Women 
  N=14 N=23 
  M SD M SD 
Amount of money donated after 
negative prime 
.071 1.54 2.35 2.71 
Frequency of donation after negative 
prime 
.214 .426 .696 .470 
Table B.1.1: Means and Standard deviations for men and women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1.2: Mean amount of money donated for men and women     Figure B.1.3: Mean frequency of 
donation for men and women 
 
 
Assuming that the ANOVAs and t-test performed above at somewhat unreliable in their 
outcomes, several tests with significant outcomes were repeated using non-parametric 
tests that do not assume normality or homogeneity of variances. These tests assign a rank 
to each value in the data set and calculated whether the differences between the mean 
ranks of each group are significant. Using a Man-Whitney U test, the difference between 
the mean ranks in negative prime conditions and positive prime conditions were assessed 
for both the amount of money and frequency of donation. Similar to the t-test in the 
previous section, the results were significant. Women who had been in the negative prime 
conditions donated significantly more money than women in the positive prime 
condition, p= .001 (See Table B.1.2 for mean rank scores). Similar results were found for 
frequency of donation, p=.006 (Table B.1.2). Next to that, two other Man-Whitney U 
tests were conducted to check the previously found significance values. The first test 
revealed that there was a significant difference between both amount of money donated 
and frequency of donation between men and women in the negative prime conditions. For 
the amount of money donated, the mean rank of women higher than for men, leading to 
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significant difference, p=.014 (see Table B.1.3 for mean ranks). For the frequency of 
donation, women again had a higher mean rank than men, which was a significant 
difference of p=.007 (see Table B.1.3). The last test assed the relationship between 
framing and frequency of donation. The mean ranks of this test were 68.20 for present-
other and 57.54 for future-other, leading to a probability value of p=.072 
 
 Legacy prime Death prime 
N=30 N=23 
Mean rank per group for the amount 
of money donated 
21.63 34 
Mean rank per group for frequency 
of donation  
22.45 32.93 
Table B.1.2: Mean rank score for women 
 
 Men Women 
N=14 N=23 
Mean rank per group for the amount 
of money donated 
13.82 22.15 
Mean rank per group for frequency 
of donation  
13.46 22.37 
Table  B.1.3: Mean rank score for men and women in the death prime conditions 
The scores from the questionnaires where then used to check whether differences in 
scores of regulatory focus, public service, mood, or death anxiety could explain the large 
difference between men and women, however no significant difference between men and 
women on these scales was found. 
 
Finally, the results from the decision game were analysed as an alternative measure of 
beneficence. Given that this task preceded the Framing manipulation, it was impossible to 
look for interaction effect.  A one-way ANOVA using Prime as independent variable and 
alternatively Trusting and Honouring as dependent variable was conducted, however no 
significant results were found. 
 
Discussion 
Generally, it can be stated that none of the research hypotheses are confirmed by the 
experiment. There appears to be no interaction effect between Prime and Framing, 
therefore people in the death prime condition did not give significantly more or more 
often to future-others than they did in present-other conditions. Neither was there a 
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reversed tendency for the control group to give more to present-others instead. Moreover, 
the legacy prime, which was thought of as an alternative to the death prime, did not 
interact with framing either to increase beneficence. These findings then do not 
correspond to previous results of Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez and Larrick (2012). 
Their experiment showed that beneficence arises from an individual’s personal desire to 
overcome the fear of death by casting him or herself into the future by means of a legacy. 
Yet no such pro-social motivation was triggered in the present experiment.  
 
A reason for these contradictory results could be due to the differences in dependent 
variables. Even though the independent variables were the same, the present experiment 
used real life donations as one of its dependent variables. In the experiment of Wade-
Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez and Larrick,(2012) the researchers instead used semi-
hypothetical rewards as a measure of beneficence. Participants in their experiment were 
entered into a lottery to win $1000 and were asked how much they would donate in case 
they won. There is a possibility that receiving a real reward, with the feeling that you 
earned it, is different from maybe getting it if you are lucky. Moreover, the amount of 
$1000 itself allows for different donations than €12. Simply because of the size of the 
amount in the Wade-Benzoni experiment, participants have much more options in 
choosing their donations and given the fact that they did not yet receive the actual money, 
participants were not restricted to coins and notes as they were in the present experiment. 
Therefore donations in this experiment were more difficult to scale as differences were 
necessarily smaller. This could have resulted in a failure to observe the predicted effects. 
It is then conceivable that the desire to leave a legacy to future-others is only a useful 
manipulation when it concerns relatively large sums of money.  
 
Another option for these findings lies in the sample sizes. Indeed, the sample sizes of the 
current study are quite low, however Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez and Larrick had a 
sample of 54 participants in their original 2 by 2 experiment. This means that their 
average amount of participants per condition was smaller than the smallest group of the 
current experiment (15). Using so few participants means there could have been some 
characteristics which influenced the results instead of only the manipulation. 
Furthermore, scores in smaller samples are rarely normally distributed (hence this study 
used non-parametric tests), and the results of the ANOVAs reported by Wade-Benzoni 
and colleagues could be inaccurate. 
 
A lack of empirical support for legacy reminders is unfortunate and some of the data in 
the experiment even argues for another explanation of beneficence. The fact that the 
present-other framing on its own affected the frequency of donations in a positive way is 
rather interesting. This seems to suggest that for some part, the donations were not so 
much motivated by a desire to leave a legacy, but rather the perception of direct need.  
 
However, there are other findings that support the existence of legacy reminders, albeit in 
a different way. The significant difference between men and women who were primed 
with death is noticeable and shows two important observations: firstly, thoughts of death 
increase beneficence in some circumstances. This is unlike findings by Kasser and 
Sheldon (2000) who showed that thought of death cause greed, and more in line with 
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general thoughts about legacy by Wade-Benzoni. Secondly, the experiment implies that 
gender is an important variable in mapping out the effects of death primes. Women were 
found to be more affected by the death prime and donated more money and more often 
than men did. Moreover, women in the death prime conditions donated more and more 
often than those in the legacy conditions. Indeed, some studies show that women 
generally have higher levels of death anxiety (Dattel & Neimeyer, 1990; Pierce, Cohen, 
Chambers & Meade, 2007), yet the present study found no significant differences in the 
death anxiety questionnaires, only the donation effect.  
 
The data for women then suggest that the fear of death did instill them with some form of 
concern for others which resulted in more beneficent Behavior. This other however could 
be both present- and future-other as the data shows. It does therefore not argue for legacy 
reminders being a unique way of increasing pro-social Behavior to future others 
specifically. Instead, it seems that the desire to leave a legacy activated by the fear of 
death can be realized by giving to any other person. Legacy based on death anxiety does 
therefore have the ability to counteract inter-temporal discounting (given the fact that 
there was no difference between present- and future-other), but this does not mean that 
the concern for present-others does not exist anymore. It is possible that others who are 
young or have an influence on young people offer just as much opportunities to leave a 
legacy to as others that do not exist yet. Especially the fact that the flyers with the 
framing manipulation contained a picture of two young men may have been important in 
this regard. Giving a donation to help people like them in immediate need impacts their 
lives in a big way, this could be perceived as an option to do something meaningful and 
leave a legacy, just as well as contributing to long-term improvement could (future-other 
framing). Even though there was no difference between the control conditions and death 
prime conditions, the effect of the latter prime on donations provides evidence against the 
idea that death primes lead to greediness at the very least. It is however difficult to 
explain why men react so differently from women, since no differences were found in the 
questionnaires included in the experiment. It can only be concluded that socialization 
processes work differently for both men and women and create different reactions to 
death anxiety. 
 
Regarding the novel findings of this research, quite a few opportunities exist to further 
elucidate the workings of legacy reminders. In the first place, it would be useful to 
examine if legacy reminders do work where people have access to a larger amount of 
money for their donations. It seems that small sums of money may not be that suited for 
drawing out the effect. For example, field studies could be conducted implementing 
different primes on people who won a large prize in television shows or lotteries. It could 
even be possible to include a legacy manipulation on an energy bill to see if the amount 
of energy spent the week decreases.  
 
Another direction worth exploring is the gender difference that resulted from priming 
participants with death. As from this experiment it seems that the prime has opposite 
effects in men and women, an option would be to find out why this effect exists. 
Examining women’s attitudes towards donations or the statistics from charitable 
organizations about donations by women could be a way to start. Moreover it would be 
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possible to test for correlations between death anxiety in women and other variables that 
could related.  
 
A third useful way of building this research would be to examine the possibilities for the 
use of a positive legacy reminder in the form of a legacy prime. This study showed that 
the prime was largely ineffective as a means of increasing beneficence, yet the usefulness 
of such a prime would be large given that reminding individuals of death might not be the 
most pleasant of manipulations. It is conceivable that the content of the newspaper article 
that served as a legacy prime did not make the notion of legacy salient enough. 
Investigating peoples’ goals in life as well as the meaning of them could be a good way 
to increases knowledge of what elements are important in making trying to instill a desire 
to leave a legacy in a positive way. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate to use of legacy reminders for promoting 
individuals’ regard for collective interest as well as intergenerational beneficence. It was 
theorized that instilling people with the desire to leave a legacy behind would be an 
effective way of reducing both temporal as well as social discounting. This reduction of 
the discounting effect was thought to bring the other closer to the self and make an 
individual more willing to either contribute to a public good or maintain one by not 
taking too much from it. Heightened levels of beneficence towards future others and 
more regard for the collective interest could then be a solution to social dilemmas in 
general and intergenerational dilemmas in particular.  
 
The experiment conducted as part of this study found that it is difficult to use both death 
and legacy primes to generate a desire for legacy creation and increase the amount and 
frequency of donations to future others. However, using a death prime it was possible to 
create a difference in beneficence between men and women towards others in general. 
Yet even the levels of beneficence in women in this condition failed to rise above the 
levels of beneficence in the control group.  
 
Although some form of success was achieved in generating a desire to leave a legacy in 
women, using the current experimental manipulations, it is not possible to increase 
people’s regard for collective interest or intergenerational beneficence to above standard 
levels. Future researchers are thus recommended to more closely examine the gender 
difference and devise different experimental set-ups in order to find out more about this 
fascinating source of motivation. 
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B.2: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Commitment 
Experimental Design and Procedures  
 
In the experimental laboratory, the treatments for the commitment nudge in non-strategic 
settings was designed as following: (1) After having filled in a short general 
questionnaire (inquiring about, for example, basic demographics such as age, gender, and 
nationality), participants received one of two treatments: either, they received a 
commitment treatment (being asked whether they were planning to contribute any money 
to charity during the course of the following 12 months, and how much), or the control 
treatment (no such question included). (2) After this treatment stage, we administered 
three non-strategic behavioural measures in order to assess participants’ time preferences 
in general, their social preferences in the future, and their present social preferences. The 
first behavioural measure assessed participants’ time preferences using a technique that 
involves multiple price lists with real payments (sooner-smaller payments versus later-
larger payments). The second behavioural measure assessed participants’ social 
preferences (altruism, ‘warm glow’) in the future, using a technique of multiple price lists 
with real payments (sooner payments versus later payments that included a charity 
donation). The third behavioural measure assessed participants’ present social 
preferences (altruism, ‘warm glow’) using a dictator game with real payments (fixed 
payment of €12 today, or €12 minus charity donation today). For the exact payment 
options of all three measures see the instructions of this experiment in Appendix B4. The 
design is visualized in Figure B.2.1: 
 
 
 
Figure C.2.1: Sequence of treatments in the “commitment experiments” 
 
One of the choices participants made in the experiment was randomly selected for 
payment. In order to provide credible incentives, participants’ trust in receiving their 
future payments needed to be ensured. According to Collor and Williams (1999) using 
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real payments decreases the mean and unexplained variance of the revealed discount rates, 
compared to using hypothetical incentives. In order to equate the transactions costs of the 
earlier and later payments (Meier and Sprenger, 2012), in the present experiment PayPal 
was used to transfer the money, even when participants decided for a payment on the day 
of the experiment. By eliminating payments in the lab, participants could not 
disproportionately prefer present in-lab payments, based on the perception that it would 
be more likely to actually receive the payment (Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012). If the 
participant did not have a PayPal account yet, PayPal automatically opened an account. 
Then the participants received an e-mail from PayPal after which they could claim the 
money, by having it transferred to their account. They received this e-mail either on the 
day of the experiment, or in exactly one month, or in six months, or in seven months, 
respectively. If their earnings involved a payment to a charity, then the payment was 
transferred to the charity of their choice on the specified date and the receipt was e-
mailed to the participant. Furthermore, the participants were given the business card of 
Professor Rosenkranz. They were told that if any problems in receiving their payments 
would occur, they could call or e-mail the Professor, who would then hand-deliver the 
payment. This procedure was also used in the experiment of Andreoni and Sprenger 
(2012) to increase trust in future payments. Also, the participants were fully informed 
about the payment method prior to the experiment and were given the choice to opt out 
against receiving a small show-up fee. None of the subjects opted out. 
 
Forty-seven (17 male and 40 female) students at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, 
agreed to participate in the experiment. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 27 
with a mean of 20. The participants were recruited using an online data base and received 
an invitation to the experiment by e-mail. Those willing to participate registered for an 
experimental session. At the beginning of the experiment, all participants who were in the 
same condition were each seated behind a computer. The instructions and materials 
needed were in front of them on their desk or were provided by the computer. The 
experimenter’s only task was to make sure that the instructions were clear and that all 
participants would stick to the rules of the experiment. No further communication 
between the experimenter and the participants was necessary. 
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the literature study (see Appendix A.2 and A.5.1) the following hypotheses can 
be formulated: 
(1) The consistency of participants’ preferences for monetary benefits and non-monetary 
benefits over time is similar. 
(2) Participants in the commitment treatment behave more pro-socially than those in the 
control treatment. 
 
Results 
To calculate the discount rates of the subjects, the switching point of their decisions from 
sooner smaller payments to later larger payments in each block is determined. The 
interest rate starts at 5% for the first decision in each block and then increases in 20 steps 
of 5% to 100%. The switching point is used to calculate the discount rates by using the 
interest rate corresponding to the given decision, e.g. if in Block A a participant switches 
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from the smaller sooner payment to the larger later payment at decision 15, where the 
choice is “Receive €12,00 today” or “Receive €12,20 in one month” we conclude that 
this participant has an annual discount rate of 20%.  
 
The mean switching point of the participants in the control group of block A (decision 1-
20) choosing the larger later option is at decision 14.70  ≈ 15 which is “Receive €12,00 
today” or “Receive €12,75 in one month.” The decision at 14.70 gives us a discount rate 
of 73.48%. In the commitment group the mean switching point to the larger later option 
9.21 ≈ 9, which is “Receive €12,00 today” or “Receive €12,45 in one month”, and 
corresponds to a discount rate of 46.04%. Accordingly the mean discount rates are 
calculated for all decision blocks for both treatments and displayed in Table C.2.1. 
Subjects’ decision in Block G generates a score for their altruism (non-monetary benefit 
from pro-social Behavior, warm glow) in the present. The warm glow is measured as the 
percentage of 12 euro that an individual would give to charity today. In the control group 
the average of the warm glow in block G is 0.0696 = 6.96%, corresponding to giving 
€0.84 to charity today. In the commitment group the average of the warm glow in block 
G is 0.1979 = 19.79%, which corresponds to giving €2.37 to charity today. Table C.2.1 
below presents all average discount factors as well as subjects’ average warm glow, 
determined separately for the control and the treatment group for each decision block.  
 
  
Control 
Difference 
within 
group 
Difference 
across 
Blocks 
Commitment 
Difference 
within 
group 
Difference 
across 
Blocks 
Difference 
between 
groups  
(N=24)  (N=24)   
Block A 73.48     46.04     27.44
+++
 
A-B   5.87**     -1.25     
Block B 67.61     47.29     20.32
++
 
B-C   14.13*     10.21     
Block C 53.48     37.08     16.4 
A-C   20.00***     8.96*     
Block D 63.7     57.29     6.41 
D-E   -10.65*     1.25     
A-D     9.78
++
     -11.25
++
   
Block E 74.35     56.04     18.31 
E-F   31.52***     9.37     
B-E     -6.74     -8.75   
Block F 42.83     46.67     -3.84 
D-F   20.87***     10.62     
C-F     10.65     -9.59   
Block G 6.96     19.79     -12.83
++
 
*,**,*** indicate p<0.1,<0.05,<0.01 in the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks equality test. 
+,++,+++ indicate p<0.1,<0.05,<0.01 in the Wilcoxon rank-sum test on unmatched data comparing 
discount rates between the two groups. 
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Table B.2.1: Summary of average discount factors and warm glow per decision block and 
treatment 
 
From these discount factors we can also calculate the average present and future charity 
donations in the two groups. The eight’s row in Table B.2.1. indicates that there are no 
significant differences between the two treatments when decisions concern future 
payments: In Block D, the control group donated on average €0,65 (5,416%), while the 
commitment group donated on average €0,55 (4,583%). In Block E, the control group 
donated on average €4,5 (35,83%), while the commitment group donated on average 
€3,30 (27,50%). In Block F, the control group and the commitment group both donated 
on average €0,45 (3,75%). In Block G, when decisions concern present payments the 
decisions of the two groups are statistically different: the control group donated on 
average €0.84 (6,96 %), while the commitment group donated significantly more with on 
average €2.37 (19,79%).  
 
The non-monetary benefit from pro-social Behavior (warm glow) in the future is 
measured as the difference in discount factors between a block with selfish payments and 
a block with altruistic payments. Hence, if an individual has a discount factor of 75% in 
Bock A (requiring an interest rate of 75% to delay consumption for one month) and a 
discount rate of 50% in Block D (requiring a payment of 50% of her present income to go 
to charity to delay consumption for one month), warm glow is calculated to be positive 
(25%). The average values for control and the treatment group are presented in column 4 
of Table B.2.1. A Wilcoxon signed rank sum test reveals that all values are not 
significantly different from zero. 
 
A Fischer’s exact test and a Kruskal Wallis test revealed that there is no significant 
difference in warm glow between the two groups (with and without commitment) when 
comparing decisions in Blocks E and F (choice between payments today or in six months, 
and choice between payment in six months or in seven months). When comparing 
decisions in Block D, average warm glow was significantly higher (Prob > |z| = 0.0546) 
in the control group. This finding contradicts the hypothesized commitment effect. At the 
same time, average present warm glow in Block G is with 19.79% significantly larger 
(Prob > |z| = 0.0620), in the treatment group compared to the control group. It seems that 
the commitment (treatment) has either no effect or a negative effect on future warm glow, 
but a positive effect on present warm glow (Block G).  
 
Note further that subjects in the control group display relation between present and future 
warm glow that corresponds to hyperbolic discounting. Future warm glow is significantly 
smaller when comparing Blocks E and F (Prob > |z| = 0.0018), and Blocks D and F (Prob 
> |z| = 0.0084). While the difference between Blocks D and E goes into the opposite 
direction it is only weakly significant (Prob > |z| = 0.0789). It seems that the commitment 
increases the consistency of subjects’ time preference regarding a warm glow.  
 
We also confirmed the following robustness check: The warm glow in the future can also 
be measured differently than by comparing the discount rates in the decision blocks 
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including charity with the ones without it. The warm glow can be calculated as the 
percentage of 12 euro that an individual would give to charity in 12 months.  
 
To calculate the warm glow in each block the row total (score) in each block is multiplied 
by the interest rate per step (5%). The warm glow in t+1 is the stated value in t+1 (1 
months, 6 months, 7 months) minus the warm glow today, because the warm glow today 
would already have been given to charity today. To calculate the warm glow in block D, 
block E and block F, the warm glow in block G will thus be deducted from the warm 
glow in these blocks to get the warm glow in t+1. A Wilcoxon signed rank sum test 
reveals that all three values are significantly larger than zero). In the commitment 
treatment values are not significantly different from each other, in the control group they 
are different.  
 
Theoretically the warm glow in t+1 is determined by the discount factor. The warm glow 
in t+1 should equal the warm glow today multiplied by the discount factor. This is not the 
case. All values, except xxx are significantly different from the theoretical value. 
 
 
Warm glow Session 1 Percentage Session 2 Percentage 
Block D-G positive WG 10 43.48 13 54.17 
Block D-G no WG 12 47.83 7 29.17 
Block D-G negative WG 1 8.70 4 16.67 
Block E-G positive WG 10 43.48 13 54.17 
Block E-G no WG 12 47.82 7 29.17 
Block E-G negative WG 1 8.70 4 16.67 
Block F-G positive WG 16 69.57 17 70.83 
Block F-G no WG 7 30.43 5 20.83 
Block F-G negative WG 0 0.00 2 8.33 
The F-test does not report any significant differences at a 10% significance level or lower. 
Table B.2.2: Warm glow (positive, zero or negative) in t+1 for Session 1 and Session 2 
 
A Fisher's exact test reveals that there is no significant difference between the warm 
glows in the two samples. 
 
Discussion 
Our first hypothesis stated that individuals have time inconsistent preferences. To test this 
hypothesis the average discount rates per block were calculated and compared. If 
participants would be time consistent, their discount rates would be the same in Blocks A, 
B, and C, since the interest rates used were the same in all time frames. If the delay was 
larger, the monetary increase would thus also be larger. The results show, just as the 
literature predicted, that most people do not have time consistent preferences. The 
discount rates in Block A are higher than in Block C in the control group, and also in the 
commitment group, while the time delay is one month in both blocks. Also, individuals’ 
discount rates in Block A should be equal to the ones in Block B, and those in Block B 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 133 
should be equal to the ones in Block C. This also does not hold for either of the two 
groups. Three different kinds of discounters were distinguished per session. Namely: 
hyperbolic discounters, consistent discounters and non-hyperbolic discounters. The 
control group seems to have more hyperbolic discounters than the commitment group. 
 
Additionally, the ‘discount factor’ for the individuals’ inter-temporal pro-social Behavior 
was obtained, which we defined as their ‘warm glow’, the non-monetary benefit from 
behaving pro-social, i.e. giving to a charity. The change in discount factors between 
Blocks (D-A, B-E, C-F) was calculated to determine the participants’ warm glow. 
Unfortunately, the results do not show that the ‘nudge’ induced participants in the 
commitment group to have a larger warm glow than the participants in the control group.  
 
Part A of the second hypothesis states that people will give more to charity even though 
their charity commitment is €0, because they are ‘nudged’ with commitment. First the 
control group and the commitment group are compared using a warm glow measure that 
takes into account the present warm glow. The percentage of people with a positive warm 
glow is larger in the commitment group compared to the control group. However, the 
difference between the control group and the commitment group is not substantially 
larger if we rule out the very patient people or not. It was also tested if the warm glow of 
people is larger in the commitment group when we distinguish between the three types of 
discounters. The two different types of warm glow calculations here were separated here. 
Using the first type of warm glow measure (using the blocks that elicit time preferences) 
there does not seem to be a big difference between the types of discounters, but the 
commitment group does show a larger frequency of having a positive warm glow. When 
taking the second type of warm glow measure (using the present warm glow) the 
consistent discounters seem to have more positive warm glow individuals than the other 
types of discounters. Furthermore, it was tested if individuals who have a strong benefit 
from giving respond more to the commitment ‘nudge’. This was done by looking if 
individuals who have a positive warm glow, tend to give more in the commitment group. 
The results show that with both measures of warm glow, the commitment group has a 
higher amount of positive warm glow then the control group. But this result is larger 
when using the first measurement of warm glow (using the blocks that elicit time 
preferences).  
 
The B part of the second hypothesis is that people give more to charity if they answered a 
positive amount (more than €0) to the charity commitment question. To see whether these 
participants respond stronger to the ‘nudge’, the 16 subjects who entered a positive 
charity commitment were compared to the 8 subjects who entered an amount of zero. 
Fischer’s exact test and a Kruskal Wallis test revealed that there is no significant 
difference in warm glow (measured in the two different ways as described above).  
 
Conclusion 
What can be concluded from these experiments is that the commitment nudge does seem 
to have a weak effect into the desired direction but this is not strong enough to show any 
meaningful significant results. Direction for further research are to test the effect of a 
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commitment ‘nudge’ on greater scale hoping for more significance, since the results are 
mostly in the desired direction. 
 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 135 
B.3: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Norms and Ranking on 
Individual and Managers Pro-Social Behaviour 
Experimental Design and Procedures  
The basic experimental design for the strategic setting used a standard Public Good Game 
(PGG) (which used a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM)), with a linear 
production function, framed in an environmental context. All participants per session (24-
28) were divided into 6-7 groups consisting of 4 people each, who played with each other 
in the PGG. For two rounds of 10 periods participants were confronted with the following 
decision task: participants had to indicate (on the computer screen in front of them) how 
many experimental currency units (ECUs) out of an initial endowment they wanted to 
allocate to either their own private account or to a group “social account”. The ECUs 
contributed by all four members of a group to the social account was multiplied by an 
efficiency factor (x=1.6) and then distributed evenly among all four members of the 
group. This means that as a collective, the group would have benefited most if each 
participant had contributed all of their money to the social account (collective rationality). 
However, at the same time, each individual member had an incentive to free-ride on the 
three other members’ contributions and to contribute little or nothing him-/herself to the 
social account (individual rationality). The key measure of pro-social behavior (or lack 
therefore) in this game, therefore, was an individual participant’s contribution to social 
account (in a given round). After the first round of 10 decisions, participants were 
rematched to a new group of 4 participants and confronted with the second round of 10 
decisions. Their final payment depended on two randomly determined decisions, one 
chosen at random by the computer for each round. In each period, each participant had 20 
experimental currency units (ECU) at his disposal, with 10 ECU converted at the end of 
the experiment to 3.00 Euro in real money. In addition, in all of these sessions, we used a 
second measure of pro-social Behavior. At the end of each session, participants could 
decide whether they wanted to donate a part of their earnings to a charity of their choice 
(Dictator Game; see above), from among four pre-selected charities that focused on the 
environment and green energy.  
 
Social Norms 
The treatment using social norms as reference points in this strategic decision-making 
setting was designed as following: After having filled in a short general questionnaire 
(inquiring about for example basic demographics such as age, gender), participants 
received one of two treatments: social norm information as reference point or no such 
information (control group). The social norm treatment consisted of information about an 
individual’s contributions to the two (private and social) accounts in relation to a social 
norm (represented by the average contribution of the other members within the group). In 
addition to the informational feedback that participants received, they also saw a face on 
their computer screen that indicated whether they were above the social norm (smiley 
face for contributions higher than the group average to the social account) or below the 
social norm (sad face for contributions lower than the group average to the social account 
(see screenshots below).  
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Figure B.3.1: Example screenshots of the social norm feedback 
 
Ranking 
The treatment using ranking, each participant was ranked within his/her group consisting 
of four members (with each group having been assigned a specific colour, e.g., red), 
depending on his/her contributions. Participants were informed at the beginning of the 
session that they would be publicly ranked at the end of each sequence of 10 periods. 
After each sequence of 10 decisions, each participant was informed on the computer 
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screen (see screenshot below) about his/her ranking within the group (from 1=highest 
contribution to 4=lowest contribution). In order to link the ranking to status and self-
image concerns, it had to be made publicly visible. Therefore, each participant was asked 
to take the corresponding number out of an envelope lying in matching colours on his/her 
desk and raise it so that everyone in the laboratory could see the participant’s position 
within the group.
49
 Every group was asked to stand up separately, to increase the public 
visibility. After the experimenter has made sure that every participant has seen the other 
group members’ rank (approximately 15 seconds), the participants could sit back and, 
after being rearranged randomly to a new group, continue with the next decision round, at 
the end of which they were ranked again.  
 
 
Figure B.3.2: Example screenshot of the ranking feedback 
 
Managers Frame 
At the beginning of some of the sessions, all participants were presented with a business 
frame (Elliott et al., 1998), that is, each participant was asked to imagine that s/he was a 
manager of a company and had to decide on the amount s/he would contribute to an 
environmental project. Participants were first presented with an article about the 
strategies of successful managers, followed by a set of questions about the particular 
business strategies (see text Manager Priming in Appendix B.4).
50
 In addition, in order to 
mimic managers’ accountability to shareholders, participants in these sessions were 
                                               
49 On top of the cubicles a clip was placed and the participants were asked to put their rank in the clip so it 
would be visible for all participants during the next 10 periods. 
50 This technique is equivalent to the technique used in the Legacy Experiments and is frequently used in 
psychological studies. It is applied to create an implicit memory effect (priming). Psychological research 
has repeatedly shown that exposure to a stimulus influences a response to a later stimulus. 
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informed that they would have to justify their decisions afterwards in writing. After 
taking a sequence of 10 decisions, participants in these sessions indeed had to write down 
justifications for their decisions, which the experimenters then collected from them. The 
design is visualized in Figure B.3.3: 
 
 
 
Figure B.3.3: Sequence of treatments in the “Public Goods experiments” 
 
Hundred-and-fifty-six students at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, agreed to 
participate in the experiment. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 32 with a 
mean of 21.4. The participants were all subscribed to an online data base and received 
invitation to the experiment by e-mail. Those willing to participate registered for an 
experimental session. The experiment had a 2 (Frame: individuals, managers) by 3 
(Nudge: control, norm, commitment) between participants design. At the beginning of the 
experiment, all participants who were in the same condition were each seated in random 
order behind a computer. The instructions and materials needed were in front of them on 
their desk or were provided by the computer. The experimenter’s only task was to make 
sure that the instructions were clear and that all participants would stick to the rules of the 
experiment. No further communication between the experimenter and the participants 
was necessary, except for the ranking in the two ranking treatments. Here the 
experimenter called out each group by their name and asked participants to put up the 
rank in front of them. Each of the six sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes. Each 
participant earned on average 15 Euros. The experiment was conducted using the 
software Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).   
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the literature study (see Appendices A.1. and A.5.1 and A.5.4) the following 
hypotheses can be formulated: 
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(1) Participants in the business-framed session (“managers”) contribute higher 
amounts to the public good (presented to them as an environmental project) in 
comparison with the participants in the non-framed session (“individuals”). 
(2) Participants in the business-framed session (“managers”) respond in a different 
way to nudges (such as norm and ranking) in comparison with the participants in 
the non-framed session (“individuals”). 
(3) Participants in the business-framed session (“managers”) change their Behavior 
over the two rounds more than the participants in the non-framed session 
(“individuals”). 
Results 
In order to determine the appropriate statistical tests for each of the hypotheses, the data 
should be first inspected for normality. If not mentioned explicitly, the used level of 
significance is 5%. The small sample size in each period in each session (24-28 
participants) allowed us to perform the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. While the null 
hypothesis of normality is accepted in some periods (p>0.05), it is rejected in other 
(p<0.05). Similar results were obtained when the skewness/kurtosis test was applied. 
Since the main dependent variable contribution is not normally distributed in more than 
one period in each of the six sessions, non-parametric tests were applied to test the 
hypotheses.  
 
The first hypothesis that is tested is whether participants in the business-framed session 
(“managers”) contribute higher amount to the public good (presented to them as an 
environmental project) in comparison with the participants in the non-framed session 
(“individuals”). A graphical illustration of the average contributions over 20 periods is 
presented in Figure B.3.4. While in the individual control treatment, the average 
contribution is higher than that of managers, in the next two sessions, in which the norm 
and ranking treatments are applied, managers contribute more to the public good than 
individuals. In order to test for the significance of these differences, a Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (Mann-Whitney U test) is applied, which will show whether there is significant 
difference between median contribution of individuals and managers in each relevant 
treatment.  
 
No significant difference in medians between individuals and managers is found over the 
20 periods in the control treatment. However, when average contributions are inspected 
per round (over 10 periods), it becomes clear that in the second round there is significant 
difference at 10% significance level between population medians (p=0.0984). This 
difference may arise from the fact that business framed participants had to justify the 
decisions made in the first ten periods to the shareholders. In the norm treatment the same 
test is applied, with firstly testing whether there is significant difference in median 
contributions in each round and over two rounds. In both rounds managers contribute 
significantly more to the environmental project (p=0.000) than individuals do. However, 
in the last treatment, in which participants are ranked at the end of every sequence of ten 
periods, no significant difference is found between individuals and managers (the 
comparison is done both over 20 periods and after each round).  
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Figure B.3.4. Average contribution over 20 periods. 
 
The test of the second hypothesis, that managers respond in a different way to nudges 
(such as norm and ranking) than individuals do, involves a comparison of the change in 
median contribution between norm and control treatment of individuals with the change 
in median contribution between norm and control treatment for managers. The same test 
is performed when ranking and control treatments are compared for individuals and 
managers, respectively. Finally, it is tested whether there is a change in the median of the 
average contribution over 20 rounds between ranking and norm treatments for individuals 
and managers separately. The Mann-Whitney U test shows that medians do not change 
significantly between the control and norm individual treatment (p=0.291). On the other 
hand, there is significant increase in managers’ contributions to the public good in the 
norm treatment (p=0.0018). Furthermore, no significant change in contributions is found 
between control and ranking treatment for individuals (p=0.433), but again as in the norm 
treatment, such significant increase in contribution in the ranking treatment is present for 
managers (p=0.013). When the effect of the nudges is compared in the individuals and 
managers sessions, respectively, it is found that while individuals significantly increase 
their contributions in the ranking treatment (p=0.0484), compared with the norm 
treatment, there is no significant difference in median contributions over 20 periods 
across the same two treatments (norm and ranking) for managers (p=0.209).  
 
With the aid of the Z-scores provided by the Mann-Whitney test, the effect size can be 
computed, following Fritz, Morris and Richler (2012). Applying their formula allows us 
to find and compare the effect of each treatment.
51
 A value of r of 0.5 indicates a large 
                                               
51 In Fritz, Morris and Richler (2012) the effects size is calculated as: 
N
z
r  . 
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effect; a value of r of 0.3 shows that there is medium effect and a small effect is present 
when r is 0.1. A complete overview of the effect sizes is presented in Table B.3.1 If the 
Z-score of the Wilcoxon test is insignificant, then the effect size is considered to be zero. 
In the comparison of the average contribution over 20 periods between norm and ranking 
conditions for individuals the increase was significant from the norm to ranking condition 
and therefore the size of the effect is 0.27, with the negative sign in front signifying that 
the average contribution is lower in the norm than in the ranking treatment. A large effect 
(-0.42) is identified in the norm treatment for managers in comparison with the control 
treatment. The sign is again negative because the mean contribution in the control 
treatment is lower than that in the ranking treatment. In addition to this, a significant 
large effect (-0.43) is identified in the managers’ norm treatment when the mean 
contributions are compared to those of individuals in the norm treatment.  The increase in 
managers’ contributions in the ranking treatment, compared to the control treatment is 
also significant and the effect is medium (-0.34).  
 
 
 Z-score Effect size 
Individuals Control vs. Norm 1.056 0 
Individuals Control vs. Ranking -0.784 0 
Individuals Norm vs. Ranking -1.974** -0.27; medium negative 
Managers Control vs. Norm -3.114*** -0.42; large negative 
Managers Control vs. Ranking -2.478** -0.34; medium negative 
Managers Norm vs. Ranking 1.258 0 
Individuals C vs. Managers C 0.99 0 
Individual N vs. Manager N -3.246*** -0.43; large negative 
Individual R vs. Manager R 0.021 0 
*,**,*** indicate p<0.1, <0.05, <0.01 
Table B.3.1. Effect sizes 
 
The third hypothesis that is tested is whether managers change their Behavior over the 
two rounds more than individuals do. From Figure B.3.5. it can be seen that managers 
contribute more than individuals in both rounds in the norm treatment and in the first 
round of the ranking treatment, and less than individuals in the control and in the second 
round of the ranking treatment. The precise mean values are presented in Table B.3.2 
below. Again, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is applied to test whether there is a difference 
in population medians of average contribution (per participant) over the first ten periods 
(R1) and the average contribution per participant over the second 10 periods (R2).  
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Figure B.3.5. Average contribution per session per round. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test is applied in each session and differences between population 
medians are tested per round. In the individual control, norm and ranking treatment the 
null hypothesis is accepted and no difference is found between medians in the first and in 
the second round (p=0.9237, p=0.6226, and p=0.4035, respectively). In addition, no 
significant difference in contributions depending on the round is found for the manager 
control and manager norm treatments (p=0.1175 and p=0.7, respectively). However, in 
the manager ranking treatment, there is significant difference in distributions between the 
first and the second round (p=0.0412).  
 
Since the median test is robust against outliers, the null hypothesis that the samples are 
drawn from populations with the same median will be tested in each session between 
rounds. In the individual control, norm and ranking treatments the null hypothesis is not 
rejected that the population medians in the first and in the second round in each session 
are equal (p=0.772, p=0.423, p=0.386). While the null hypothesis is also not rejected for 
the managers norm treatment (p=0.789), significant difference (at 10% significance level) 
in medians between rounds is found in the business-framed control and ranking 
treatments (p=0.061 and p=0.083). A summary of the three hypothesis and the obtained 
results is presented in Table B.3.2 and Table B.3.3. 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 143 
 
Session/Contribution Round 1
1 
Round 2
1 
Individual Control (VCM 1) 7.30 7.30 
Individual Norm (VCM 2) 5.60 6.27 
Individual Ranking (VCM 3) 8.90 7.93 
Manager Control (VCM 4) 6.90
+
 4.88
+
 
Manager Norm (VCM 5) 8.95 9.76 
Manager Ranking (VCM 6) 9.25**,
+
 7.64**,
+
 
*,**,*** indicate p<0.1, <0.05, <0.01 for Wilcoxon rank-sum test and 
+,++,+++ indicate p<0.1, <0.05, <0.01 for median test .  1. Wilcoxon rank-sum 
and median tests comparing the difference in contributions between rounds 
for each session. 
 
Table B.3.2. Summary of the results obtained from Wilcoxon rank-sum test and median test 
 
Contribution over 2 rounds 
Session/Contribution Control
1
 Norm
1
 Ranking
1
 Control-
Norm
2
 
Control-
Ranking
2
 
Norm-
Ranking
2
 
Individual treatment 7.30 5.93*** 8.41 1.43 -1.11 -2.48** 
Manager treatment 5.89 9.35*** 8.44 -3.46*** -2.55** 0.91 
*,**,*** indicate p<0.1, <0.05, <0.01. 1.Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing the difference in contributions over 2 rounds 
between each pair of treatments (VCM 1 to VCM 4, VCM 2 to VCM 5, VCM 3 to VCM 6). 2. Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing 
difference in differences in contributions in each session, depending on the framing. 
Table B.3.3. Summary of the results for contribution over 2 rounds 
 
Finally, two robust regressions are run (one for control and norm treatments and one for 
control and ranking treatments) in order to see whether the estimated results are robust to 
changes in model specification, such that the inferences that have been made about the 
tested hypotheses or predictions do not change (Plümper & Neumayer, 2012). The main 
dependent variable is the average contribution over ten periods in round 2. A dummy that 
indicates a difference between managers and individuals is introduced as well as three 
dummies for the three types of treatments (control, norm and ranking). The inclusion of 
interaction terms (between managers and norm and managers and ranking) allows us to 
see whether the effect of the treatment is different for the two groups (managers and 
individuals). In the first robust regression it is tested whether there is a difference in 
contributions depending on the type of treatment (control and norm) and the framing 
(individuals and managers). Two F-tests are performed, one that tests the significance of 
the treatment, and another one for the significance of the framing. Both tests show that 
there is statistically significant difference between the norm and control treatments (for 
managers and individuals, p=0.0004) and framed and non-framed treatments (for norm 
and control treatments, p=0.017). This result is in harmony with the one obtained with the 
Mann-Whitney test. The second robust regression is similar to the first one with the only 
difference being that instead of the norm treatment, the ranking treatment is compared to 
the control treatment, and differences that arise from framing are compared. While the 
first F-test shows that the effect of framing is not significantly different for the ranking 
and control treatments (p=0.23), the second one reveals a significant difference (at 10% 
significance level) of the type of treatment (ranking) for individuals and managers 
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(p=0.096). The results of the two F-tests are the same as those of the Mann-Whitney tests 
performed earlier. 
 
Next we analyse the effect of the feedback in Round 1 on the Behavior in round 2. Table 
B.3.4 show the change in contribution in the second round after feedback on the relation 
of own contribution to the norm at the end of the first round. It seems that the injunctive 
norm ensured that those participants who contributed more than 50% more than the norm 
did not reduce their contributions in the next round. However, the participants who 
contributed less than the social norm did decrease their contribution even further. 
 
Average contribution in Round 2 
Feedback on 
deviation from 
Norm 
increase same decrease 
50% or more 
above  
7 - 1 
above but less 
than 50%  
10 - 7 
below but less 
than 50%  
7 1 13 
50% or more 
below  
1 4 5 
Table B.3.4. Change in contribution in second round after feedback on norm in first round 
 
Table B.3.5 show the change in contribution in the second round after feedback on the 
ranking w.r.t own contribution in the group at the end of the first round.  
 
Average contribution in Round 2 
Rank in 
Round 1 
increase same decrease 
1 5 - 8 
2 3 - 8 
3 3 - 10 
4 4 1 6 
Table B.3.5. Change in contribution in second round after feedback on rank in first round 
 
A Kruskal-Wallis test confirms that the norm feedback led to significantly (p = 0.0304 
different response, while for the ranking feedback this test does not confirm significantly 
different responses (change in contribution). A simple linear regression in Table X shows 
that the ranking in round 1 has a weakly significant negative effect on the change in the 
contribution, while the deviation is positively associated with changes in the contribution. 
 
Finally we included two measures on the subject level: the individual scores on the 
Machiavelli scale and on the Social value orientation (SVO) scale. The two samples 
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índividuals’and ‘managers’ do not differ statistically with respect to the scores on the 
Machiavelli scale, (Prob > |z| =   0.7787). Social value orientation (SVO) is significantly 
higher in the sample of “individuals”. There are no significant interaction effects between 
these two variables and the treatment variables.  
 
Change in 
contribution 
Ranking 
treatment 
Norm   
treatment 
Rank in Round 1 
-1.065*   
(-1.81)   
Percentage 
Round 1 
 0.031*** 
 (2.720) 
Manager 
1.379 -0.4466 
(1.080) (-0.33) 
Age 
0.151 -0.0029 
(1.190) (-0.02) 
SVO 
7.832 13.6093 
(0.730) (1.250) 
Machiavelli 
0.056 0.0159 
(0.840) (0.320) 
Constant 
-5.958 -3.1018 
(-1.150) (-0.490) 
Number of obs 41 48 
Test statistics F(5, 35) =1.49 F(5, 42) =1.89 
Prob > F   0.2196 0.1166 
R-square 0.174 0.1706 
Root MSE 3.9319 4.5026 
t-values in parenthesis, *,**,*** indicate p<0.1, <0.05, 
<0.01. 
Table C.3.6. Linear regression on the change in contribution in second round after 
feedback on rank and norm in first round 
 
Table B.3.7 presents an  OLS regression of  the relation between a participant’s score on 
the Machiavelli scale and this participant’s contribution. This analysis reveals that 
participants in the ‘managers’ sessions who score higher on the Machiavelli scale 
contribute significantly less to the public good. This result indicates that we were able to 
achieve the desired effect by our priming: participants in the ‘managers’ sessions  who 
have an attitude described as ‘the end justifies all means’ behave more selfishly.  
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Contribution Managers Individuals 
Norm 3.0711*** -1.146 
  (3.31) (-0.87) 
Ranking 2.067** 1.355 
  (2.22) (0.93) 
Machiavelli -0.112** -0.0455 
  (-3.04) (-0.85) 
Age 0.127 0.151 
  (1.07) (1.32) 
Friends 0.219 -0.5838 
  (0.36) (-1.16) 
gender 0.959 0.1794 
  (1.17) (0.89) 
_cons 12.746*** 8.9078 
  (3.39) (1.67) 
Period Dummies yes*** yes*** 
Number of obs 1380 1340 
Test statistics F(17, 68) =15.17 F(16,  66)=6.20 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.2086 0.1545 
Root MSE 5.2703 6.6101 
t-values in parenthesis, *,**,*** indicate p<0.1, <0.05, 
<0.01. 
Table B.3.7. Comparison on contribution in the two samples. 
 
 
 
Discussion  
The findings of this research support the first hypothesis that some forms of non-
monetary incentives have higher impact on managers’ regard for collective interests than 
on individuals. The specific type of non-monetary incentive that has higher influence on 
managers and makes them contribute more to the public good is social norm. When 
social norm is present and managers are informed whether their contribution is below or 
above the average, this is reflected in their investments in the second round. A possible 
explanation of the significant increase of managers’ contribution in comparison with 
individuals as a result of the presence of this nudge could be that social norms constitute 
a substantial part of the institutional framework, of which each organization is part, and 
as a result powerful individuals have to conform to them. Therefore, if there is an 
established norm in the society, the manager has to fulfil the expectations of the 
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stakeholders. This change in Behavior of managers in comparison with individuals also 
indicates that pro-social tendencies (which represent the investment in the environmental 
project) have been made salient in this treatment to induce managers to consider 
collective interests in addition to their own interests. Therefore, in this hypothesis the 
finding of Piff et al. (2011) is confirmed that individuals with high power will exhibit 
more pro-social Behavior than individuals with low power when such tendencies are 
present.  
 
However, another hypothesis that was not confirmed was that visibility and reputation 
(which was represented by ranking in the experiments), for which managers are also 
concerned and is part of their hierarchical position, have no different effect on them than 
on individuals who do not experience this higher visibility both in and outside the 
organization. The reason for this could be that image motivation (Ariely et al., 2009) is 
something about both individuals and managers are concerned. As a result of the fact that 
both types of individuals are equally affected by image utility, no significant differences 
between these two sessions have been identified. Thus, granting individuals with power 
does not lead to higher contributions than if individuals without such power make 
decisions about their investments when no nudges are present, even if there is higher 
visibility of group members. This finding could complement the theory about managerial 
reputation in the organization. Since managers and individuals do not differ significantly 
in their contributions, it cannot be concluded that individuals with power aim at achieving 
more power and maintaining the reputation and image they have more than individuals 
with low power.  
 
Another main finding is that managers respond in a different way to nudges than 
individuals. In both cases when the control group is compared to the respective treatment 
(norm or ranking) managers did change their Behavior and increased their contributions 
in comparison with the control group significantly more than individuals did. This result 
may be due to the fact that the combination of nudges and business framing increases the 
responsibility of managers. When these nudges are present managers’ concern for 
collective interests increases and they consider to a greater extent stakeholder claims than 
when such nudges are not present. While stewardship theory alone does not hold 
(managers’ contribution is the same as that of individuals in the control group), when this 
business framing is combined with nudges, there is significant increase in contributions. 
However, while there is significant increase in these treatments in comparison with the 
control group for managers, the difference between the nudges in question is not 
significant. On the other hand, individuals respond differently to norms and ranking. 
Again, this confirms the image utility theory (Ariely et al., 2009) and implies that 
individuals care more about their image in the society than what the social norms posit to 
be right. 
 
The final test shows that managers and individuals do not change significantly their 
contributions over the two rounds in the control and the norm treatment. However, while 
managers change their Behavior after ranking in the second round and after they know 
that their increased visibility will affect their reputation, no such difference is found 
between the first round and the second round for individuals. Thus, the impact of ranking 
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is more salient for individuals in the comparison between rounds. Therefore, the 
reputation that managers may gain as a result of their pro-social Behavior and the 
additional power that they may be granted, has an effect on their contributions, although 
they are lower than in the first round. This finding is also in harmony with the theoretical 
predictions about reputation concerns and visibility in organization. 
 
With the results obtained from this study it becomes clear that the fact that managers 
have more power than individuals and act in a different framework will affect their 
decisions regarding pro-social Behavior. However, these results relate to present 
Behavior only. Future research may take these results as a starting point and include the 
intergenerational interests. Intergenerational dilemmas have two main dimensions – inter-
temporal and interpersonal – which are in a constant interaction (Wade-Benzoni & Tost, 
2009). These dilemmas arise because of the conflict that exists between satisfying self-
interest in the present while taking into account the interests of future generations. The 
inter-temporal dimension relates to problems that arise due to the fact that decisions that 
individuals take now have consequences in the future. Related to this is the interpersonal 
dimension, whose main idea is that Behavior of individuals has an impact of other people 
as well. One of the main characteristics of these intergenerational dilemmas relates to the 
distribution of power between the generations. When the current generation is fully 
responsible for the allocation of limited resources, then it has complete decision-making 
power and future generations cannot voice their concerns and are hence powerless 
(Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008). In addition to this power asymmetry, there is absence of 
generation-to-generation interaction and direct reciprocity between generations. However, 
similar to the stewardship concerns that managers in an organization may have, Wade-
Benzoni et al. (2008) suggest that the complete power that current generations possess 
and the uncertainty about the future outcomes of current decisions may lead them to 
express responsibility and stewardship concerns for the welfare of future generations. 
Using the same procedure with priming, Tost et al. (2008) found that high-power 
individuals considered higher allocations to future generations to be fair than those who 
were not primed. Wade-Benzoni et al. (2008) explain these higher offers with the fact 
that the uncertainty about future consequences gives people the feeling of power. As a 
result, they recognize that they are responsible for powerless future generations and they 
focus their attention more on the outcomes of their decisions. What can be tested in future 
studies is whether these stewardship concerns are triggered in managers and individuals 
and whether the difference between both groups is significant. 
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B.4: Experiment  Instructions 
 
 
Instructions Legacy Experiment 
 Instructions  
 Neutral (Control) - Positive – Negative Prime 
 Charity Text Future Other 
 Charity Text Present Other 
 
Instructions Commitment and Social Preferences 
 Control Treatment - Commitment Treatment 
 
Instructions Individual Public Good Game 
 Control Treatment - Norm Treatment - Ranking Treatment 
 
Instructions Managers Public Good Game 
 Control Treatment – Norm Treatment – Ranking Treatment 
 Text Manager Priming  
 
Charity Information Text Public Good Games 
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Instructions Legacy Experiments 
 
 
Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics 
 
- Instructions for Experiment 5 - 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. These instructions state everything you need to know in order to 
participate in the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of 
the experimenters will approach you in order to answer your question. The rules are equal 
for all the participants. 
 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. 
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Turn 
off your mobile phone and put it in your bag. Also, you may only use the functions on the 
screen that are necessary for the functioning of the experiment. If you happen to violate 
one of these rules, you will be excluded from the experiment and from all payments. 
 
This experiment will take about 45-60 minutes in total. After you completed all the 
required tasks, you will be awarded 12 Euro by the experimenter for your efforts. 
 
 
- Overview of the experiment - 
 
The experiment consists of three parts. For the first part you are asked to fill in a short 
questionnaire on the computer. Please take your time to fill in this questionnaire 
accurately. After you answered the questionnaire, the second part of the experiment will 
start. 
 
The second part of the experiment is divided into two tasks. First, you will be asked to 
read a newspaper article which is provided with these instructions. Then you will be 
asked to do a short related task.  
 
The third part of the experiment consists of a short decision-making task on the computer.   
 
At the end you will be asked to fill in another brief questionnaire. In the meantime your 
earnings will be prepared. We would like you to remain seated until the experimenter 
signals that you can leave. 
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- Detailed information on the second part of the experiment - 
 
For the second part, please read the news story that has been provided together with the 
instructions. After you finish reading the story, you will be asked to do 2 tasks. 
First, describe how you would characterize the author’s writing style. 
Second, what changes could be made to the text to clarify the description of the incident?  
Write down your answers on the provided answer sheet under ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively.  
(If you need more space, you can continue writing on the reverse side of the page.) 
 
- Detailed information on the third part of the experiment - 
 
In this third part of the experiment you will be asked to make decisions. In these 
instructions we will explain which options you will face. These options will appear on the 
screen of your computer. You will be asked to make a choice for one of the options.  
 
This decision-making game has two players: person A and person B. (For a graphical 
representation see figure 1 on the next page.) 
 
Possible moves are: 
Person A moves first and has two choices: 
1) Left 
2) Right 
 
If person A decides to play Right person B can do nothing and the game ends. 
 
If person A decides to play Left person B will have the following two choices: 
1) Left 
2) Right 
 
After person B made his/her decision the game ends. 
 
This game will be played in the following way: 
Imagine you will first play  the role of person A. What decision would you make in this 
situation. Next, suppose you will be person B under the assumption that person A did 
choose Left. How would you decide in this case?  In sum,  you are asked twice to make a 
hypothetical decision between Left and Right once in the role of person A and once in the 
role of person B. 
Please indicate your decision on the computer. 
 
In order to enable you to make your decisions, table 1 provides a  detailed overview of 
the structure of the hypothetical payoff consequences of the decisions (see also the game 
tree in figure 1). Please note: all payoffs are hypothetical, and given in the table and 
figure below.  
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Assume you are assigned the role of person A Payoffs: 
You chose Right You receive 15 points and person B receives 
10 points 
You chose Left and person B chose also Left You receive 38 points and person B receives 
22 points 
You chose Left and person B chose Right You receive 6 and person B receives 44 points 
    
Assume you are assigned the role of person B Payoffs: 
Person A chose Right You receive 10 points and person A receives 
15 points 
Person A chose Left and you chose also Left You receive 22 points and person A receives 
38 points 
Person A chose Left and you chose Right You receive 44 and person A receives 6 points 
Table 1: Payoff structure. 
 
 
Figure 1: The game tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
person A 
person B 
Left Right 
Left Right 
Payoffs:  
The upper number is person A’s hypothetical  payoff. 
The lower number is person B’s hypothetical payoff. 
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



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
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Questionnaire 
 
After the third part you will be asked to fill in another short questionnaire. In the 
meantime your earnings will be prepared. Please remain seated until the payment has 
taken place and the experimenter tells you to leave.  
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Neutral Legacy Text 
HAS RUSSIAN MATH WHIZ SOLVED $1M PUZZLE? 
A reclusive Russian mathematician may have solved one of the world's toughest 
mathematics problems and stands to win $1 million -- but he doesn't appear to care. 
Grigori Perelman from St. Petersburg claims to have solved the extremely complicated 
Poincare Conjecture that tries to explain the Behavior of multi-dimensional shapes in 
space, thereby making himself eligible for the prize offered by the Massachusetts-
based Clay Mathematics Institute. But there's a snag. He has simply posted his results 
on the Internet and left his peers to work out for themselves whether he is right -- 
something they are still struggling to do. “There is good reason to believe that 
Perelman's approach is correct. But the trouble is, he won't talk to anybody about it 
and has shown no interest in the money,” said Keith Devlin, Professor of Mathematics 
at Stanford University in California. “There won't be a golden moment when he is 
suddenly accepted as being right. There will just be a drift in that direction,” he told 
the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. 
 
 
Negative Legacy Text 
PERSON KILLED IN AIRCRAFT BRAKE FAILURE ACCIDENT 
The privately-owned L39 jet failed to stop on the runway at Duxford, in 
Cambridgeshire, on Sunday and careened on to the normally busy M11 motorway, 
local police said. A spokeswoman for Cambridgeshire ambulance service said: “We 
sent two ambulances and two medics, and Essex assisted with air ambulance. One 
patient was deceased at the scene.” The deceased was a passenger on the plane who 
was burned to death when the plane caught fire shortly after impact with the runway. 
As far as she was aware, there were no other passengers in the plane. The jet managed 
to avoid hitting any cars before coming to a stop in the central reservation, straddling 
both carriageways. A spokeswoman for Duxford Airfield said that the Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch was looking into the cause of the accident. It is the second freak 
aerial accident in two days in southern England: Two people were killed when a 
skydiver crashed through the wing of a glider near Hinton Airfield on Saturday. In that 
incident, the skydiver survived, however the glider fell from 5,000 feet to hit two 
innocent pedestrians walking along a popular road. 
 
 
Positive Legacy Text 
LEXINGTON CELEBRATES BIRTHDAY LOCAL HERO 
Several dozens of people gathered at Emery Park last Friday to celebrate the 75
th
 birthday 
of local hero and community man Richard Harper. Harper decided to devote his live to 
the community of Lexington after he saved the then 5-year old Maura Corr from 
drowning in 1962. Since then, he founded the Evergreen Association to create more parks 
in town, and made it to the interstate finals as a trainer/coach of the local boys’ soccer 
team, Lexington Rangers. A few years ago, he started up a conservation initiative to 
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separate trash. His fellow townsmen at the park praise his efforts for the well-being of the 
community. “Parker’s time at the Rangers has taught our boys that sport is both fun and 
rewarding”, says soccer fan Mike Willow. “He is such a devoted man”, says Evergreen 
Association’s current chair, Tommy Wilkins, “his love parks have made our town one of 
the best places to live in all of America”, referring to Lexington’s 2012 nomination for 
‘Best Town of America’. Harper himself is sitting happily amidst the crowd, knowing 
that Lexington will continue to build on his legacy to become one of the most pleasant 
and beautiful places in the country. 
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Charity Text Future Other 
 
 
Utrecht University has recently started to encourage pro-environmental 
Behavior and the support of a charitable organization called SolarAid  to 
which you could donate a part of/all of your earnings. Below is a 
description of this organization. In case you would wish to make a 
donation please indicate the amount and leave this together with the flyer in the envelope 
on your desk. 
 
SolarAid is an organization that aims to relieve poverty in the sub-Sahara through 
facilitating the provision of solar energy to those who have poor outlook for their lives. It 
is a small charity with a big impact: the average household size in east Africa is five 
persons, so with more than 450,000 solar lights sold since 2012, their work has helped 
transform the lives of over two million people already. Solar energy can help people to 
power lamps and do away with expensive kerosene lamps. Families spend about 20% of 
their income on fuel for these lamps that emit a dangerous and poisonous smoke. Using 
solar-powered lamps means that people have significantly more money left for investing 
in their own, their families’ and their children’s future, that is, to spend on education and 
better food to improve their long-run nutrition. Thereby, they are able to provide a better 
future for new generations.  
 
 
I donate the following amount of money out of my experimental earnings (please insert 
either amounts of full Euros or rounded to 50 cents): 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
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Charity Text Present Other 
 
 
Utrecht University has recently started to encourage pro-environmental 
Behavior and the support of a charitable organization called SolarAid  to 
which you could donate a part of/all of your earnings. Below is a 
description of this organization. In case you would wish to make a 
donation please indicate the amount and leave this together with the flyer 
in the envelope on your desk. 
 
SolarAid is an organization that aims to relieve poverty in the sub-Sahara through 
facilitating the provision of solar energy to those who are in immediate need. It is a small 
charity with a big impact: the average household size in east Africa is five persons, so 
with more than 450,000 solar lights sold since 2012, their work has helped transform the 
lives of over two million people already. Solar energy can help people to power lamps 
and do away with expensive kerosene lamps. Families spend about 20% of their income 
on fuel for these lamps that emit a dangerous and poisonous smoke. Using solar-powered 
lamps means that people have significantly more money left for their immediate needs, 
that is, to buy the necessities of life such as food and clean water and relief their current 
state of poverty.  
 
 
I donate the following amount of money out of my experimental earnings (please insert 
either amounts of full Euros or rounded to 50 cents): 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
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Instructions Commitment and Social Preferences 
 
 
Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics 
 
 
- Instructions - 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions state everything you 
need to know in order to participate in the experiment. If you have any questions, please 
raise your hand. One of the experimenters will approach you in order to answer your 
question. The rules are equal for all the participants. 
 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. 
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Turn 
off your mobile phone and put it in your bag. Also, you may only use the functions on the 
screen that are necessary for the functioning of the experiment. Thank you very much. If 
you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all 
payments. Should you have any questions please ask us 
 
 
- Overview of the experiment - 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. For the first part you are asked to answer a short 
questionnaire. Please take your time to fill in this questionnaire accurately. After every 
participant answered the questionnaire, the second part of the experiment will start. 
 
The second part of the experiment is divided into different decision screens. In total, the 
second part of experiment consists of eight decision screens, seven of which are 
presenting a sequence of decisions.  
 
The following pages describe the course of the second part of the experiment in detail: 
 
 
- Detailed information on the second part of the experiment - 
 
On the first decision screen you are asked to answer a short question. [This screen was 
added only in the commitment treatment.] 
 
For the next three decision screens you are asked to choose between smaller payments 
closer to today and larger payments further in the future. For each row, choose one 
payment: either the smaller, sooner payment or the later, larger payment.  
 
For the second set of three decision screens you are asked to choose between fixed 
payments closer to today and the same payments plus a payment that we transfer to a 
charity further in the future. If you decide for a payment in the future that involves a 
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transfer to the charity, we will transfer the specified money at the specified date to a 
charity of your choice. More information on the charities is provided on the separate 
information sheet. For each row, choose one payment: either the sooner payment without 
a payment to charity or the later payment with a payment to charity  
 
For the last decision screen you are asked to choose between fixed payments today and a 
smaller payment today plus a payment that we transfer to a charity today. If you decide 
for the smaller payment plus a payment to the charity, we will transfer the specified 
money today to the charity of your choice. 
 
For participating in the experiment, you get a minimum amount of €12.00 for yourself to 
start with. Now we ask you to determine when you will receive this amount, with the 
payment increasing if you choose to receive it later in time in the first three decisions or 
with a payment to the charity of your choice if you choose to receive your payment later 
in the second set of three decisions, or if you choose a smaller payment today in the last 
set of decisions. You will make your decisions in seven blocks:  
 
A BLOCK (Numbers 1 through 20):  
Decide between payment today and payment in one month (10th of July 2013) 
1. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.05 in one month. 
2. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.10 in one month. 
3. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.15 in one month. 
4. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.20 in one month. 
5. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.25 in one month. 
6. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.30 in one month. 
7. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.35 in one month. 
8. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.40 in one month. 
9. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.45 in one month. 
10. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.50 in one month. 
11. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.55 in one month. 
12. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.60 in one month. 
13. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.65 in one month. 
14. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.70 in one month. 
15. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.75 in one month. 
16. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.80 in one month. 
17. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.85 in one month. 
18. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.90 in one month. 
19. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.95 in one month. 
20. Receive €12.00 today or receive €13.00 in one month. 
 
B BLOCK (Numbers 21 through 40):  
Decide between payment today and payment in six months (10th of December 2013) 
21. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.30 in six months. 
22. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.60 in six months. 
23. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.90 in six months. 
24. Receive €12.00 today or receive €13.20 in six months. 
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25. Receive €12.00 today or receive €13.50 in six months. 
26. Receive €12.00 today or receive €13.80 in six months. 
27. Receive €12.00 today or receive €14.10 in six months. 
28. Receive €12.00 today or receive €14.40 in six months. 
29. Receive €12.00 today or receive €14.70 in six months. 
30. Receive €12.00 today or receive €15.00 in six months. 
31. Receive €12.00 today or receive €15.30 in six months. 
32. Receive €12.00 today or receive €15.60 in six months. 
33. Receive €12.00 today or receive €15.90 in six months. 
34. Receive €12.00 today or receive €16.20 in six months. 
35. Receive €12.00 today or receive €16.50 in six months. 
36. Receive €12.00 today or receive €16.80 in six months. 
37. Receive €12.00 today or receive €17.10 in six months. 
38. Receive €12.00 today or receive €17.40 in six months. 
39. Receive €12.00 today or receive €17.70 in six months. 
40. Receive €12.00 today or receive €18.00 in six months. 
 
C BLOCK (Numbers 41 through 60):  
Decide between payment in six months (10
th
 of December 2013) and payment in seven 
months (10th of January 2014) 
41. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.05 in seven months. 
42. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.10 in seven months. 
43. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.15 in seven months. 
44. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.20 in seven months. 
45. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.25 in seven months. 
46. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.30 in seven months. 
47. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.35 in seven months. 
48. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.40 in seven months. 
49. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.45 in seven months. 
50. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.50 in seven months. 
51. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.55 in seven months. 
52. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.60 in seven months. 
53. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.65 in seven months. 
54. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.70 in seven months. 
55. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.75 in seven months. 
56. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.80 in seven months. 
57. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.85 in seven months. 
58. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.90 in seven months. 
59. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.95 in seven months. 
60. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €13.00 in seven months. 
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Example 1:  
If you get number (3): Would you like to receive €12.00 today or €12.15 in one month 
 
If you prefer €12.00 today in Question 3, mark as follows:  
● Receive €12.00 today or receive ○ €12.15 in one month.  
If you prefer €12.15 in one month in Question 3, mark as follows:  
○ Receive €12.00 today or receive ●  €12.15 in one month. 
 
D BLOCK (Numbers 61 through 80):  
Decide between payment today and payment in one month (10
th
 of July 2013) 
61. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.05 going to the charity of 
your choice 
62. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.10 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
63. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.15 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
64. Receive €12.00today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.20 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
65. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.25 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
66. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.30 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
67. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.35 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
68. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.40 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
69. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.45 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
70. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.50 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
71. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.55 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
72. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.60 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
73. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.65 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
74. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.70 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
75. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.75 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
76. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.80 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
77. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.85 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
78. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.90 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
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79. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €0.95 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
80. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in one month, plus €1.00 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
 
E BLOCK (Numbers 81 through 100):  
Decide between payment today and payment in six months (10th of December 2013) 
81. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €0.30 going to the charity of 
your choice 
82. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €0.60 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
83. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €0.90 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
84. Receive €12.00today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €1.20 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
85. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €1.50 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
86. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €1.80 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
87. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €2.10 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
88. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €2.40 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
89. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €2.70 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
90. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €3.00 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
91. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €3.30 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
92. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €3.60 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
93. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €3.90 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
94. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €4.20 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
95. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €4.50 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
96. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €4.80 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
97. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €5.10 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
98. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €5.40 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
99. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €5.70 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
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100. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 in six months, plus €6.00 going to the charity of 
your choice.  
 
F BLOCK (Numbers 101 through 120):  
Decide between payment in six months (10th of December 2013) and payment in seven 
months (10th of January 2014) 
101. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.05 going to 
the charity of your choice.  
102. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.10 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
103. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.15 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
104. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.20 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
105. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.25 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
106. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.30 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
107. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.35 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
108. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.40 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
109. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.45 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
110. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.50 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
111. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.55 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
112. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.60 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
113. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.65 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
114. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.70 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
115. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.75 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
116. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.80 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
117. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.85 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
118. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.90 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
119. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €0.95 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
120. Receive €12.00 in six months or receive €12.00 in seven months, plus €1.00 going to 
the charity of your choice. 
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G BLOCK (Numbers 121 through 140):  
Decide between payment today and payment to a charity of your choice today 
121. Receive €12.00 today or receive €12.00 today. 
122. Receive €12.00 today or receive €11.40 today, plus €0.60 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
123. Receive €12.00 today or receive €10.80 today, plus €1.20 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
124. Receive €12.00 today or receive €10.20 today, plus €1.80 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
125. Receive €12.00 today or receive €9.60 today, plus €2.40 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
126. Receive €12.00 today or receive €9.00 today, plus €3.00 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
127. Receive €12.00 today or receive €8.40 today, plus €3.60 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
128. Receive €12.00 today or receive €7.80 today, plus €4.20  going to the charity of 
your choice. 
129. Receive €12.00 today or receive €7.20 today, plus €4.80 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
130. Receive €12.00 today or receive €6.60 today, plus €5.40 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
131. Receive €12.00 today or receive €6.00 today, plus €6.00 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
132. Receive €12.00 today or receive €5.40 today, plus €6.60 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
133. Receive €12.00 today or receive €4.80 today, plus €7.20 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
134. Receive €12.00 today or receive €4.20 today, plus €7.80 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
135. Receive €12.00 today or receive €3.60 today, plus €8.40 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
136. Receive €12.00 today or receive €3.00 today, plus €9.00 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
137. Receive €12.00 today or receive €2.40 today, plus €9.60 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
138. Receive €12.00 today or receive €1.80 today, plus €10.20 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
139. Receive €12.00 today or receive €1.20 today, plus €10.80 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
140. Receive €12.00 today or receive €0.60 today, plus €11.40 going to the charity of 
your choice. 
 
 
Example 2:  
If you get number (76): Would you like to receive €12.00 today or €12.00 in one month,  
plus €0.80 going to the charity of your choice.  
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If you prefer €12.00 today in Question 76, mark as follows:  
● Receive €12.00 today or receive ○ €12.00 in one month, plus €0.80 going to the charity 
of your choice 
If you prefer €12.00 one month, plus €0.80 going to the charity of your choice in 
Question 76, mark as follows:  
○ Receive €12.00 today or receive ● €12.00 in one month, plus €0.80 going to the charity 
of your choice. 
 
Note the following: As soon as you have once checked the box at the right hand side, 
you should consider carefully whether it makes sense for you to switch back to the left-
hand side at any successive row in any of the seven blocks. Consider decision number (9) 
and suppose you prefer receiving €12.45 in one month over receiving €12.00 today. Then 
it seems most likely that you will prefer receiving €12.50 in one month even more to 
receiving €12.00 today, because €12.50 is more money than €12.45 which you preferred 
to receiving €12.00 today before. 
 
 Decide for the numbers 1 till 60 whether you would like the payment for sure 
sooner, or the payment for sure later.  
 Decide for the numbers 61 till 120 whether you would like the payment for sure 
sooner, or the payment for sure later that includes a payment made to a charity.  
 Decide for the numbers 121 till 140 whether you would like a larger payment for 
sure today, or a smaller payment for sure today where the difference is a payment 
made to a charity. 
 
Please answer this for each possible number (1) through (140) by filling in one box for 
each possible number. One of these numbers will be randomly selected by the 
computer and will be implemented. 
 
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 1 AND 140?  
You will be paid your chosen payment. The choices you make could mean a difference in 
payment of up to than €6.00, so CHOOSE CAREFULLY!!! 
 
If you chose to be paid today, you will receive an email later today (10th of June) from 
PayPal. If you do not have a PayPal account yet, PayPal will automatically setup an 
account. You can claim the money by having it transferred to your account. If paid at one 
of the later dates, you will receive an email from PayPal on that date.  
 
If your payment involves a payment to a charity, we will transfer the payment to the 
charity of your choice on the specified date and email you the receipt. For more 
information on the charities please refer to the separate information sheet you find on 
your desk. 
 
If there are any problems in receiving your payments, you can call or e-mail Professor 
Stephanie Rosenkranz. She will then hand-deliver you the payment. We will provide you 
with her contact details at the end of the experiment.  
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- Questionnaire - 
 
After the 140 decisions you will be asked to fill in another short questionnaire. In the 
meantime your earnings will be calculated. Please remain seated until you are allowed to 
leave. 
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Instructions Individual Public Good Game – Control Treatment 
 
 
Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics 
 
- Instructions - 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions state everything you 
need to know in order to participate in the experiment. If you have any questions, please 
raise your hand. One of the experimenters will approach you in order to answer your 
question. The rules are equal for all the participants. 
 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. 
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Turn 
off your mobile phone and put it in your bag. Also, you may only use the functions on the 
screen that are necessary for the functioning of the experiment. If you violate these rules, 
we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. Should you 
have any questions, please ask one of the experimenters. 
 
During the experiment we shall not speak of Euros but rather of ECU. During the 
experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in ECU. At the end of the experiment 
the total amount of ECU you have earned will be converted to Euros at the following 
rate:  
 
10 ECU = 3.00 Euro 
 
At the beginning of the experiment each participant receives 12 Euros (40 ECU) for 
participating and for filling in the questionnaires. At the end of the experiment your entire 
earnings from the experiment will be immediately paid to you in cash, without other 
participants being able to see how much you earned. Further instructions on this will 
follow. 
 
- Overview of the experiment - 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. For the first part you are asked to answer a short 
questionnaire. Please take your time to fill in this questionnaire accurately. After every 
participant answered the questionnaire, the second part of the experiment will start. 
 
The second part of the experiment is divided into different periods. In total, the second 
part of experiment consists of 20 periods, divided in two sequences of 10 periods. At the 
end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one period out of each 
sequence for payment. Therefore, every decision you make can determine your final 
payment with equal probability. 
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At the beginning of each sequence of 10 periods the participants are divided into groups 
of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants for one sequence of 10 
periods. After these 10 periods, the groups are randomly re-matched. In each sequence of 
10 periods your group will therefore consist of different participants. 
 
The following pages describe the course of the second part of the experiment in detail:  
 
 
- Detailed information on the second part of the experiment - 
 
In each sequence, each participant can decide over half of their 40 ECU. We call this 20 
ECU the participants’ endowment. In each period, your task is to decide how to use your 
endowment. You have to decide how many ECU you want to contribute to a project and 
how much to keep to yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in detail 
below. 
 
At the beginning of each period the following input-screen will appear: 
 
 
 
The number of the period appears in the top left corner of the screen. We ask that you 
make your decision within 30 seconds, as displayed in the top right corner of the screen. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 ECU. You have to decide how many ECU you 
want to contribute to the project by typing a number (a multiple of ten) between 0 and 20 
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in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. As soon as you 
have decided how many ECU to contribute to the project, you have also decided how 
many ECU you keep for yourself: This is (20 – your contribution) ECU. After entering 
your contribution you must press the O.K. button (either with the mouse, or by pressing 
the Enter - key). Once you have done this your decision can no longer be revised.  
 
After all members of your group have made their decision the following income screen 
will show you the total accumulated amount of ECU contributed by all four group 
members to the project (including your contribution). Also this screen shows you how 
many ECU you have earned at the first period. The income screen after the first period: 
 
 
 
Your income consists of two parts: 
1. the ECU which you have kept for yourself (“Income from ECU kept”)  
2. the “Income from the project”, which is calculated as follows: 
The accumulated amount put in the project by all four group members is multiplied by a 
factor of 1.6. The resulting amount is then equally distributed among the four group 
members. Thus, your income from the project is 0.4 times the sum of the contribution of 
all 4 group members to the project. 
 
Your income in ECU of a period is therefore: (20 - your contribution to the project) + 
0.4*(total contributions to the project).   
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The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this 
means that each group member receives the same income from the project. Suppose the 
sum of the contributions of all group members is 60 ECU. In this case each member of 
the group receives an income from the project of: 0.4*60 = 24 ECU. If the total 
contribution to the project is 9 ECU, then each member of the group receives an income 
of 0.4*9 = 3.6 ECU from the project. 
 
For each 1 ECU you keep for yourself you earn, of course, an income of 1 ECU. Instead, 
if you contributed this 1 ECU to the project, the total income of the group from the 
project would rise by 1.6 ECU. Since this amount is equally distributed among the group 
members, your income from would rise by 0.4*1 = 0.4 ECU. In addition, you earn an 
income for each ECU contributed by the other members to the project. For each 1 ECU 
contributed by any member you also earn 0.4*1 = 0.4 ECU. Your contribution to the 
project thus also raises the income of the other group members, and their contribution 
raises yours. 
 
Please remember: at the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select 
one period out of each sequence for payment. Therefore, every decision you make 
can determine your final payment with equal probability. 
 
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to 
view the income screen. If you are finished with it before the time is up, please press the 
continue button (again by using the mouse or pressing the Enter key).  
 
At the end of the first sequence of 10 periods you will be informed on the screen that the 
groups will be randomly re-matched and that you will be in a group with 3 new 
participants for the next 10 periods. You must press the O.K. button (either with the 
mouse, or by pressing the Enter - key) to confirm that you are aware of the new group 
composition. Once every participant pressed the O.K. button, the next 10 periods will 
start, in which your decision situation is equivalent to the first 10 periods.  
 
 
- Questionnaire - 
 
After the 20 periods you will be asked to fill in another short questionnaire. In the 
meantime your earnings will be counted. Please remain seated until the payment has 
taken place.  
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Instructions Individual Public Good Game – Norm Treatment 
 
Everything equal except for the last italic paragraph 
 
(…)  
 
At the end of the first sequence of 10 periods you will receive feedback on how much you 
contributed to the project relative to the average contribution to the project of all 
participants in the room. You have 45 seconds to view the feedback screen. If you are 
finished with it before the time is up, please press the continue button (again by using the 
mouse or pressing the Enter key).  
 
After that, you will be informed on the screen that the groups will be randomly re-
matched and that you will be in a group with 3 new participants for the next 10 periods. 
You must press the O.K. button (either with the mouse, or by pressing the Enter - key) to 
confirm that you are aware of the new group composition. Once every participant 
pressed the O.K. button, the next 10 periods will start, in which your decision situation is 
equivalent to the first 10 periods.  
 
At the end of the second sequence of 10 periods you will again receive feedback on how 
much you contributed to the project relative to the average contribution of all 
participants in the room. 
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Instructions Individual Public Good Game – Ranking Treatment 
 
Everything equal except for the last italic paragraph 
 
(…) 
 
At the end of the first sequence of 10 periods you will receive feedback on how much you 
contributed to the project relative to the average contribution to the project of all 
participants in the room. All group members will be ranked according to their 
contribution to the project. You will be informed about your ranking in your group and 
about your group name (a colour) on the screen.  
 
When your group is called up, you will be asked to put up the respective sign of your rank 
(which you find on your desk) on the wall of your cubicle such that and everybody in the 
room will see your relative position. You have time to view the ranking until the 
experimenter asks you to press the continue button (again by using the mouse or pressing 
the Enter key).  
 
After that, you will be informed on the screen that the groups will be randomly re-
matched and that you will be in a group with 3 new participants for the next 10 periods. 
You must press the O.K. button (either with the mouse, or by pressing the Enter - key) to 
confirm that you are aware of the new group composition. Once every participant 
pressed the O.K. button, the next 10 periods will start, in which your decision situation is 
equivalent to the first 10 periods.  
 
At the end of the second sequence of 10 periods you will again receive feedback on how 
much each of the other group members contributed to the project. All group members 
will be again ranked according to their contribution to the project and everybody in the 
room will again see your relative position. 
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Instructions Manager Public Good Game – Control Treatment 
 
 
 
Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics 
 
- Instructions - 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions state everything you 
need to know in order to participate in the experiment. If you have any questions, please 
raise your hand. One of the experimenters will approach you in order to answer your 
question. The rules are equal for all the participants. 
 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. 
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Turn 
off your mobile phone and put it in your bag. Also, you may only use the functions on the 
screen that are necessary for the functioning of the experiment. If you violate these rules, 
we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. Should you 
have any questions, please ask one of the experimenters.  
 
During the experiment we shall not speak of Euros but rather of ECU. During the 
experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in ECU. At the end of the experiment 
the total amount of ECU you have earned will be converted to Euros at the following 
rate:  
10  ECU = 3.00 Euro 
 
At the beginning of the experiment each participant receives 12 Euros (40 ECU) for 
participating and for filling in the questionnaires. At the end of the experiment your entire 
earnings from the experiment will be immediately paid to you in cash, without other 
participants being able to see how much you earned. Further instructions on this will 
follow. 
- Overview of the experiment - 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. For the first part you are asked to answer a short 
questionnaire and to read the text you find in the envelope on your desk. Please take your 
time to fill in this questionnaire accurately and to read the text carefully. After every 
participant answered the questionnaire, the second part of the experiment will start. 
 
The second part of the experiment is divided into different periods. In total, the second 
part of experiment consists of two sequences of 10 periods. In total, the second part of 
experiment consists of 20 periods, divided in two sequences of 10 periods. At the end of 
the experiment the computer will randomly select 1 period out of each sequence for 
payment. Therefore, every decision you make can determine your final payment 
with equal probability. 
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At the beginning of each sequence of 10 periods the participants are divided into groups 
of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants for one sequence of 10 
periods. After these 10 periods, the groups are randomly re-matched. In each sequence of 
10 periods your group will therefore consist of different participants. 
 
The following pages describe the course of the second part of the experiment in detail: 
 
 
- Detailed information on the second part of the experiment - 
 
You are the manager of a large company in the Netherlands, listed at the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. The decisions you make will affect the shareholders (the owners of the 
firm) and the stakeholders (everyone else affected by the firm) of your firm. You will be 
in this role in all periods of the experiment.  
 
In each sequence, each participant can decide over half of their 40 ECU. We call this 20 
(thousand) ECU the company budget. In each period, your task is to decide how to use 
this budget. You have to decide how many ECU you want to invest to a project and how 
much you invest in your firm. The consequences of your decision are explained in detail 
below. 
 
At the beginning of each period the following input-screen will appear: 
 
 
 
The number of the period appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top right 
corner you can see how many more seconds remain for you to decide on the investment 
of your company’s budget. You are asked to make this decision in 30 seconds. 
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Your company’s budget in each period is 20 thousand ECU. You have to decide how 
many ECU (in thousands) you want to contribute to the project by typing a number 
between 0 and 20 in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the 
mouse. As soon as you have decided how many ECU (in thousands) to invest in the 
project, you have also decided how many ECU (in thousands) you invest into your 
company: This is (20 thousand – your investment in the project) ECU. After entering 
your investment in the project you must press the O.K. button (either with the mouse, or 
by pressing the Enter - key). Once you have done this your decision can no longer be 
revised.  
 
After all members of your group have made their decision the following income screen 
will show you the total accumulated amount of ECU invested by all four group members 
to the project (including your investment). Also this screen shows you how many ECU 
you have earned as a manager. The income screen after the first period: 
 
 
 
Your bonus as a manager is 1 ECU per thousand ECU company income, which consists 
of two parts: 
1. the ECU which you have invested in your company (“Income from ECU 
invested”)  
2. the “Income from the project”, which is calculated as follows: 
The accumulated amount invested in the project by all 4 group members is multiplied 
with a factor of 1.6. The resulting amount is than equally distributed among the 4 group 
members. This is your company’s income from the project. Thus, your company’s 
income from the projects is 0.4 times the sum of contribution of all 4 group members to 
the project.  
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Your bonus in ECU of a period is therefore: 0.001*((20 thousand - your investment in the 
project) + 0.4*(the sum of contributions to the project)).   
 
The bonus of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this 
means that each group member receives the same bonus from the project. Suppose the 
sum of the investments of all group members is 6 thousand ECU. In this case each 
member of the group receives a bonus from the project of: 0.001*0.4*6 thousand = 24 
ECU. If the total investment in the project is 9 thousand ECU, then each member of the 
group receives a bonus of 0.001*0.4*9 thousand = 3.6 ECU from the project. 
 
For each thousand ECU you invest in your company you, of course, earn a bonus of 1 
ECU. Instead, if you invested these thousand ECU to the project, the total income of the 
group from the project would rise by 1.6 thousand ECU. Since this amount is equally 
distributed among the group members, your company’s income from the project would 
raise by 0.4*1=0.4 thousand ECU.  
 
In addition, you earn an bonus for each ECU invested by the other members to the project. 
For each ECU invested by any member you also earn 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. Your investment 
to the project thus also raises the bonus of the other group members, and their investment 
raises yours.  
 
Please remember: at the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select 1 
period out of each sequence for payment. Therefore, every decision you make can 
determine your final payment with equal probability. 
 
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to 
view the income screen. If you are finished with it before the time is up, please press the 
continue button (again by using the mouse or pressing the Enter key).  
 
At the end of the first sequence of 10 periods you will be asked to justify the decisions 
that you have made towards the shareholders (owners of your company) by writing a 
maximum of 5 sentences on the prepared sheet “A” of paper that you find on your desk. 
If you fail to do so, or the justification is considered insufficient (e.g. no real words are 
used) by the experimenter, you will be excluded from payments at the end of the 
experiment. If you are finished with writing your justification towards the shareholders 
(owners of your company), please press the continue button (again by using the mouse or 
pressing the Enter key).  
 
At the beginning of the next period you will be informed on the screen that the groups 
will be randomly re-matched and that you will be in a group with 3 new participants for 
the next 10 periods. You must press the O.K. button (either with the mouse, or by pressing 
the Enter - key) to confirm that you are aware of the new group composition. Once every 
participant pressed the O.K. button, the next 10 periods will start, in which your decision 
situation is equivalent to the first 10 periods.  
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At the end of the second sequence of 10 periods you will be asked to justify again the 
decisions that you have made towards the shareholders of your company, by writing 
again a maximum of 5 sentences on the prepared sheet “B” of paper that you find on your 
desk. 
 
 
 
Questionnaire - 
 
After the 20 periods you will be asked to fill in another short questionnaire. In the 
meantime your earnings will be counted. Please remain seated until the payment has 
taken place.  
 
 
Instructions Manager Public Good Game – Norm Treatment 
 
Everything equal except for the last italic paragraph 
 
(…) 
 
Afterwards, you will receive feedback on how much you contributed to the project 
relative to the average contribution of all participants in this session.  
 
You have 45 seconds to view the feedback screen. If you are finished with it before the 
time is up, please press the continue button (again by using the mouse or pressing the 
Enter key).  
 
After that, you will be informed on the screen that the groups will be randomly re-
matched and that you will be in a group with 3 new participants for the next 10 periods. 
You must press the O.K. button (either with the mouse, or by pressing the Enter - key) to 
confirm that you are aware of the new group composition. Once every participant 
pressed the O.K. button, the next 10 periods will start, in which your decision situation is 
equivalent to the first 10 periods.  
 
At the end of the second sequence of 10 periods you will be asked to justify again the 
decisions that you have made towards the shareholders (owners of your company) by 
writing again a maximum of 5 sentences on the prepared sheet “B” of paper that you find 
on your desk.  
 
At the end of the second sequence of 10 periods you will again receive feedback on how 
much you contributed to the project relative to the average contribution of all 
participants in this session. 
 
 
Project Report Sustainable Decision-Making  October 2013 
 178 
Instructions Manager Public Good Game – Ranking Treatment 
 
Everything equal except for the last italic paragraph 
 
(…) 
 
 
Afterwards you will receive feedback on how much each of the other group members 
invested to the project. All group members will be ranked according to their contribution 
to the project. You will be informed about your ranking in your group and about your 
group name (a colour) on the screen.  
 
When your group is called up, you will be asked to put up the respective sign of your rank 
(which you find on your desk) on the wall of your cubicle such that everybody in the room 
will see your relative position. You have time to view the ranking until the experimenter 
asks you to press the continue button (again by using the mouse or pressing the Enter 
key).  
 
After that, you will be informed on the screen that the groups will be randomly re-
matched and that you will be in a group with 3 new participants for the next 10 periods. 
You must press the O.K. button (either with the mouse, or by pressing the Enter - key) to 
confirm that you are aware of the new group composition. Once every participant 
pressed the O.K. button, the next 10 periods will start, in which your decision situation is 
equivalent to the first 10 periods.  
 
At the end of the second sequence of 10 periods you will be asked to justify again the 
decisions that you have made towards the shareholders of your company by writing again 
a maximum of 5 sentences on the prepared sheet “B” of paper that you find on your desk.  
 
At the end of the second sequence of 10 periods you will again receive feedback on how 
much each of the other group members invested to the project. All group members will be 
again ranked according to their contribution to the project and everybody in the room 
will again see your relative position. 
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Text Manager Priming
52
 
 
In this part of the experiment, you are asked to read an excerpt from the book The Risk 
Takers which describes ten entrepreneurial strategies for success. After that you will 
receive the instructions for the decision making part of this experiment  
 
Ten Entrepreneurial Strategies for Success 
by Renee & Don Martin 
 
Managers have many characteristics in common with one another, and the authors of 
“The Successful Manager” say that's no coincidence. Find out what ten traits managers 
share that contribute to their success. 
 
1. Trust Your Gut  
Successful managers know when to trust their gut. An expanding body of research from a 
number of fields -- including economics, neurology, and cognitive psychology -- 
confirms that intuition is a real form of knowledge. It's a skill you can develop and 
strengthen -- one that's particularly valuable in the most chaotic, fluid business 
environments, when you must make critical, high- pressure decisions at a moment's 
notice. At such times, intuition usually beats rational analysis. 
 
Trusting your instincts also emboldens you to carry out new, untested ideas and ventures, 
even when nobody else believes in them. It's about seeing the need for a product or new 
service and just knowing you can make it happen. You may not have the cash on hand to 
commission a market study or conduct a focus group, but you're still willing to stake your 
reputation and money on that idea. Why? Because that's what your gut tells you to do. 
 
2. Buck the Conventional Wisdom  
Ignore those who say, "It won't work" or "It's never been done that way." Our profiled 
managers succeeded in large part because they veered away from established formulas 
and ways of thinking. Don't just blindly accept the so-called best practices of your 
industry. Look at them with a hypercritical eye. Dissect them, slice and dice them, 
contemplate different what-if scenarios. Challenging convention can open the door to 
competitive advantage. 
 
3. Never Let Adversity or Failure Defeat You  
Don't accept the limits that others or circumstances place upon you. The ranks of 
successful managers are filled with men and women who refused to stop believing in 
themselves, despite the derision of others or heart-breaking failures in their past. As a 
                                               
52 The subsequent text is an adapted excerpt from the book “The Successful Manager”: 16 Women and Men 
Who Built Great Businesses Share Their Strategies For Success by Renee & Don Martin.  
http://www.businessknowhow.com/startup/entrepreneursuccess.htm 
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manager you'll undoubtedly experience stressful moments that will test your faith. Just 
remember, the antidotes are persistence and resiliency. 
 
4. Go on a Treasure Hunt and Find an Underserved Niche  
In the business world, there's nothing more exciting than finding an underserved niche 
representing a lucrative market that everyone else has failed to spot and target. That's like 
finding gold bullion at a crowded beach - it was there for everyone else to see, but you 
were the one who took notice of the golden glint in the sand.  
 
5. Spot a new Trend and Pounce  
Often, a shift in cultural or economic trends will create new entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Sometimes that shift arises from advances in technology. Many of our profiled managers 
recognized emerging consumer needs and desires that signalled new market 
opportunities. 
 
6. Hit 'Em Where They Ain't 
Casey Stengel, legendary manager of the New York Yankees, loved to tell the story of 
baseball great "Wee Willie" Keeler, who stood at just 5' 4'', weighed 140 pounds, and 
began a streak of eight seasons with two hundred or more hits. The Hall of Famer's bat 
was only thirty inches. Once a sports reporter asked him how such a small guy could get 
so many big hits. Willie replied, "Keep your eye clear, and hit 'em where they ain't -- 
that's all." The same holds true in the business world. Whenever possible, set your sights 
on areas that your competitors have neglected or ignored. 
 
7. Deliver value for your shareholders 
If you are managing a business, always remember that you have been hired to generate 
real value for your shareholders. If your gut is telling you a certain business idea is a 
winner that will create shareholder value, take action now. The "perfect" time for a 
launch will never present itself. More often than not, waiting just gives would-be 
competitors the opportunity to beat you to the punch. None of the managers we 
interviewed waited for a sign from heaven.  Nonetheless, they saw a market opportunity 
and grabbed it. 
 
8. Save Your Bucks and Get Noticed Without Expensive Advertising  
If your business is on a tight budget, there are plenty of ways to get customers' attention 
without spending money on advertising. Get your creative juices percolating and try 
something different. And when an opportunity arises to expose your brand to the masses, 
don't think twice -- jump right in. Use your own creativity to make your company stand 
out in a crowd. 
 
9. Exploit Your Competitor's Weakness and Make It Your Strength  
The sharpest managers have a knack for viewing the world from the perspective of their 
customers. That quality can help identify your competitors' vulnerabilities and 
shortcomings. If your number one competitor has a reputation for slow deliveries, for 
example, make certain your deliveries arrive in less time. Engage and listen to customers 
to identify such weaknesses. 
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10. Never Stop Reinventing Your Company  
You know the old adage "If it ain't broke, don't fix it"? The problem with that piece of 
advice is that it invites complacency - and complacency in business is like a slow leak in 
a tire. You may not notice the damage it's causing until the thing is completely flat and 
you can't move forward. Top-performing managers aren't afraid to take chances and keep 
expanding their product line. They're not afraid to give their business a major overhaul 
now and then to keep pace with changes in the marketplace. And sometimes a complete 
face-lift is in order. 
 
Believe that growth and opportunity for a nation's economy are inevitable. Look at the 
world through the eyes of a manager. Use your imagination to identify market 
opportunities that others have overlooked. Believe in the power of your ideas and just 
start the pursuit of your own managerial dream
1
. 
 
Now please take your time to answer these questions with max 2-3 sentences.  
 
Question 1: After you read about the 10 characteristics of successful managers, could you 
please give an example of a person who, in your opinion, possesses these qualities and 
does (did), as a result, manage a profitable business?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 2: In addition to this, can you think of at least one benefit of being a manager? 
You may want to connect your answer with the previous question – what do you think 
drives (drove) the person to manage the company the way he/she does (did)? 
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After you have answered these questions, you may proceed with the next part of the 
experiment.  
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Charity Information Text  
 
 
RENEWABLE WORLD 
 
Renewable World is an organization which aims at tackling poverty through renewable 
energy in poor, remote, off-grid communities where financial or geographical barriers 
prevent private sector solutions being effective. Currently, its program activities are 
focused on East Africa and South Asia. In East Africa, the strategy focuses on addressing 
the specific issues faced by poor people in the region, such as lack of basic infrastructure 
(roads, energy services, ITC services). The charity targets the most isolated and 
disadvantaged communities and tries to provide them with affordable renewable energy 
services. In South Asia, the focus of the charity is on Nepal, and more specifically on the 
poor people in the most mountainous part of the country. Since people there are 
influenced by the extreme geographical isolation and large climatic seasonal fluctuations, 
the charity aims at providing energy service infrastructure and the stimulation of 
renewable energy manufacturing and distribution facilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOLAR AID 
 
SolarAid is an organization that aims to relieve poverty in the sub-Sahara through 
facilitating the provision of solar energy to those who are in immediate need. It is a small 
charity with a big impact: the average household size in east Africa is five persons, so 
with more than 450,000 solar lights sold since 2012, their work has helped transform the 
lives of over two million people already. Solar energy can help people to power lamps 
and do away with expensive kerosene lamps. Families spend about 20% of their income 
on fuel for these lamps that emit a dangerous and poisonous smoke. Using solar-powered 
lamps means that people have significantly more money left for their immediate needs, 
that is, to buy the necessities of life such food and clean water and relief their current 
state of poverty. 
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AFRICA PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 
(in cooperation with Hivos) 
 
The Africa Biogas Partnership Program stimulates the building of biogas-installations in 
six African countries. The use of biogas reduces the emission of greenhouse gases, saves 
the woods, supplies durable energy and creates new opportunities for women. Besides the 
positive effect on the climate, the use of biogas installations also gives an economic 
impulse. Since the introduction of the installations in Kenya, Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania a whole new sector of biogas-entrepreneurs and masons 
originated. A biogas installation is not cheap. The smallest installation comes with a cost 
of €750 euro. The African Biogas Partnership Program subsidizes €300 and the rest has 
to be paid by the users themselves. That is why the program stimulates micro-credit 
institutions to invest in the biogas installations. The ambition of the program is to build 
50.000 biogas installations in the next four years.   
 
 
 
THE CLIMATE GROUP        
 
 
The Climate Group is an independent, not-for-profit organization working to catalyse 
leadership for a Clean Revolution: a low carbon future that is smarter, better and more 
prosperous. A low-carbon economy (LCE), low-fossil-fuel economy (LFFE), or 
decarbonised economy is an economy that has a minimal output of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions into the environment biosphere, but specifically refers to the 
greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. The Clean Revolution is a partnership of international 
statesmen and governments, business leaders and corporations, thinkers and opinion 
formers. A Clean Revolution will help avoiding the social, environmental and economic 
impacts of climate change. A massive up-scale of clean technologies will improve the 
efficiency and use of our natural resources; it will create jobs and it will boost economic 
growth. 
 
